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This dissertation is an ethnography of a contemporary ‘exodus’ of downwardly mobile 
middle-class millennials from Seoul, the political, cultural and economic center of South Korea, 
to Jeju Island, a semi-rural farming, fishing and tourism island south of the Korean peninsula. I 
argue that this mass relocation to Jeju constitutes what political theorists call ‘exodus’ – an 
engaged exit from the ‘rules of the game,’ and a positive remaking of social foundations from the 
ground up. ‘Exodus’ has been theorized in political philosophy, but there have been few 
empirical studies that analyze what it looks like on the ground – and the possibilities and 
limitations its spatial manifestations might afford. In this dissertation, I combine contemporary 
political theory with an anthropological approach to studying space/place to produce an 
empirical on-the-ground study of a contemporary movement of exodus in South Korea.  
Through fourteen months of ethnographic research, I have found that millennials’ 
contemporary encounters with Jeju Island have opened up the island as a space to build a 
politically engaged alternative sociality from the ground up. Millennials who move to Jeju 
redirect their creative labor – formerly tied up in precarious work in small and large companies 
in Seoul – to design new lives in Jeju that diverge sharply from the normative ideals of middle-
class life in South Korea. I contend that in Jeju millennial migrants remake kinship relations, 
create new forms of subjectivity, carve out new temporalities and narratives, and transform 
Jeju’s landscape through localized, material, and embodied engagement with the space/place of 
Jeju. Furthermore, this study also incorporates the perspectives of other players on the island – 
longtime Jeju residents, and the Jeju regional government – and in so doing charts the tensions 
and limitations that a politics of exodus affords.  
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In this dissertation, I contend that in making this unprecedented reverse movement from 
the city to the country, downwardly mobile middle-class millennials are not just relocating 
geographically, but they are acting in politically salient ways. They are not just leaving Seoul, 
but making an exit from dense classed social networks, powerful Korean conglomerates, 
neoliberal labor regimes, and a national legacy of state-led, future-oriented development in 
Korea. That the intensely neoliberal, competitive, and class-stratified environment of 
contemporary Seoul has provoked such a dramatic and sudden relocation of the younger 
generation makes this research in Korea a timely case study, as with tightening global 
competition and expansion of neoliberal policies around the world, this phenomenon is likely to 
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NOTE ON ROMANIZATION 
 
Romanization of Korean words in this dissertation follows the McCune-Reischauer system 
except when there was a widely accepted Romanization that differs (e.g., Jeju, Seoul), or in the 
case of well-known figures whose names have been commonly Romanized in the media and 
scholarly literature in a particular way (e.g., Park Chung Hee, Park Geun-hye), or when an 
individual has already selected a Romanization of his/her name that differs from the McCune-





In 2007, Suh Myung-sook began to uncover and mark existing country road that 
wandered through quaint, rural Jeju Island. With the help of her brother and a group of 
volunteers, Suh was creating what would become known as the Jeju Olle Trail – a set of walking 
trails traveling the perimeter of the island that allow travelers to experience the heretofore 
unknown scenery of rural Jeju. Jeju Island, Korea’s largest island, located 70 miles south of the 
peninsula, had for decades been a treasured domestic and increasingly international tourist 
destination in Korea. But sightseeing tours were generally limited to the regional cities and the 
well-developed tourist sites throughout the island. The Olle Trail was groundbreaking in that it 
opened up the everyday beauty and charm of Jeju Island to Koreans and to the world.  
 Suh was a native of Jeju Island who, like many of the ambitious young people of her 
generation, had left Jeju for Seoul to attend a prestigious university and then remained there to 
work. She worked in the journalism industry in Seoul for over two decades, gaining success as a 
political reporter and later editor in chief of a popular citizen journalism website. However, after 
23 years of work, Suh felt burned out, overworked and frustrated. In 2006, as a way to recharge 
from her exhausting career, she took a trip to Spain, where she spent 36 days walking the 
pilgrimage trail called the “Camino de Santiago” or the “Way of Saint James.” As she walked, 
she felt reinvigorated and inspired. Remembering her home island of Jeju, she determined to 
move back and create an even more beautiful walking trail there. She returned to Jeju the next 
year and began to make good on her dream, gaining the approval of the local government and 
help from a group of eager volunteers. The Olle Trail quickly began attracting visitors and then 
loyalists. In 2007 there were 3000 visitors to the trail and the number quickly rose to above 1 
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million by 2010, peaking at 1.2 million visitors in 2013. Numbers have fallen slightly since then, 
but the trail remains a very popular destination for travelers to the island.  
 The Olle Trail was remarkable for its success at fostering new encounters between a 
weary urban population and a previously underrecognized swathe of the Jeju countryside. Ten 
years after a serious economic crisis – what Koreans called the IMF Crisis of 1997 – with an 
economy and society that still hadn’t recovered, Koreans craved escape, rest and restoration. The 
expanding encounter between mainland Koreans and rural Jeju that the Olle Trail prompted also 
touched off an explosive migration of urbanites to Jeju Island. While between 2000 and 2009 the 
population of Jeju had been slowly growing at between 1000 to 4000 a year, in 2010 the growth 
in population shot up to about 8,500 people. By 2013, the yearly growth was well over 10,000 
people per year and by 2016 it peaked at over 17,000 people. From 2012 to 2017, Jeju Island had 
the highest percentage of increase in population of any region in South Korea.1 While some of 
these migrants were retirees who wanted to pursue a slower life against the backdrop of Jeju’s 
natural landscape, increasingly, those who migrated were from among a younger generation of 
millennials, specifically those who had come of age in post-IMF crisis South Korea, and who 
were part of a downwardly mobile middle class  
The study of this migration of millennials from urban areas on the mainland, mostly 
Seoul, the political, cultural, and economic center of South Korea to Jeju Island, a semi-rural 
farming, fishing, and tourism island of Korea’s southern coast, is the subject of this dissertation.  
In making an unprecedented reverse movement from the city to the country, downwardly-mobile 
middle class millennials were not just relocating geographically, but were acting in politically 
salient ways. They were not just leaving Seoul, but making an exit from dense classed social 
                                                 
1 KOSIS: Korean Statistical Information Service - http://kosis.kr/eng/ 
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networks, powerful Korean conglomerates, neoliberal labor regimes, and a national legacy of 
state-led, future-oriented development in Korea. Specifically, I argue that the encounter between 
a downwardly-mobile generation of young adults and the once marginalized rural spaces of Jeju 
Island precipitated what political theorists call ‘exodus’ – a politically-engaged exit from the 
“rules of the game” (Virno 1996), and a positive remaking of social foundations from the ground 
up. 
 Millennials who moved to Jeju redirected their creative labor – formerly tied up in 
precarious work in small and large companies in Seoul – to design new lives in Jeju that 
diverged sharply from the normative ideals of middle-class life in South Korea. In the chapters 
below, I detail the ways millennial migrants in Jeju remake kinship relations, create new forms 
of subjectivity, carve out new temporalities and narratives, and transform Jeju’s landscape 
through localized, material, and embodied engagement with the space/place of the island. In spite 
of the emancipatory spirit of these spatial remakings, however, this exodus was tempered by 
existing and overlapping designs on the space of Jeju Island. I also draw out the frictions, cracks 
and pitfalls in their place-making projects in the chapters that follow.  
 
Generation IMF: Downwardly Mobile Middle-Class Millennials 
The cohort of young adults that made the move to Jeju and on whom I focus in this 
dissertation went to college in the 1990s or early 2000s and came of age in the wake of a very 
particular moment: a financial crisis that has become known in South Korea as the IMF crisis. 
After many decades of impressive growth in the South Korean economy, the IMF crisis hit in 
South Korea in 1997. This economic crisis, tied to the larger Asian Financial Crisis, was caused 
by the limitations of a state-controlled economy in the context of a larger liberalizing global 
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market along with an unexpected withdrawal of short-term foreign hedge funds (Chang 1999; 
Nelson 2000; J. Song 2009). As a result, South Korea was forced to accept bail out money from 
the IMF and agree to restructure its economy. The immediate effects of the IMF crisis in South 
Korea were large-scale economic restructuring, the weakening and dismantling of some Korean 
conglomerates, flexibilization of labor, increased unemployment, and socioeconomic confusion 
(Abelmann 2003; Chang 2007; A. E. Kim 2004; B.-K. Kim 2000; S. Kim and Finch 2002; Lim 
and Jang 2006; Nelson 2000; K.-Y. Shin 2013). The IMF crisis was especially striking for the 
way it impacted the middle class in Korea – for the first time, there were mass layoffs of white 
collar workers and downward mobility of middle class families (Koo 2007; G.-S. Park 2004; G.-
W. Shin and Chang 2000; J. Song 2009; M. Yang 2017). While previous post-war generations 
had witnessed rapid growth in the national economy, a measured increase in social mobility, and 
an expansion of the middle class, the generation that I engage with came of age during a time of 
pronounced downward mobility of the middle class.  
This generation has been widely known as “Generation IMF,” the first group of college 
graduates to face the post-IMF job market  (Kang 2016, 34).  Throughout this dissertation, I 
gloss this generation as “millennials” after the Pew Research Center definition of millennials as 
those who have entered adulthood at the turn of the 21st century (“Millennials: Confident. 
Connected. Open to Change.” 2010). For these South Korean millennials, that designation also 
means they are part of what I called a “downwardly mobile middle class.” 
 Most of the young adult migrants that I came to know during my field research had been 
previously employed on a temporary or part-time basis in the creative industries by medium to 
large companies in Seoul or other urban areas. They worked as journalists, editors, screenwriters, 
after school teachers, designers, writers, artists, cultural workers, adjunct professors, and in other 
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artistic and cultural fields. Not many of these jobs were considered desirable by Korean 
standards because they were unstable and underpaid. The class of jobs that most of them had 
worked on the mainland fell under the Korean term pijŏnggyujik, which can be translated as 
“non-regular” or “temporary” positions, and were generally renewed yearly by contract.2  
Among my group of interlocutors, only about 30% of them had held permanent positions — 
either in the public or private sector — before moving to Jeju.  This was all in spite of the fact 
that 80% of them had degrees from four-year universities.  
The young adults who ended up moving to Jeju were largely members of an emergent 
class stratum in post-economic crisis South Korea. Scholars of class have pointed to a process of 
segmentation among the middle class in the globalizing era. Post-Fordist, neoliberalizing 
societies tend to see increasing variegation of the middle class (Dudley 1994; Heiman 2012; 
Liechty 2012; Zhang 2010). Anthropologists of the middle classes have unpacked the intra-class 
tensions between what some have termed the “old middle class,” which is tied to national 
economic plans, public sector professional-level jobs, and affordable state education, and the 
“new middle class,” which in the contemporary world most often takes the form of risk-taking 
entrepreneurs in high-growth start-up companies (Liechty 2012; Schielke 2012; Zhang 2010). As 
competition takes on global proportions, the old middle class is subsumed by the new middle 
class as those who cannot be competitive in the free market fail to hold their own against new 
and shifting global standards.  
The middle class in South Korea has undergone intra-class segmentation in recent 
decades. The “old middle class” was built and expanded in Korea during the decades of rapid 
                                                 
2 There is a vast literature in Korean Studies on the casualization of labor after the IMF Crisis and its deep economic, 
sociological, political, and cultural effects. See Chang 2007; Ha and Lee 2001; Y. Lee 2015; Lim and Jang 2006; A. 
E. Kim and Park 2006; Koo 2007; K.-Y. Shin 2013; M. Yang 2017. 
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economic growth in the 1970s, 1980s and first half of the 1990s, when state-led economic plans 
propped up the founding and growth of Korean chaebŏls, family-owned conglomerates that fast-
tracked South Korea into industrial production and created large swaths of factory and white 
collar jobs. There was expansion of educational advancement and visible increases in 
conspicuous consumption during this time (Abelmann 2003; Nelson 2000).  
However, the middle class began to undergo shifts after the IMF Crisis. The 
government’s response to the economic crisis was to aggressively promote economic 
globalization and to encourage restructuring of corporations to make them leaner and more 
flexible in riding out economic shifts. Stable middle-class employment was whittled down at 
both ends of the life course as large companies had to downsize to cut their losses as well as 
restructure to make themselves more competitive on the global market. Company men who had 
worked in stable jobs at large companies their whole lives were being forced to retire early, often 
as early as their late 40s. At the same time, there was a growing number of unemployed and 
underemployed young college graduates as regular positions in corporations dwindled in number 
and the competition for being hired at those that remained intensified (Cho 2015). As the 
structure of the “old middle class” deteriorated, a “new middle class” emerged in its place. The 
“new middle class” in Korea is characterized by venture capitalism and start-ups, and the 
socialization of individuals who take on the risk that used to be covered by state-backed 
conglomerates.  
The young adults I encountered in Jeju were caught up in these times of structural 
transformation. They were solidly middle class by measures that, unfortunately for them, seemed 
too quickly to become outdated. Pursuing the traditional educational route of middle-class young 
adults, most of them had received four-year degrees from a range of different educational 
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institutions in South Korea, although few of them had graduated from elite universities in Korea. 
A four-year degree would have guaranteed a comfortable middle-class future in past generations. 
However, in the climate of global competition that has become increasingly severe in South 
Korea since the 1990s, the requirements for stable middle class jobs have become more stringent 
and these young people were unable to compete with those of higher educational caliber and 
class privilege to get the shrinking number of professional and managerial jobs that would allow 
them to stay solidly in the traditional middle class. They are also unable to compete in the race to 
jump into new start-up ventures or to qualify to work for expanding multinational companies. In 
short, at best, they could be described as “middling” — middle class in terms of their origins, 
their parents’ class status and their education—but suddenly in danger of downward mobility 
because of their inability to get secure professional jobs. 
 
The Affect of Downward Mobility and “Healing” 
 In post-IMF South Korea, among those in the millennial generation, the shared 
experience of being downwardly mobile produced particular kinds of affects and discourses. 
Among my interlocuters there was much of talk of disappointment, despair, lack of a sense of 
future, and markedly, a discourse of “woundedness.” Young people that I met in Jeju often 
talked about the physical wounds of overly competitive life in Seoul: declining health, sensitivity 
to bad air, untreated and sometimes even unnoticed illness, fatigue, and an inability to rest. They 
also talked about psychological suffering they experienced because of bad treatment in 
workplaces, cutthroat competition, and the constant comparison game they were always having 
to play with their friends, family members and associates. These descriptions of suffering were 
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part of a larger discourse in Korea that centered around the paired experiences of being 
“wounded” (sangch'ŏ padasŏ) and the antidote of “healing” (hilling).  
The transliterated English word “healing” (hilling) came into use in Korean public 
discourse in the early 2000s and reached wide usage by 2007. It was influenced by Japanese 
uptake of a concept of psychological and spiritual ‘healing’ inspired by western New Age trends 
(J. K. Park 2016; Yoon 2014). The concept of “healing” as it took shape in Korea indexed a 
specific restoration that was necessary because of the psychological or emotional “wounds” that 
came from a society of excessive competition. Jin Kyu Park (2016) characterizes the 
woundedness of this discourse as “’social wounds,’ ie the wounds caused by social and structural 
problems” (383). Although this suffering was largely presented as a universal and generalized 
pain that anyone could experience, the idea of woundedness resonated especially well among the 
millennial generation who faced stiff competition in successive contests of life: preparing for and 
taking the college entrance exam, acquiring a regular job, surviving the brutal workplace, saving 
up enough money for retirement, getting their kids into the best schools. Those who were “in 
pain” because of the trials of competitive Korean life, who felt frustration, anxiety and a sense of 
failure, were encouraged to find sources of “healing.”  “Healing” was the provision of comfort, 
encouragement, sympathy, rest, and relaxation as solace and restoration for these wounds of 
modern life. 
Although the “wounds” that were described were social and structural in their causes, the 
solution that came about in the form of “healing” was depoliticized and quickly commodified. 
After 2008, there was a proliferation of experiences and products that were marketed as having 
“healing” properties: healing food, healing camp, healing music, healing music festival, healing 
spa, etc. Numerous self-help books were published with “healing” in their titles. A popular TV 
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talk show called “Healing Camp” aired in 2011, which generated and popularized a new genre of 
healing talk. Famous Korean celebrities came onto the show to talk through their problems and 
received comfort and encouragement from the show’s hosts. In 2012, Haemin Sunim, a Korean 
Buddhist monk who had studied at prestigious schools in the US and taught Asian religions at 
Hampshire College in Massachusetts for several years, published a book called Things You Can 
Only See When You Pause, which remained a bestseller in Korea for almost a year after its 
publication. Haemin Sunim had gained fame through social media, offering advice for daily 
living through his Twitter and facebook accounts. The book was a compilation of his bite-sized 
words of comfort and encouragement for those in the daily grind. While it delivered some 
Buddhist teachings, the book also offered practical advice for people in distress and in need of 
care. Haemin Sunim came to be known as South Korea’s “healing mentor.”  
Haemin Sunim’s book popularized the idea of “pausing” or taking a break from the fast 
flow of modern life. He encouraged people to take breaks through meditation, self-care, spending 
time alone, and encounter with ecological spaces (2012). While producers of the healing 
discourse in Korea have been criticized for depoliticizing and individualizing structural 
problems, and encouraging people to endure rather than overturn the status quo, Park (2016) 
argues that popularizing the idea of a pause or a break introduced the possibility of discontinuity, 
of removing oneself, even temporarily, from the constant project of neoliberal self-improvement, 
forward-moving progress, and professional and social achievement. Indeed, the idea of taking a 
break not as a way to recharge for more back-breaking labor but in order to reconsider life and 
perhaps make changes took hold among Korean young people in the post-2008 years. Hyun Mee 
Kim (2016) writes about millennials who spent time – either for short periods or for longer 
multiple years stints – living in city Buddhist temples in Seoul. She argues that these experiences 
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provided millennials with opportunities to take a break from familial and social pressures, labor-
intensive work places, and the intensity of materialism and consumerism. She called this practice 
a “social moratorium” and argued that it created “resistant, alternative, and subversive solutions 
to life’s problems.”   
The Olle Trail’s founder Suh Myung-sook was doubtless influenced by the discourse of 
healing when she took her trip to the Camino de Santiago and subsequently created a sister trail 
on Jeju Island. She writes in the Prologue of her 2008 book Jeju Olle Travel, which helped to 
popularize the trail, “I want you to look into the inner life of Jeju as you walk the Olle Trail. 
Then the Olle Trail can heal your wounded heart, and in an instant you can escape the steep pace 
of life and, even if just for a moment, be transformed from a workaholic to a kansedari ( 
translated as ‘horse’s leg’; a colloquial Jejuan phrase that means a ‘slow and lazy person’)” 
(2008). Suh urged Koreans to look critically on their present lives and to take time away, in the 
transformative environment of Jeju Island, to pause, heal, and reflect. It was part of a larger post-
IMF movement towards an initial break from the flow of neoliberal life in Korea.   
While the discourse of healing didn’t lead to structural change, it did at least identify a 
shared affect among downwardly mobile millennials and point to woundedness as a structural 
rather a personal problem. However, as we shall see, the first group of young people who 
decided to relocate to Jeju did so not to make a politicized statement about neoliberal Seoul, but 
rather out of a strong desire to hide away and lick their wounds after fighting a losing battle of 
middle class achievement in Seoul. Lacking spatial alternatives in the city and having been 
exposed to Jeju through the Olle Trail, it was often because they were touched off by the most 
recent lost job, broken relationship, illness or bout of fatigue that they decided to give up on life 
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in Seoul and, desperately and without a plan, relocate to Jeju. For this early group, their 
migration more a dejected slinking away and less a triumphant exit.  
 
Space/Place of Jeju Island 
 This dissertation is an ethnography of a contemporary exodus of downwardly-mobile 
middle class millennials from Seoul and other urban areas on the mainland to Jeju Island. It 
examines millennials and their encounters with the island by drawing on several analytic themes. 
In the section below, I lean on Lefebvre’s conception of the production of space and Virno’s idea 
of engaged exodus to spell out a core argument about millennial migrants’ spatial engagements 
with the space of Jeju Island. Later, I outline a theme of alternative capitalism that I develop in 
the dissertation. And finally, I go on to review the literature on important theoretical approaches 
that run through the dissertation: exodus, place-making, and immaterial labor.   
 As outlined above, the early group of millennial migrants relocated to Jeju largely in 
response to wounds of urban life. When they came to Jeju, however, they encountered an 
availability of space that they hadn’t known before. Housing was shockingly affordable. And the 
Jeju landscape opened up before them with a kind of beauty that startled and beckoned them. As 
I will explain in the next chapter, Jeju Island had been through a particularly troubled history that 
left a gulf between it and the mainland, but also between the rural areas and the cities and resort 
areas of the island. The Jeju countryside that millennials encountered when they walked the Olle 
trails was a dispossessed countryside that was far behind the development of mainland urban 
areas – or even rural areas on the mainland. In these rural towns some of these downwardly 
mobile millennials saw affordability and possibilities for a new life.   
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 In Seoul, the struggles and pains of these millennials had often manifested themselves in 
feelings of immobility and suffocation because they lacked spaces of their own. Without regular, 
full-time employment, they couldn’t afford to put down payments on apartments in the city and 
so were stuck in their parents’ homes or cheap and often very tiny rental housing. On the other 
hand, in Jeju they found space that was available to them, both materially in the sense that there 
were homes that they could affordably inhabit and also symbolically in the sense that they could 
give meaning to the spaces they inhabited and worked and played in, instead of being determined 
by them.  
French theorist Henri Lefebvre has written about the fundamentally social aspect of 
space. He makes the case that “(Social) space is a (social) product” (Lefebvre 1991). Space 
cannot be separated from social reality but is produced by society. Lefebvre broke down the 
production of space into three interconnected dimensions: “spatial practice” or the material 
foundations of a space, “representations of space” or “conceptualized space, the space of 
scientists, planners, urbanists, technocratic subdividers and social engineers” and 
“representational spaces” or “spaces as directly lived through its associated images and symbols, 
and hence the space of ‘inhabitants’ and ‘users’” (1991, 38-39) Space, then, was always in the 
process of being made materially, conceptually by planners, and symbolically by the 
‘inhabitants’ or ‘users’ of the space.  
Because space was a social product, Lefebvre stressed that every society necessarily 
produced a space of its own. Class struggles inherent to capitalism, had to be “inscribed in 
space” in order to have any effect. “Change life!' 'Change society!' These precepts mean nothing 
without the production of an appropriate space” (1991, 59). Lefebvre contended that any new 
and emergent ‘social existence’ that set itself apart from dominant social space required the 
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production of “its own space.” Lefebvre wrote, “Any ‘social existence’ aspiring or claiming to be 
‘real’ but failing to produce its own space, would be a strange entity, a very peculiar kind of 
abstraction unable to escape from the ideological or even the ‘cultural’ realm. It would fall to the 
level of folklore and sooner or later disappear altogether, thereby immediately losing its identity, 
its denomination and its feeble degree of reality” (1991, 53). Without producing a space, then, a 
new social existence or new sense of class consciousness would fade from “reality” and lose its 
potential to “change life” and “change society” and to exist in contradistinction to dominant 
forms.  
Drawing from Lefebvre here, I argue that the downwardly mobile middle-class stratum of 
millennials had produced a shared affect and shared identity in the years following the IMF crisis 
in Korea. And yet without a space of their own, this affect didn’t produce any social or political 
change in society. In Seoul, these young people had no leverage to break away from the 
mainstream and live lives that pushed against the totalizing neoliberal system. However, with the 
opportunity to relocate to Jeju and produce a space of their own, this group was able to build a 
new ‘social existence’ anchored in their shared experience as downwardly mobile middle-class 
subjects. This was a social existence that did not have to be defined by neoliberal Seoul – 
particularly by the standards of middle-class existence that found them lacking. Through a 
material and symbolic production of space on Jeju, downwardly mobile millennial migrants from 
Seoul were able to build alternative lives and a new social existence. This social existence in 
effect threw away the benchmarks of middle classness laid out for them and celebrated 
alternatives grounded in place in Jeju.  
Through a production of alternatives located in place in Jeju, migrants were able to bring 
about what Italian political philosopher Paolo Virno has called “exodus” (1996). Virno defined 
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his concept of exodus in this way: “Exodus is the foundation of a Republic.  . . . The political 
action of the Exodus consists, therefore, in an engaged withdrawal. Only those who open a way 
of exit for themselves can do the founding; but, by the opposite token, only those who do the 
founding will succeed in finding the parting of the waters by which they will be able to leave 
Egypt” (1996, 196). For Virno, exodus was not “engaged” without involving the founding of 
alternative political and social structures. The founding of an alternative community and 
alternative modes of being was part and parcel of the exit. Virno wrote, “The conflict is engaged 
starting from what we have constituted through fleeing in order to defend social relations and 
new forms of life out of which we are already making experience. To the ancient idea of fleeing 
in order to better attack is added the certainty that the flight will be all the more effective if one 
has something else to lose besides one's own chains” (2005, 20, emphasis in original). Virno 
made the crucial point that flight only had sticking power and potential to impact the social and 
political structures of society if it was paired with the creation of alternative “social relations and 
new forms of life.” Once there were alternatives to defend, an exodus could have 
counterhegemonic power.  
Taking a cue from Virno, I contend that migrants’ encounter with the built environment 
and landscape of Jeju Island and their subsequent founding of social alternatives on the island 
was crucial in constituting an engaged exodus from Seoul. As the infrastructure of an alternative 
life – living spaces that rejected a reproduction of middle classness, new and impassioned forms 
of labor, looser forms of society, new affective relationships with the landscape – was 
constructed on Jeju, migration to Jeju became more and more a positive, alternative, celebrated 
choice. Before these alternatives were firmly laid out in Jeju, migration to Jeju was a dispersed 
movement, sometimes shrouded in shame and secrecy. It was more about running away than it 
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was about establishing something new and better. However, with the production of new spaces, 
relocation to Jeju transformed from the dejected slinking away of the early years of the 
migration, to something desired, chosen, and celebrated. In a few years’ time, the dominant 
narrative of millennial migrants changed from “I moved to Jeju because I was in pain,” to “I 
moved to Jeju because I love Jeju.”. Through an engagement with place on Jeju, the migration to 
Jeju transformed from an effort to hide away and lick one’s wounds to a clear positive choice 
and alternative pathway.  
Although migrants did not construct alternative political structures as Virno might have 
envisioned, I emphasize the revolutionary character of the social alternatives that they set up in 
place in Jeju and the creation of counterhegemonic stances in South Korean society. In removing 
themselves from professional employment, from classed social networks, from normative 
middle-class consumption, and even from the expectations of their natal families, migrants were 
pushing back against everything they had grown up with. The rejection of the social fabric of 
middle-class Korean life was perhaps the most shocking aspect of their migration. These young 
adults had spent their weekdays laboring for big companies and many weekends of their adult 
lives in events thoroughly embedded in tight familial, collegial and alumni networks. To walk 
out on all of this for a life in which they knew no one and had no means of making a professional 
living was a bold and dramatic life choice. That young adults were making this choice en masse 
was a pronounced statement of rejection of the Seoul system. It was engaged exodus.   
 
Alternative Capitalism, Not Alternative to Capitalism 
 Even though this engaged exodus took migrants away from the heart of neoliberal Korea 
and the stream of middle classness that they had found oppressive, it didn’t take them away from 
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the production and consumption involved in capitalist life. While they withdrew themselves from 
the production of a state and chaebol driven economy, from middle class, status-driven 
consumption, and even from dense social networks and family units that had often become 
sources of competition and exploitation, they couldn’t remove themselves completely from 
global capitalism.  
Instead of selling their labor to big corporations in the cultural industries in Seoul, 
migrants applied their labor to the production of alternative forms of life in Jeju that they then 
marketed and sold to other millennials who were eager to leave Seoul. Many migrants who 
moved to Jeju became involved in crafting, structuring, and narrativizing their alternative 
experience in Jeju for others like them who were “stuck” back in Seoul. This was a way to 
support themselves apart from the chaebol-driven cultural industry that they had left behind in 
Seoul. A new small-scale travel industry blossomed as migrants created guesthouses for travelers 
to stay, cafes for them sit, slow down, reflect and enjoy the natural Jeju landscape, and various 
modes of engaging in intimate ways with the Jeju landscape (See Chapters 2 and 3). This kind of 
labor drew inspiration from the new material, embodied and affective connections that migrants 
had formed with the built environment and landscape of Jeju, and created new infrastructures, 
experiences, and stories that guided others like them to encounter similar kinds of 
transformations and emancipatory effects.  
 On the one hand, this alternative production helped to engender an engaged exodus from 
Seoul, filling out and popularizing a new alternative social existence located in place in Jeju. 
However, on the other hand, this alternative production was still enmeshed in capitalist markets 
and thus was both at risk of edging out other existing modes of production and of being pulled 
back into state and chaebol-driven plans of neoliberal capitalist production.  
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Ultimately, I argue that this alternative social existence, this exodus from the heart of 
neoliberal Korea, was tenuous and limited, although not lacking in emancipatory power. The 
exodus I describe here could never be a complete exit from neoliberal Korea or a neoliberal 
world. Once they crafted these alternative modes of life, migrants found themselves marketing 
and selling them to others as a way to support themselves, falling into the capitalist logics of 
monetization and profitable production, which had negative impacts on existing groups on the 
island and also made them vulnerable to cooption by larger neoliberal forces. Even while they 
couldn’t make an exodus from capitalism, though, I argue that this infrastructure that they built 
and marketed was, crucially, an alternative, competing mode of capitalism (Luvaas 2012). I 
argue that the alternative infrastructure that they set up on Jeju, while not existing outside of 
neoliberal capitalism, was successful in gesturing to values beyond it, and had potential to 
transform it from within. 
 
Exodus 
 In the following sections, I move through a literature review of key analytical themes in 
the dissertation. I discuss exodus here and move on to outline place-making and immaterial labor 
in subsequent sections.    
Paolo Virno and David Graeber, among others, have written about projects of retreat that 
are in some sense counter to the state. Paolo Virno, an autonomous Marxist philosopher, has 
advocated for what he has called “exodus” or “engaged withdrawal,” as opposed to a full-fledged 
battle against the injustices of the state in post-Fordist regimes. As stated earlier, Virno classifies 
this exodus not as passivity or a mere defensive strategy, but as fundamentally active in nature. 
He said, “Radical Disobedience involves, therefore, a complex ensemble of positive actions. It is 
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not a resentful omission, but a committed undertaking” (1996, 199). For Virno the construction 
of new alternatives was just as important as the refusal of and retreat from the existing 
conditions. This focus on the creating new alternatives was an important part of the broader 
autonomous Marxist school of thought and the Italian workerist movements which inspired it. 
Gill and Pratt describe “autonomists’ emphasis on the positive, constructive aspects of refusal, 
and on a kind of politics which is not only designed to change the future, but also, in its very 
practice, to bring into existence new ways of being, living and relating” (2008, 6). 
 David Graeber picked up on this strand of thinking in elucidating his concept of 
“counterpower” or “a collection of social institutions set in opposition to the state and capital: 
from self-governing communities to radical labor unions to popular militias” (2004, 24). In 
elaborating his theory of counterpower, Graeber lands on examples of Virno’s “engaged 
withdrawal” that have existed in the historical record: “They have not involved challenging 
power head on . . . but from one or another strategy of slipping away from its grasp, from flight, 
desertion, the founding of new communities” (Graeber 2004, 61). Graeber gives the example of 
the Tsimihety, an ethnic group in modern-day Madagascar who can trace their roots to an 
“engaged” political project to live free of the domination of the ruling state – the Sakalava. 
Tsimihety wished to live free from the hierarchy and status markers that infused every aspect of 
Sakalava life, and so escaped to the hills of northwest Madagascar to live based on a radical 
egalitarian social arrangement. Peter Wilson’s (1992) ethnography of the Tsimihety describes the 
everyday social activities that make up this political exodus.  
Other historical and anthropological examples of these politically engaged movements of 
exodus from domains of oppressive state and capitalist structures have been recorded. The 
historical and cross-cultural literature on intentional communities and back to the land 
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movements describes the often political or religiously engaged nature of these migrations (S. L. 
Brown 2002; D. Brown 2011; Christensen and Levinson 2003; Conkin 1959; Daloz 2016; Earle 
and Simonelli 2005; Gould 2005; Hicks 2001; Meltzer 2005; Metcalf 2004; T. Miller 1998, 
1999; Sanford 2017; Sargisson and Sargent 2004; Spiro 1956).       
However, what these theoretical and empirical accounts have often left out is the spatial 
dynamics of these movements of engaged withdrawal. Flight, exodus, desertion, all imply a 
spatial relocation, a spatial remaking of communities. And yet, many of the more theoretical 
discussions don’t address the complexity of a spatial remaking on the ground – both the 
freedoms and openings that are afforded as people relocate to new spaces, but also limitations as 
they have to contend with as they encounter other communities and projects already in place. 
Through my research on millennial migrants to Jeju Island, I have found that the ossified spatial 
reality of Seoul had boxed downwardly mobile millennials in – limited their ability to move 
beyond a prescribed middle-class lifestyle which they could no longer pretend to be part of. A 
move to Jeju prompted an expansion of options and possibilities for living. Millennials could 
now live in ways that they couldn’t have imagined in Seoul – as individuals apart from 
oppressive social networks, in leisure rather than at work, and in new modes of relationships 
with other migrants. On the other hand, upon relocation to Jeju, millennial migrants were met 
with a host of other spatial projects that they had to contend with in their everyday lives. Their 
project of exodus faced limitations and new challenges in place in Jeju. I engage with the 
literature on exodus broadly by asking how projects of alternative living are tempered by the 





Place-making: Everyday Space, Landscape, Chronotope  
 My approach to place-making focuses on the everyday practices and lived experiences 
that constitute places. To this end, I use three different modes of analysis in this dissertation to 
get at different aspects of millennial migrants’ production of spaces: analysis of “everyday 
spaces”, landscape, and chronotope. 
First I draw from Chase, Crawford and Kaliski’s (2008) conception of “everyday 
urbanism” in my analysis of the small-scale semi-public infrastructure that millennial migrants 
crafted in Jeju. Although the scholarship of this group of urban planners has focused on bigger 
urban areas like LA and New York City, the principles apply to any space that is being remade 
through everyday lived experience. In their analysis, Chase, Crawford, and Kaliski analyze 
“everyday space” as public spaces that are separate from carefully designed and planned public 
spaces, spaces that are often seen as trivial, repetitive, unappealing and often invisible to many. 
Crawford (2008a) describes as an example the way “Southern California’s banal, incoherent, and 
repetitive landscape of roads is lined with endless strip malls, supermarkets, auto-repair facilities, 
fast-food outlets, and vacant lots that defeat any conceptual or physical order” (26). In Jeju, the 
everyday spaces that migrants came upon, resided in, repurposed and resignified – rural spaces 
that had fallen into disrepair and disuse – were important sites of small-scale social remaking. 
The concept of everyday urbanism pushes against the impulse to undo the spatial totality of 
capitalist society. Rather, these scholars contend that there are no singular, universal, or even 
united responses that can scale back the growing abstract space of capitalism. Rather, as 
Crawford (2008b) argues, “Our solutions are modest and small in scale – micro-utopias, perhaps, 
contained in a sidewalk, a bus bench, or a minipark” (10). Everyday urbanism is a fragmentary 
and accretional approach to transformation. The idea is that small re-structurings of everyday life 
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can accumulate to break down and challenge imposing hierarchies and structures in localized 
ways that contribute to a micropolitical struggle against the status quo.  
Secondly, I take up landscape as a unit of analysis to unpack the impact that millennial 
migrants have had on Jeju Island. Landscape as an analytic is useful for understanding this 
transformation in place because it invites a multiplicity of perspectives at different scales with 
different relationships that together constitute a contemporary place.  And unlike the spatial 
analysis of neoliberal globalization, which assumes a teleological takeover of local spaces in the 
interest of capital, landscape as a conceptual tool leaves space and place radically contingent, 
open, and always in the process of becoming (Bender and Winer 2001; Feld and Basso 1996; 
Hirsch and O’Hanlon 1995; Tilley and Cameron-Daum 2017). Furthermore, new theoretical 
work on landscape incorporates the perspective of those in motion along with those who are 
rooted in place in the constitution of landscapes. I look at the contemporary Jeju landscape as 
something that is created “in movement” (Bender 2001) – through the movement of different 
perspectives that see, walk through, feel, make, remake and consume it, and through the overlap 
and contestation of these perspectives. In this way, I am able to contextualize millennial 
migrants’ role in the creation of the Jeju landscape among a range of other actors and projects – 
both historically and in the contemporary moment.  
In thinking through landscape, I also draw out the contradictory character of middle-class 
migrants, whose spatial projects are often caught between the development plans of the 
neoliberal government and investors and the communities of longtime locals.  This contestation 
and cooperation between different spatial projects makes the contemporary Jeju landscape, rather 
than any pre-set formula for neoliberal space-making. Place-making is localized and contingent, 
even as it increasingly is made “in motion.”   
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And finally, I use chronotope in this dissertation to build on analysis of place-making in 
everyday spaces and landscape. Chronotope, which literally means “time-space” is a concept that 
linguistic anthropologists have used to think about the ways in which temporality, places, and 
figures of personhood are inherently interconnected in narrative and other cultural forms. When 
migrants talked about their newfound connection with the Jeju landscape, I contend, they were 
also talking about temporality and new forms of personhood. Conceptually, chronotope is also 
helpful in elucidating how, through cross-chronotopic alignment and contrast, narratives that 
people tell have real world implications. Through chronotopic analysis of what I call the “Jeju 
migration narrative” – stories that migrants told about their migration – I tease out the way that 
millennial migrants narrate their experience of transformation vis-à-vis the Jeju landscape. In the 
chronotopic narratives that my interlocutors told, the temporalities, embodiments, and 
subjectivities that encounters with the Jeju landscape provoked were bundled together, became 
routinized and circulated as a cultural product that others could take up and take inspiration from. 
I stress how through the circulation of these stories, young Seoulites were recruited to identify 
and live out these stories themselves. In this way, these stories had real effects in the social world 
of South Korea, effectively widening the path of exodus from Seoul.  
 
Immaterial Labor and Materiality   
 This dissertation also draws from literature on the potentialities for social transformation 
and new modes of politics that immaterial labor in the post-Fordist era holds. Hardt and Negri 
define immaterial labor as “labor that creates immaterial products, such as knowledge, 
information, communication, a relationship, or an emotional response” (2004, 108). In 
postindustrial economies, especially in the context of neoliberal structural adjustments like the 
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one South Korea experienced at the turn of the millennium, there is often an increase in the 
proportion of labor that is “immaterial” as the push towards competitiveness on the global 
market increasing means development of the knowledge, information and cultural industries. 
Immaterial labor, according to Hardt and Negri (2000; 2004) and Lazzarato (1996), was 
revolutionary for the way that it changed the conception of work. By incorporating the 
subjectivity and personality of the worker along with cooperative social relations in the 
production of value, there was little distinction between work and leisure and between labor and 
society. Negri called new era of production the “factory without walls” (1989). On the one hand, 
the rise of immaterial labor has opened up the modern worker to new forms of exploitation. 
Lazzarato writes, “Precariousness, hyperexploitation, mobility, and hierarchy are the most 
obvious characteristics of metropolitan immaterial labor.” (1996, 137). Jobs in the immaterial 
economy are unstable, pay is low, teams are repeatedly assembled and then dismantled for short-
term projects, and long hours and passionate devotion are expected. Because there are no longer 
boundaries between work and leisure, it is as if “the whole society is placed at the disposal of 
profit” (Negri 1989, 79).  
 On the other hand, however, even within this environment of precarity, instability and 
exploitation, autonomist Marxists stress the potentialities for social transformation that 
immaterial labor brings. Precisely because immaterial labor exploits cooperation and 
communication between workers more than ever before, it fosters relationships and 
commonalities that can give rise to new socialities that have the potential to push against 
capitalist structures. Hardt and Negri write: “Producing communication, affective relationships, 
and knowledges, in contrast to cars and typewriters can directly expand the realm of what we 
share in common . . . This becoming common, which tends to reduce the qualitative divisions 
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within labor, is the biopolitical condition of the multitude.” (2004, 114). The “multitude” is the 
base for Hardt and Negri’s hope for new forms of politics that aim for transformation and 
liberation. The multitude is the collective subject that will transform society from below. It is the 
affective and collaborative aspects of immaterial labor that unwittingly pave the way for the 
creation of new socialities that have emancipatory and democratic potential.  
 Many millennial migrants who relocated from the mainland to Jeju were what these 
scholars would call “immaterial” workers. They had worked for the large cultural industries in 
Seoul, often living lives marked by the “precariousness, hyperexploitation, mobility, and 
hierarchy” (1996, 137) that Lazzarato describes. They were employed on short-term contracts, 
underpaid, had to travel all around the city for work, and were often disrespected and looked 
down upon by their employers and by wider society. However, as I stress throughout my 
dissertation, upon their relocation to Jeju, many of these former workers in the culture industries 
were able to recapture their own immaterial labor, bending it to the aims of building of new 
social formations and forms of life in Jeju and in the process remaking themselves.  
 Under the right circumstances, the immaterial labor of these young people was indeed 
harnessed to work against systems in place to create new commonalities that gestured to a world 
beyond neoliberal Korea. My dissertation adds to conversations about immaterial labor, 
however, by arguing that the materiality of place can have an important role in this process of the 
transformation of immaterial labor for emancipatory ends. As I argue throughout the dissertation, 
the availability of affordable places and emancipatory spaces on Jeju island was the original 
impetus for drawing millennials away from their soul-crushing labor in the cultural industries in 
Seoul. The materiality of Jeju as well as the embodied and affective connections that they created 
with Jeju inspired the alternative immaterial production that led to the creation of alternative 
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forms of life and sociality. I stress the crucial mediating function of materiality in the production 
of these emancipatory forms.     
 
Methodology 
 This project is an ethnography of the contemporary migration of millennials to Jeju 
Island, their place-making projects, and their impact on the island at large. Field research 
consisted of two pre-dissertation research trips to Jeju in the summers of 2013 and 2014 and 14 
months of field research conducted between March 2015 and August 2016.  
My entrée into research mimicked the typical pathway of millennial migrants to Jeju 
Island, in the post-Olle Trail era. During my initial exploratory short-term field research trips, I 
spent my time walking parts of the Olle Trail and hanging out in guesthouses, coffee shops and 
restaurants that had popped up along it. These businesses – very small in scale – sometimes with 
only a couple of tables and two to ten beds to rent out to guests – were almost exclusively owned 
by millennial migrants. I talked to travelers and small-scale business owners alike, and also took 
stock of how longtime local residents were reacting to this influx of young adults from the city.  I 
also walked large sections of the trail, as I tried to understand the embodied and psychological 
transformation that migrants described in their narratives about Jeju.  
 When I returned to Jeju for long-term research in the fall of 2015, I began a 
comprehensive ethnographic study of the island. I divided my time roughly evenly between the 
northern, more urbanized half of the island, where the capital city, airport, shopping districts, 
university areas, and the new research park area located amidst smaller villages, and the 
southern, more rural section of the island that is dominated largely by the fishing and farming 
villages but has a few pockets of developed resort districts. I met millennial migrants to Jeju 
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through my visits to guesthouses and coffee shops, as well as by attending arts and cultural 
events on the island, and eventually through snowball sampling. When meeting new migrants 
who were willing to talk, I typically set up a time for a semi-structured interview through which I 
was able to get a sense of their migration narrative. Eventually I conducted semi-structured 
interview of with 101 millennial migrants. I also hung out extensively with a smaller group of 
my interlocutors, sharing meals and coffee with them, visiting them at their workplaces, going on 
hikes and swimming in the ocean with them. In order to get a sense of the formation of the 
countercultural milieu I also attended social events among groups of young adult migrants, 
participated in arts and cultural events that they organized, and read publications that they put 
out.  I paid particular attention to the way in which they inhabited the spaces that they lived and 
worked in, and their interactions with the natural space of the island.  
 Because I traced an emergent migration, this was a time sensitive study. When I began 
initial field research in 2013, this migration of millennials was still in its early stages. It was less 
than 5 years old and was still in its upward climb. However, even in 2013, this migration was 
already changing form, as my interlocutors told me about different “generations” of millennial 
migrants to Jeju.  While the first generation was built on the affect of failure, woundedness and 
social pain, and the second generation on the affect of love and desire for Jeju island, many 
insisted that later “waves” or “generations” of young adult migrants were driven by economic 
calculation and financial investment more than an affective reaction to Seoul life and an impulse 
to create counterhegemonic alternatives. Of course the story was not as clearly periodized as 
some interlocutors claimed. And in spite of perhaps varying motives among young adult 
migrants to the island, as with any countercultural trend, most of the young people that I spoke 
with put themselves in the category of the purist “first generation,” no matter when they had 
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moved down. In spite of the challenges of tracing a shifting trend, my fieldwork did take on a 
temporal dimension as I traced the morphology of this migration, and the development of an 
alternative, countercultural milieu.  I made an effort to talk to migrants who had moved to the 
island during different stages of this migration.  
 Throughout my long-term research period, I also did targeted field research at three sites 
that I identified as contact zones (Pratt 1991) for millennial migrants and longtime local residents 
of Jeju Island. This allowed me to observe the by turns friendly and contested relationship 
between these two groups on the island. The first site was a unique “culture and arts space” that 
functioned as an art gallery and historical preservation society, as well as a meeting ground for 
arts minded migrants from the mainland. It had been started by a Jeju returnee who had lived in 
Seoul for many years as a government employee before deciding to move back to Jeju to create 
this space in his grandmother’s traditional Jeju home in a small village just on the outskirts of 
Jeju City (the capital city of the island). The mission of the space was to record the history of the 
small village and engage local residents through individual and community art projects led by 
artists-in-residents who were typically from Seoul. At this space, which I will call The Village, I 
attended art openings, special lectures, and walking tours of the town hosted by The Village; I 
also participated in community art projects, tagged along with artists as they delved into local 
history as inspiration for their work, talked to longtime local residents, and had formal interviews 
and many informal conversations with the founder and the staff of the organization.  
 My second research site, which I feature in Chapter 3, was a small mid-mountain town 
called Kashiri that had had an early influx of millennial migrants, and was still a popular 
destinations for new millennial migrants when I arrived in 2015 because of its location off the 
coastal circuit and its beautiful setting in the hills. However, this town was famous in Jeju history 
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for being a site of conflict during the April 3rd Uprising of 1948 and had been one of many mid-
mountain villages that was burned to the ground in a counterinsurgency campaign by the Korean 
military in November of 1948. In the 1950s and 1960s, townspeople came together and rebuilt 
the village by pooling together their resources in spite of their abject poverty. Many of the 
longtime local residents were still oriented to this founding event in its history. Millennial 
migrants, on the other hand, were often only very superficially aware of the history of the town, 
instead praising its beauty and isolation as an ideal site for their lives of refusal and exodus. 
These starkly different orientations to the Jeju landscape in this small town created a productive 
backdrop for research on the contestation and cooperation that happened in place in Jeju through 
this influx of new residents.  
 Finally, I did participant observation research in Jeju Island’s famous Hansup’ul Haenyŏ 
School, as part of the ninth graduating class. This research is featured in Chapter 5. This training 
site for haenyŏ, women who practice a form of diving for shellfish that doesn’t involve any 
breathing equipment, has been funded by the Jeju government as a way to preserve and revitalize 
Jeju’s unique cultural properties. Since its founding in 2009, the Jeju Hansup'ul Haenyŏ School 
has grown in popularity and size, and in recent years has attracted a growing number of 
millennials from the city. It has also become a site for the Jeju government to advertise the 
uniqueness of its cultural heritage and to launch itself into the global spotlight. I applied to be a 
participant in this training program in the spring of 2016 and completed the four-month course 
along with my Korean peers. I attended all the lectures, participated in all the training sessions, 
and helped organize the festivals and performances that were designed to draw attention to the 
haenyŏ tradition. I also interviewed my classmates, talked with our haenyŏ instructors and 
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interviewed the manager of the haenyŏ school. This site gave me still another level at which to 
observe and analyze millennial migrants contact with the Jeju local context.  
 
Dissertation Outline 
In Chapter One, “The Dispossession of the Jeju Countryside: History and Context,” I 
delve into the history of Jeju Island beginning with the founding event of Jeju’s modern history: 
the violent 1948 repression of a populist uprising at the eve of the establishment of the South 
Korean nation. This chapter tracks the different ways Jeju Island has functioned as the periphery 
of the nation since its violent initiation into the modern South Korean state. I trace the political 
repression after the Jeju uprising, the exclusion of Jeju from industrialization, the forced 
development of sex tourism and then domestic tourism which led to massive dispossession of 
Jeju land, and then development projects spearheaded by the Jeju regional government in the 
contemporary era. I argue that it was because Jeju Island was dispossessed and marginalized, 
receding to the periphery of the Korean imaginary, that it could be newly encountered early in 
the 21st century as an available space for millennial migrants from Seoul.  
 In Chapter Two, “Home Alone: Building Alternatives in the Jeju House/Home,” I argue 
that new modes of rebellion against middle class norms of urban life emerge from the material 
remaking of migrants’ lives – in houses – on Jeju Island. As migrants discovered, renovated, 
redesigned and resignified houses on Jeju Island, they also built alternative and often subversive 
modes of sociality and understandings of the self. I argue in this chapter that the ‘exodus’ was 
not premeditated or a result of political mobilization. Rather, it emerged from a localized and 
material encounter with out-of-the-way spaces on Jeju Island. As some migrants turned their 
redesigned and repurposed homes into businesses – like guesthouses and other spaces of 
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hospitality – they began to create the spatial foundation of subculture that pulled other like-
minded millennials into migration. In this way, a localized subversion of the status quo began to 
arise on Jeju Island.    
 In Chapter Three, “Diverging Perspectives in Jeju’s Villages: Millennial Migrants, 
Longtime Jeju Residents, and Landscape,” I use landscape as an analytic to investigate the 
diverging emotional and embodied bonds that migrants and longtime Jeju villagers created with 
the Jeju landscape. The relationship of healing and love that migrants created with what they 
described as the “pure” natural landscape of Jeju Island became another localized, material space 
through which migrants carved out their exodus from Seoul. According to my interlocutors, 
while the Seoul landscape was calcified, cold, and unforgiving, the Jeju landscape provided 
healing, comfort and instilled feelings of love. However, in seeking this emotional and embodied 
relationship with the Jeju landscape, I argue that migrants were in fact producing a ‘leisurescape’ 
in Jeju that they laid over the ‘taskscape’ that had long been operative in Jeju’s rural villages. 
The ‘taskscape’ of the longtime Jejuans3 emerged from a history of state violence, dispossession, 
and a developmental desire to create material and imagined bonds with the nation. Migrants’ 
development of leisurescape in Jeju’s rural villages in some cases amounted to a kind of erasure 
of the sociality and aims of longtime Jeju villagers, and often led to a commodification of rural 
village life. I argue that the diverging visions of millennial migrants and longtime Jeju villagers 
calls into question the future shape of Jeju’s rural villages.  
                                                 
3 I use the terms “longtime Jejuan,” “longtime Jeju residents” interchangeable (along with “Jeju villagers” when 
talking about longtime Jejuans who reside in villages) to refer to Jeju residents who were already settled in Jeju 
before this most recent in-migration from the mainland. These terms reflect the emic terms that were used on the 
ground to distinguish between newcomers and old timers. Longtime Jeju residents were typically referred to by 
themselves and others as Cheju saram or Chejuin, which literally mean “Jeju person.” Newcomers were generally 
referred to by themselves and others as ijumin or “migrants.” While migrants from the mainland were officially 
considered Jeju residents – Chejudomin – once they registered with a new address at the provincial office, they often 
continued to refer to themselves as “migrants.”  
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 In Chapter Four, “The Jeju Migration Narrative,” I analyze the narratives of 
transformation that millennial migrants to Jeju Island tell about their relocation to and new lives 
in Jeju. I argue that in sharing and circulating narratives of transformation about their Jeju lives – 
what I call ‘the Jeju migration narrative’ – migrants intervened in a future-oriented narrative of 
upward mobility among the Korean middle class to create a new presentist orientation grounded 
in Jeju. As this narrative circulated, so too did a critique of Seoul and a growing recognition of 
Jeju Island as its spatiotemporal contrast.  Bending their creative labor towards their own ends, 
downwardly mobile middle-class millennials were able to upend the script of middle class 
reproduction that had been given to them by their parents through the production of this 
narrative. The Jeju migration narrative contributed largely to the construction of the new 
localized, material social forms in Jeju concretized the path of exodus from Seoul.  
In Chapter Five, “Jeju Island and the Cultural Mode of Production,” I address head on the 
question of the cooption of millennial migrants’ creative, immaterial labor by the state. I analyze 
millennial migrants’ participation in and resistance to island-wide government initiatives to 
mobilize creative talent in the service of a cultural and global transformation of Jeju Island. I 
argue that even while the Jeju government recruits millennial migrants into its projects of global 
production, millennial migrants still maintain a scrappy autonomy as they impose their own 
creative will over the shape of their work, lives and futures. Many of them do this by mobilizing 
a connection to a global youth travelling culture that helps them to resist governmental designs 






CHAPTER 1: THE DISPOSSESSION OF THE JEJU COUNTRYSIDE:  




 In this chapter, I outline the modern history of Jeju Island since the postwar period in 
order to describe the context within which the migration to Jeju emerged. Beginning with the 
state response to the Jeju Uprising in the years following Korea’s liberation, and into the era of 
economic development, Jeju Island was thoroughly dispossessed, the Jeju landscape nearly 
destroyed and then rebuilt to serve the purposes of national development, and Jejuans recruited 
into the South Korean nation through a Koreanization process, tourism development and rural 
development. In the liberalized era since the Democratic Movement in the late 1980s and 
following the trend of decentralization of power in regional areas, economic development in Jeju 
has been localized, with less overt top-down planning and control on the part of the central 
government. However, in spite of this recovery of regional agency, local pro-development voices 
are dominant in Jeju and economic development continues to favor the local business elite and 
outside investors. This only widens the intra-island gap between development in Jeju City and 
designated areas of tourism development and poorer rural farming and fishing villages. Rural 
villages in Jeju remain some of the most impoverished in the nation. The Jeju migration unfolds 
against this backdrop of dispossession. The amazing availability of low-cost housing and space 
to live in rural Jeju were ripe conditions for a millennial exodus from Seoul to Jeju.         
 
Premodern Jeju and Peripheralization  
 Scholars of Jeju Island often stress the spirit of self-reliance of the Jeju people, stemming 
from Jeju unique landscape and history. That Jeju is South Korea’s largest island, its weather 
semi-tropical, its terrain distinct from that of the Korean peninsula, and its languages and 
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customs different from those of the mainland have made it an object of special study over the 
years (Hyŏn 2009; S. Song 2010). However, Jeju’s identity as a culturally distinct and unique 
territory also stems from the peripheralization of Jeju by Korea and other nearby state powers 
throughout history (S. N. Kim 1989a; Koh and Barclay 2007) and its pattern of political 
rebellion.   
 A significant part of Jeju islanders’ historical consciousness has been constituted by 
native peoples’ struggles against outsiders. Before it was absorbed by the Korean kingdom, Jeju 
was an independent tribal state, most often referred to as ‘T’amna.’ T’amna maintained political 
and cultural autonomy until the 12th century. Gradually the T’amna Kingdom came under the 
direct control of the Koryo dynasty of the (Korean) mainland and in 1105, its status was 
downgraded to a local province and T’amna was incorporated into the centralized bureaucracy of 
the mainland kingdom. Amicable relations with the Koryo kingdom existed until 1275, when the 
Chinese Yuan dynasty occupied the Koryo kingdom and began to exploit T’amna, using it as a 
pasture to raise horses for their royal family and as a military base to prepare for Yuan’s invasion 
of Japan. During this period, the Yuan forces established the Office for Subjugation and 
exploited men and women on the island as slaves for about 100 years. Seong Nae Kim (1989) 
argues that it was during this period that Jeju islanders first fostered an “indigenous culture of 
resistance and separatism that typified the island later in history as the island of rebellions” (61).   
In 1402 the Korean Chosŏn dynasty (also known as the “Yi” dynasty) took back 
administrative control of the island, making an official register of slaves and imposing taxes on 
the island. For the next 800 years, the island was run by administrators from mainland Korea 
who tried to force islanders to build fortresses and offer tribute to the central Korean state. 
During this period, many islanders left Jeju to live on the sea as pirates or to try to make a living 
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on the mainland. In retaliation, the Korean central ruling body imposed a Law of Exit Ban on all 
islanders in 1629. This exit ban remained in place for 200 years, until 1830, effectively 
imprisoning Jeju residents in a marginalized periphery (S. Yang 1984).  
Not only did Jeju Island become a tacit prison for all indigenous islanders, it was also a 
colony of political exiles from the mainland. Jeju Island effectively became an open air prison 
for political dissidents, and as a result it was constantly under surveillance by the central 
government and was suspected of harboring rebels and traitors. Jeju was unique in that, because 
of the shortage of land and low productivity, there were not many feudal landlords, as was 
common on the mainland. As a result, the social structure was more egalitarian. In the place of 
feudal landlords, the state systematically exploited farmers through extraction of tributes and 
taxation. This meant that resistance movements historically were fought directly against the state, 
in the mode of separatist or independence movements. In addition, many of the revolts were 
instigated by political exiles on the island who used the islanders’ suffering to rebel against the 
state. Jeju has a long history of association with state resistance (S. N. Kim 1989a).  
During the Yi dynasty (1392-1910), Jeju was also cast as a cultural backwater, in need of 
enlightenment and development from the dominant Confucian culture of the mainland. King 
Sejong was the first king to try to integrate Jeju more closely to the peninsula by establishing a 
national Confucian school on the island and generating a class of Jeju Confucian scholar elites 
who formed a bureaucracy on Jeju and could send a representative to the capital. However, Jeju 
was excluded from the system of the higher civil service examination, which very much 
differentiated it from mainland society. Because of this exclusion, Jeju islanders could not use 
education as a means of upward mobility in the Korean state to the same extent that mainlanders 
could, and their social and political structures therefore formed very differently. Because of these 
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and other policies of exclusion, Jeju islanders’ identity as outsiders to the Korean nation was still 
fairly strong throughout the Chosŏn period, both from the perspective of mainlanders, and from 
the perspective of Jeju islanders themselves. Differences in gender structure on the island, where 
women are often breadwinners with economic and social power (Cho 1979) also led to 
mainlanders’ conception of Jeju as “wild and uncivilized” (Koh and Barclay 2007).  
Seong Nae Kim (1989) argues that Jeju Island’s political isolation, geographical distance, 
and containment from the mainland meant that indigenous revolts were crushed by the central 
state with much more force and impunity than on the mainland. She argues that Jeju was 
constructed by the Korean state as a borderland, a space where the state could test its martial 
power and carry out violence against rebels to an extreme. Because Jeju Island was constructed 
as a borderland to the state, the pattern of resistance among Jeju islanders took a 
counterhegemonic form. The legacy of resistance has been naturalized as a distinct Jeju cultural 
trait by the native people themselves in reaction to repeated subjugation by the center. The 
framework of center-border is so deep-seated, some scholars argue, that Jeju people internalize 
their fate of being rebels, fighters, and exiles from dominant society. Kim (1989) states: “The 
strong regionalism and independent cultural identity of the Jeju people are indeed the products of 
dialectical (rather than consensual) interaction of indigenous local discourse and state discourse 
of power.” 
Jeju Island’s geographical and dialectical position vis-à-vis the Korean state made it 
prone to a series of rebellions in the 19th century. Merrill (1980) outlines the typical sequence 
for these uprisings: a local magistrate would exploit and tax the islanders until they rebelled; 
however, once their grievances were met, the rebellion would die down. These uprisings 
occurred starting in 1813. In 1876, when Korean ports were opened to foreign forces and 
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markets, the rebellions took on an anti-modernization and anti-foreigner flavor. Both the 
Japanese and the French made attempts at installing a colonizing presence on Jeju Island. The 
1901 peasant revolt on Jeju was in part a reaction to French and Japanese forces on the island, as 
well a reaction to the introduction of Catholicism. The memory of the 1901 peasant revolt in part 
fueled the later April 3rd Uprising in 1948 (Merrill 1980). 
 
The Jeju Uprising  
The Jeju Uprising/April 3rd Uprising, or what in Jeju is commonly known as the “April 
3rd Incident” or simply “April 3rd,” began in 1948, and is considered by most scholars and 
residents of Jeju to be the founding event of Jeju Island’s modern history. After the end of 
Japanese colonial rule in 1945, the US set up a temporary military government in the southern 
part of the peninsula, with the Soviet Union controlling the north. Many of the policies of the US 
military government, including suppression of grassroots state-building efforts, and the revival of 
the Japanese colonial state apparatus and employment of former Japanese collaborators for the 
sake of governmental expediency following liberation caused deep resentment among Koreans. 
Within this context, the late 1940s in Korea became a volatile era of protests and strikes against 
the socioeconomic policies of the US military government (H. J. Kim 2014).  
On March 1, 1947 this unrest reached Jeju Island. Leftist groups organized a 
demonstration to celebrate the anniversary of the 1919 attempted Korean independence 
movement against the Japanese and used the opportunity to express their dissatisfaction with the 
interim US military government (Merrill 1980). Twenty-five thousand people showed up for the 
peaceful protest and violence was nearly avoided until a child was hit by a mounted police 
officer. Angry protesters pursued the policeman to the police station, where other officers then 
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opened fire onto the crowd killing six and injuring eight. This incident led to a widespread 
general strike on the island and in the following year further skirmishes between police and the 
local population. The long-standing enmity between islanders and mainlanders in large part 
fueled this conflict, as more police reinforcements, and young men from rightest youth groups 
were sent to contain the unrest (H. J. Kim 2014).  
The Moscow Conference in 1945 had ended with an agreement to set up a four-power 
trusteeship among the US, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and China for five years to create a 
provisional democratic government on the Korean peninsula before handing over complete 
control to an independent Korean government. However, talks between the US and the Soviet 
Union froze up and in 1947, the Korea issue was handed off to the UN, which, through American 
leadership, tried to plan country-wide elections. When the Soviets controlling northern Korea 
refused to cooperate with the UN commission, the commission scheduled monitored elections 
only in the southern half of the Korean peninsula for May 10 of 1948. There was widespread 
dissatisfaction with the decision to hold elections on only half of the peninsula – which many 
believed would lead to permanent separate governments in northern and southern Korea and 
break up the millennia long unity of the Korean peninsula (Merrill 1980). Leftist groups, which 
had gained widespread public support since the 1920s under Japanese colonial rule, also began to 
organize retaliatory action. 
On the morning of April 3, 1948, the local Communist party in Jeju launched an 
organized insurrection against the police and rightest youth groups stationed on the northern 
coast of the island. Four policemen, two insurgents and eight civilians were killed in the 
confrontation. The motivation for these attacks was resistance to the May 10 elections that would 
divide the nation, dissatisfaction with US military rule, and most viscerally the increasing enmity 
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between local people and the outsider police and rightest groups on the island that inflamed 
deep-seated resentments against the central state. Scholars agree that this was a local rather than 
centrally planned uprising, as the unusually well-organized and well-respected Communist party 
in Jeju led Jejuans to revolt as an expression of their pent-up frustration amidst political and 
socioeconomic conditions beyond their control (Merrill 1980; Cumings 2010; H. J. Kim 2014). 
After the confrontation, insurgents fled to their bases on Halla mountain and police 
reinforcements were sent from the mainland. More violence ensued in the weeks leading up to 
the May 10 elections.  
In June 1948, the military launched a full-scale counterinsurgency attack that involved 
conducting massive sweeps of the interior of the island, relocating residents of mountain villages 
to refugee camps and burning all mountain villages to the ground. The military and the police 
employed indiscriminate violence and torture as they arrested and killed insurgents, their 
families, and innocent residents of mountain towns. With the establishment of the South Korean 
government in August 1948, a hard-line policy against leftist insurgents was established, 
labelling this homegrown insurrection a Communist uprising. Martial law was declared on the 
island, strongholds of insurgents on Mount Halla thoroughly crushed, and mass killings of 
residents in mountain villages whose family members were involved in the uprising were carried 
out as a deterrent to future insurrection. In April of 1949, the first president of South Korea, 
strongman Syngman Rhee, declared a successful end to the counterinsurgency. By the time the 
conflict was over, an estimated 30,000 Jejuans had been killed or wounded, nearly ten percent of 
the population of Jeju at the time (H. J. Kim 2014). More than half of the islands’ houses had 
been burned to the ground (Cumings 2010).  
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 The counterinsurgency campaign after the Jeju Uprising left Jeju economically and 
politically devastated. It would be decades before some of the most interior villages would be 
rebuilt. A politically repressive environment reigned on the island and massacres and terrors 
continued throughout the Korean War (1950-1953) and into the 1950s. On August 30, 1950, for 
example, 132 people from the Sagye village in southern Jeju were rounded up and murdered in a 
large field under the pretext of eradication of “impure elements.” Afterwards, police banned 
access to the site, and it was only nine years later in 1959 that people were even able to collect 
the remains and bury them (Suh 2007). When war broke out on the mainland in June 1950, the 
police collected all the radios on the island so that islanders would not find out about the North 
Korean advance on the mainland (Cumings 2010). In 1952 and 1953, the South Korean 
government deployed a special unit to Jeju called the “Rainbow Unit,” which continued the work 
of suppression of anti-government activities (Ryang 2013).  
Furthermore, islanders were forbidden to talk about the Uprising; there was a fifty-year 
ban in South Korean on investigating or conducting research related to the event. The details of 
the Uprising were also excluded from Korean history books. In 1978, when Hyun Ki-young, a 
famous novelist from Jeju, published a short story about a woman who survived the April 3rd 
Uprising, he was arrested, tortured and released on the condition that he would never write about 
the event again (Ryang 2013).  
Jejuans were not even discouraged from speaking openly of the Uprising or mourning the 
death of the “Communist” guerrilla fighters or innocent civilians who were killed in the 
counterinsurgency. The heavy silences of the witnesses and victims of the Jeju Uprising has been 
incisively analyzed by Eun-shil Kim who looks at how embodied suffering and emotion speaks 
volumes even decades later and Seong Nae Kim who analyzes how memory and mourning is 
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reconstituted in shamanic healing rituals and interaction with the spirits of the dead (E.-S. Kim 
2018; S. N. Kim 1989b). Sonia Ryang also brings very poignant attention to the enforced silence 
about the Jeju Uprising when she compares the silence about the April 3rd Uprising among 
Jejuans in Jeju to the way Jeju Zainichi (Koreans who have permanent residency or citizenship in 
Japan) in Japan, free from the restraints of the Korean state, were able to memorialize the event 
again and again throughout generations: “There remains . . . a difference between the nation that 
forced absolute silence onto the islanders of Jeju for over fifty years and the community of exiles 
that talked about the massacres of 80,000 innocent people if only in a chant-like, prayer-like, and 
curse-like manner, through powerful refrain, generation after generation” (Ryang 2013). By not 
being able to speak about such violent and tragic events in their history for fifty years, Jeju 
Islanders’ identity and sense of historical subjectivity was further suppressed, although not 
forgotten. 
Thus, abject state violence ushered Jeju into the South Korean nation. Without a cent of 
state help, Jeju Islanders were left with the task of rebuilding their villages, livelihoods, and 
communities after the counterinsurgency. It was decades before Jeju could become economically 
viable again. An external survey conducted in the early 1960s reports that more than ten years 
after the end of major hostilities surrounding the conflict, few of the interior villages had been 
rebuilt, and there was only one useable, if unpaved, road that encircled the island. There was one 
small provincial hospital, and disease was widespread. Many Jeju Islanders lacked clean water 
and adequate food supply (Garver 1962).  
Furthermore, the suppression and violence following the Jeju Uprising left Jejuans 
completely stripped of any political agency. Even after total suppression of the insurgency, those 
Jejuans who survived had to endure decades of shame and suspicion as island-wide association 
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with the “red” uprising clung to them throughout the Cold War in militantly anti-communist 
South Korea. Jejuans had no choice but to follow imperatives of the central government. On the 
extreme end, especially in the years following the Jeju Uprising, there was the very real threat of 
torture and death, and in everyday life for decades following there was the constant effort to 
clear one’s name and one’s family from association with Communism.     
 
Sex tourism on Jeju  
It is telling that the first signs of the Korean state’s interest and investment in Jeju after 
the uprising came in the form of the development of an exploitative sex tourism industry. In the 
1960s, during a period when Jejuans had absolutely no voice to weigh in on policies that would 
remake their island, the South Korean state in conjunction with the Japanese government and 
businesses began to discuss the development of the so-called “kisaeng tourism” industry on Jeju. 
The ‘kisaeng’, a class of enslaved women during the Koryo and Chosŏn dynasties who were 
trained in the fine arts of singing, dancing, poetry, playing musical instruments, and hosting, 
were legal state entertainers for the court and high-level scholar-officials who sometimes also 
performed sexual services. Although official state-sponsored kisaeng institutions dissolved after 
the end of the Chosŏn dynasty, the practice of mixing political and economic deals with women 
and entertainment continued in private establishments into the postwar era.     
Kisaeng establishments flourished across the country during the immediate post-war 
Syngman Rhee’s presidency; but when Park Chung Hee came to power in 1961 through a 
military coup, one of the first things he did was to strictly prohibit politicians from entering 
kisaeng venues. Many corrupt deals between politicians and businessmen had transpired in these 
kisaeng establishments during the presidency of Syngman Rhee, and Park hoped to create an 
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environment of transparency and crackdown on corruption. The “laws on the prevention of 
prostitution” were passed in 1961. However, Jeju Island was specifically exempted from laws 
that banned access to kisaeng establishments in part because the government deemed Jeju to be 
so politically insignificant that the ban was unnecessary. In Jeju, far away from the eyes of the 
Korean public, Park saw opportunity. The Park administration specifically mandated the 
development of “kisaeng tourism” on Jeju Island – big hotel structures that provided space for 
business deals along with the hospitality and sexual services of young women -- in the hopes that 
it would bring in foreign currency to the country.  
Japanese businessmen and the Japanese state were also involved in the development of 
the kisaeng tourism industry on Jeju. After normalization of relations with Japan in 1965, the 
Japanese government in the early 1970s proposed a major Overseas Development Assistance 
(ODA) plan of financial and technical assistance to Korea, which included funds for “tourism 
development” on Jeju Island. The assistance plan on Jeju included development of a ferry service 
between Japan and Jeju, technical assistance regarding tourism on Jeju, and government support 
for Japanese firms that would promote development on Jeju. The Japanese Ministry of Tourism 
carried out several surveys to evaluate Jeju’s suitability for tourism development (Norma 2014). 
One report specifically pointed out the need for development of venues on Jeju for “nightlife for 
foreign tourists.” Although there were objections in the Japanese parliament surrounding this 
issue, the Japanese state economic support for kisaeng tourist development in Jeju went ahead as 
planned (Leheny 2003).  
In her book about militarism, sex work, and migrant labor in South Korea, Lee (2010) 
draws a comparison between export-processing zones and military bases in the anticommunist 
developmental state of South Korea during the Park Chung Hee era. She argues that both were 
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spaces where “complex negotiations and calculations of cost and profitability” were made 
between countries for their mutual, if not always equal, benefit. I would extend this comparison 
to tourist spaces on Jeju that functioned according to a similar logic. In an era when Jeju lacked 
many other resources, female sexuality was made into a profitable human resource that was 
exchanged for foreign currency. Jeju Island during the Park Chung Hee era became a special 
transnational space where the greed of the Korean state intersected with the desire of the 
Japanese state to produce a development that interested both parties. Jeju Island, having been 
physically, politically and economically destroyed after the uprising, was conveniently poised to 
become an available space for the central state to freely experiment with profitable development 
projects no matter the moral and psychological costs. This first initiative was to make Jeju into a 
profitable playground for the Japanese.  
 The development of the kisaeng tourism industry was paired with a more comprehensive 
plan of development of a leisure tourism industry on Jeju. From very early on, international 
tourism was the aim, as Park Chung Hee saw Jeju as a means of gaining foreign currency. 
President Park Chung Hee personally visited the island in 1966 and outlined a 30-year plan to 
develop Jeju through its “hidden resources,” one of which was tourism. It was a slow road to 
getting Jeju into shape for outside visitors. In the 60s and 70s the basic infrastructure that would 
enable tourism development was built. In the 1960s, an important road connecting Jeju City and 
Sŏgwip’o was built, and access to clean water improved. In 1973, the Jeju International Airport 
was expanded to accommodate flight service of jumbo passenger jets. The first ferry between 
Jeju and Busan was successful completed in 1977. Big hotels began to be built on Jeju, and Jeju 
became a destination for domestic honeymooners and high school field trips, even as it also drew 
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Japanese businessmen bound for kisaeng establishments. By 1983, the annual number of tourists 
had reached 1 million.  
 
Koreanization and exoticization  
In South Korea more broadly, anticommunism and nationalism fueled what Nemeth has 
called “economic growth ideology” (Nemeth 1988) – the legitimization and support of rapid 
economic development as the best path forward. Starting right after Koreas’s liberation 
following the Second World War, American economic support of South Korea was tied to a 
project of anticommunism, as Cold War tensions were lived out on the Korean peninsula. The 
very real North Korean threat in the postwar era paired with government rhetoric of economic 
development as political defeat of North Korea compelled many Koreans to buy into the aim of 
collective economic growth – and to do their part in working hard to help fuel the growth of the 
economy.  Similarly, nationalism in postwar Korea was a powerful motivator for economic 
development and modernization. With Japanese colonization still in the living memory of adult 
Koreans, economic development was successfully sold by the Park Chung Hee administration as 
a way to prove Korea’s legitimacy as an independent nation and to achieve parity with their 
former colonizer. 
During this time there was a concerted effort on the part of the Korean state to 
“Koreanize” Jeju society and to include them in the push toward economic development. Overt 
connections with Japan – which many Jeju islanders maintained because of historical ties to Jeju 
labor migrants to Japan – were looked upon with suspicion. The use of the Jeju local dialect was 
discouraged. Standard Korean began to be taught in schools, and along with participation in the 
military draft system, and the increased traffic between Jeju and the mainland that the early years 
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of tourism brought, Jeju Islanders were increasingly becoming disciplined subjects of the Korean 
nation-state (Koh and Barclay 2007).   
 In the developmental economy, tourism development on Jeju (both kisaeng tourism and 
general tourism) was useful to the central government as a way both to Koreanize Jeju Island 
(shoring up nationalist feeling both on the island and on the mainland) and to exploit its 
distinction from the mainland as an exotic and exceptional Other within Korea’s borders – all 
while gaining foreign currency for national coffers. In an analysis of newspaper articles written 
during the Park Chung Hee era, I have found both discursive positions expressed: Jeju as 
metonym for the developmental nation, and Jeju as internal exotic Other.  
In terms of presenting it as an internal exotic Other, Jeju was constructed as a space of 
exception since the beginning of the Park government, when prostitution laws were exempt in 
Jeju. In order to encourage development of the tourism industry more broadly as time went on, 
Jeju was encouraged to market its culture as distinct, unique, and worthy of the tourist gaze.  
In his analysis of ethnic theme parks, Bruner (2005) points out the irony that ethnic parks 
display ethnic diversity and yet promote unity, ultimately aiming to strengthen nationalism. This 
kind of touristic display presents “difference” in a form that is palatable to audiences, but most 
importantly, sanitized and sanctioned by the state. Thus tourists can consume titillating 
exoticism, and the nation can celebrate its natural and cultural diversity at the same time, and still 
not be politically or culturally threatened in any way. This was the case in the Jeju tourist 
industry as well: political difference on Jeju was suppressed and economic difference hidden, 
while safe “cultural” differences were celebrated and promoted.  
 In analyzing local and national newspaper articles from the time, it is clear that the 
central government tried hard to construct Jeju as exotic, different from the mainland, and 
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appealing in benign ways. Since the image that was constructed was ultimately designed for an 
international audience, I also analyzed articles from the New York Times to see how the Jeju 
tourist image was received and reconstructed by the world outside South Korea.  
In one local article written in 1973, the news outlet reported that The Ministry of Home 
Affairs in Korea had prohibited the transformation of thatched roofs into slate roofs on Jeju, 
although this was the trend for rural development in the rest of the country. The Ministry also 
promoted the use of “traditional” earthenware jars in tourist areas.4  Palm trees were planted on 
the main roads and near the highway.5 Palm trees have never been native on Jeju and Jeju differs 
in climate only slightly from the southernmost provinces of South Korea. However, from very 
early on in the development process, newspapers reported on how Jeju aimed to be the “Hawaii 
of East Asia.”6  The goal was to create an exotic environment, the taste of the semi-tropic.  
In the New York Times, as early as 1967, Jeju was called a “Candidate for Hawaii of the 
Far East.”7  The article begins by saying, “A visitor to Jeju-do will immediately sense that the 
island is different from the rest of Korea in more ways that its more moderate climate.” The 
image of Jeju as set apart from Korea is reinforced by the American media here. The haenyŏ, 
female divers in Jeju (and in coastal areas on the mainland) who dive several dozen meters 
beneath the surface of the water without equipment to gather abalone and others seafood, have a 
special mention in this article. The article goes on to describe natural wonders on Jeju – the 
waterfalls, the volcano mountain, hiking trails – but then ends with a description of the other 
kind of notable women on the island – women in Jeju’s “cabarets”. “The Korean hostesses 
usually speak English” the journalist writes. A Newsweek article that called Jeju one of the “top 
                                                 
4 Jeju Shinmun, May 26, 1973. 
5 Jeju Shinmun, April 18, 1972. 
6 Jeju Shinmun, July 8, 1967; Kyŏnghyang Shinmun, September 14, 1968; Jeju Shinmun, January 29, 1972. 
7 New York Times, May 21, 1967. 
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ten tourist destinations in the world” in 1975 was celebrated as a benchmark for Jeju tourism in 
Korea. This article called Jeju the “village of the gods” and extolled the wonders of the Jeju 
haenyŏ and the unique social structure that their labor and lifestyle provided. A celebratory 
report about the Newsweek article was published in the Kyŏnghyang Shinmun.8   
During this time, the Korean state was able to exploit the difference that Jeju presented 
and also “manage” the once rebellious region in part by taming the image of Jeju that it 
presented to the world. While on the one hand suppressing any mention of modern Jeju history, it 
was also able to play up the unique cultural differences that set Jeju back in time (to traditional 
time) and made it at once appealing to tourists and non-threatening to the state. The feminization 
of the image of Jeju – Jeju as a receptacle of tradition, or an island of women divers, young 
honeymooners, or beautiful kisaeng hostesses – was a way in which the state could sell Jeju and 
at the same time keep it under tight political control. Jeju as exotic internal Other was not a threat 
to anyone. At the same time, the successes of the development of Jeju tourism were credited to 
the Korean nation-state, and thus Jeju’s successes also contributed to the strength of the South 
Korean nation.  
O (2003) argues that having to perform a cultural “gap” for domestic and international 
tourists had the ironic effect of destroying and secularizing Jeju culture. Jeju Islanders were 
asked to perform “staged authenticity” in order to impress tourists; O argues that this led to loss 
of identity and a feeling of self-deprecation on the part of the islanders, who had to perform a 
simplified and ultimately false version of themselves. With a deterioration of their sense of 
identity and culture came an even further distancing from their long-standing regional identity 
and sense of autonomy. Jeju Islanders were becoming more Korean and less Jejuan. 
                                                 
8 Kyŏnghyang Shinmun, July 9, 1975. 
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Performing development and becoming national subjects 
Just as Jeju Islanders had to perform difference, they also were swallowed up in the 
national mania to perform “development” according to nationally mandated economic plans and 
international benchmarks. Jeju Island went through several five and ten year, and even one 
thirty-year economic plan. In analyzing local and national newspapers to see how the Jeju media 
narrated this march towards of development, I found that the most prominent storylines were 
those that either celebrate benchmarks of “successful” development or that shamed Jeju for not 
reaching benchmarks or expectations set by Seoul or by the increasing presence of the 
international tourist gaze. I argue in this section that in being pushed into the discursive frame of 
“national development,” Jeju Islanders were made into acquiescent national subjects during this 
period. When we look to see who was actually benefiting economically from tourism 
development on Jeju, we find that most of the money made in this venture was going to the 
developers from the mainland and not into the pockets of locals.  
Jeju newspapers are peppered with celebrations of even the smallest signs of economic 
development on the island. In 1963, the Jeju Shinmun described the opening of the first private 
hotel on Jeju as “symbolic,” describing the fanfare of the opening ceremony and the presence of 
the Minister of Transportation at the ceremony.9  Later, local newspapers celebrated the 
welcoming of the Pacific Travel Asia Travel Association delegation in 1965, and the completion 
of the expansion of the Jeju International Airport in 1973.10  There is celebration of the first high 
school trip to Jeju by plane in 1970,11 and later, the successful entrance into Jeju harbors of the 
                                                 
9 Jeju Shinmun, October 15, 1963. 
10 Jeju Shinmun, March 14, 1965. 
11 Jeju Shinmun, July 27, 1970. 
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first 3,800 ton-level car ferry in 1977.12  These and other events were the instances in which Jeju 
could celebrate its successes – and the newspapers attest to their celebration of even the smallest 
gains in development. 
However, what the newspapers also reveal is the reporting of far more instances in which 
Jeju exhibited signs of “bad” development or embarrassment at not meeting the benchmarks of 
development or modernity. The reality is that while the Jeju economy developed at a moderate 
pace during the Park Chung Hee era, it was only in the 1990s that tourism really took off in Jeju. 
During the 60s and 70s, there was a sense of the Jeju economy as lagging behind growth on the 
mainland. There are many published articles from the era of stories of botched attempts, unruly 
violence, and other hiccups in what should have been smooth transitions in the development 
process. In the framework of national development, these were embarrassing episodes in which 
Jeju was not reaching expected levels of development and as a result shaming Korea on an 
international stage. One newspaper article from 1965 details the story behind a seven-minute 
delay in the departure of a plane from Jeju airport. While a seven-minute delay does not seem 
like a major inconvenience, the article makes a big deal of the incident because of the 
embarrassment involved in the event. The cause of the delay was a “shameful” fight that breaks 
out when a hotel employee blocks the entrance to the boarding gate in order to confront a travel 
agent. The hotel employee is upset because of a failure of the travel agent to pay the entire bill 
for his clients’ stay and grabs the travel agent’s neck in the tussle. The tone of the article is that 
even though the incident was not a huge inconvenience, it was extremely embarrassing because 
the travel agent was travelling with an American tourist.13  Here we can see that shame comes 
from the gaze of the international traveler who stands in for standards of travel that are not being 
                                                 
12 Jeju Shinmun, April 12, 1977. 
13 Jeju Shinmun, September 27, 1965; Jeju Shinmun, October 14, 1965. 
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met on Jeju. This kind of tussle indexes the failure of Jeju in letting trifling interpersonal 
conflicts get in the way of smooth travel.  
In another article, a starch manufacturing company dumps its wastewater over the cliff of 
the Cheonbang waterfall – one of the natural wonders of Jeju. The smell that emanates from the 
water shocks tourists and embarrasses Jeju. The factories near the waterfall are relocated right 
away. This embarrassment comes from the fact that Jeju regulation systems are still so 
“undeveloped” that something so big could slip through the cracks.14  In another instance, Jeju 
tourism companies decide to take advantage of the Osaka Expo in 1970, to try to convince 
travelers headed there to make a stop in Jeju. Ferries are set up from Pusan to Jeju, all the Jeju 
hotels advertise discounts, and Jeju sets the goal of receiving 50,000 tourists. There is much 
fanfare about receiving these tourists and indeed some make the stop in Jeju. However in one 
account of this time, a chartered bus carrying thirty-two members of the Hong Kong Chamber of 
Commerce takes almost six hours to travel between Jeju City and Sŏgwip’o, a trip that should 
have taken and hour and a half. Because of the poor conditions of the bus and the roads the trip 
takes all day and the travelers’ experience is spoiled.15 Again Jeju Islanders are shamed because 
of the embarrassment of the state of their developmental progress.  
While some of these articles were written up in national newspapers, most of these 
negative reports were written in Jeju papers. In other words, Jeju Islanders were chastising 
themselves for not reaching the national or international standard; Jeju Islanders were in many 
ways disciplining themselves. One of Michel Foucault’s observations about modern societies 
concerns the execution of disciplinary control. In modern societies, Foucault (1978) argues, 
power is not always centralized in the state or the seat of the sovereign, but rather is diffused in 
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techniques and institutions throughout society. In the case of the developmental state in Korea, 
the standards set by the central state were circulated and enacted in many different modes and 
institutions – the tourism industry in Jeju being one of them. The disciplinary control that was 
imposed on Jeju, then, included the creation of norms and expectations of progress and 
development that the nation was gearing up together to reach. When Jeju was not meeting these 
standards, they responded with self-disciplinary measures.  
One very telling example is a 1966 slogan that was created by the local government on 
Jeju. June 1966 was designated as the “Month for making Jeju tourism.” In the local governor’s 
statement in June 1966, he encouraged all Jeju residents to consider themselves “agents of 
tourism” and asked them to raise their “consciousness” for tourism on the island; he urged them 
to “voluntarily” participate in improving the state of tourism by helping keep facilities clean and 
creating a “cheerful” environment. The slogan the local governor created for all Jeju residents to 
keep in mind during the month was, “Insufficient facilities – Let’s fill the lack with our 
kindness!”16  The governor was creating good self-disciplinary subjects. While there were many 
moments in Jeju history in which raw violence was used by the Korean state to suppress any 
dissenting regional political identity, this kind of self-disciplinary control was effective 
throughout Korea and in Jeju during the developmental era.  
It is interesting to think about the extent to which Jeju Islanders were mobilized to the 
development ideology during the Park Chung Hee era, especially in light of the lack of economic 
benefit they were actually gaining from tourism development. In fact, the way that development 
stripped Jeju people of their land and the profits that development brought is quite startling. In 
many cases local landowners, if they lived on desirable property for tourism development, 
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simply had their land sold from underneath them. Through the Korean equivalent of eminent 
domain, the central government would post land for sale in certain areas and the local people 
would be forced to sell their land at very low prices and then relocate. In the process, wide 
swaths of Jeju people’s living and farming spaces vanished overnight and there were huge shifts 
in social structures. Outsiders soon came to dominate society. By 1991, 21% of the total land 
mass of Jeju was owned just by people from Seoul and all the top-tier hotels in Jeju were owned 
by Koreans from Seoul or by Zainichi Koreans. The seven people who owned the most land on 
the island were all outsiders. By 2002, 45% of Jeju land was owned by non-Jeju people. If public 
land was excluded from the total land mass, the percentage would have been even higher. It is 
clear how little economic benefit went to Jeju Islanders when we compare the capital flowing 
into the island with that flowing out of it. Between 1989 and 1993, the capital flowing out of Jeju 
was 2.6 times the capital flowing in. Furthermore, although many jobs were created on Jeju 
because of the tourist industry, by and large these were low-skilled wage labor. Most of the 
positions that were created for Jeju Islanders were unskilled, while most of the management and 
higher skilled labor was recruited from the mainland. In the Chungmun tourist complex in the 
1990s, the biggest tourism structure on the island, about two thirds of the local labor that was 
hired was daily contract labor – the most volatile of all labor positions (O 2003).  
The question then, becomes: in light of such blatant exploitation, what made Jeju people 
acquiesce to the development plans set by the national government? National voting records 
reveal majority support for Park Chung Hee in Jeju in all of his presidential elections (Gimm 
2013). One reason for such widespread support of the Park administration was that basic 
infrastructure improvement, along with agricultural innovations, which I will discuss in the next 
section, brought real material changes in everyday life in Jeju. Another reason that Jejuans 
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complied with and even celebrated tourism development was that participation in economic 
development through tourism made Jeju Island into a Korean space, and Jeju Islanders Korean 
subjects. For an island that had been stigmatized for years as “red” and rebellious, many Jeju 
islanders welcomed a path to a more normalized national subjecthood. By marketing Jeju as 
culturally different and exotic in appealing ways, but not threatening or rebellious in any way, 
the localness of Jeju was erased during tourism development and the space of Jeju was 
transformed from being from local island with a history of political resistance, persistent poverty 
and lack of sophistication to a Korean and even global space, where first Koreans and then 
international travelers could come to experience leisure and sophistication.  
 
New Village Movement 
 In addition to tourism development, rural development in Jeju also aided in the 
Koreanization of Jeju and the creation of good developmental Korean subjects in Jeju. The New 
Village Movement, which was launched across the country in 1971, was designed as a policy to 
spur rural development in the face of the increasing gap between the growth of industry and the 
growth of the agricultural sector in the 1960s. There was growing criticism of President Park’s 
focus on industrial and urban development at the expense of the rural hinterlands – and former 
heartland – of Korea. The 1971 presidential election showed waning support or President Park in 
the rural areas – particularly in the southwestern part of the country. The New Village Movement 
aimed to stimulate agricultural development, increase the income of farming families and 
improve the infrastructure of rural villages. However, its deeper goal was to capture the hearts 
and minds of rural Koreans to buy into the national strategy of economic development and 
modernization. It aimed to promote among rural residents what the central state called the 
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“Saemaul Spirit” or the “New Village Spirit.” The values that were cultivated among New 
Village Movement village leaders and then passed onto village residents were the “values of 
integrity, self-help, cooperation, rationalism, and an optimistic view of life” (Boyer and Ahn 
1991, 36).  This installation of new values was at the heart of the New Village Movement. In 
fact, President park “openly stated that he believed mental development to be more important 
than economic development” (Sonn and Gimm 2013, 26). The idea was that this “mental 
transformation” – or developmentalist awakening would lead to the permanent rationalization of 
rural life. The goal of economic uplift was secondary to a rural buy-in to the ideology of 
economic development that had already taken hold in Korea’s urban areas.  
 As part of the New Village Movement, surplus cement and steel from industrial 
production was shipped to villages all over the country. At the same time leaders in every village 
were trained to encourage villagers to voluntarily work together to use the materials and 
participate in village improvement projects like broadening village access roads, repairing and 
improving village dikes and ponds, constructing community wells and community laundry 
facilities, and reforesting nearby terrain (Boyer and Ahn 1991). The program also used 
intervillage competition and classification of villages as undeveloped, developing, and developed 
to motivate villagers to move up on the hierarchy of development. In spite of notable visual 
changes in villages due to infrastructural improvements, high levels of participation in the 
program, and increases in rural income levels in the early 1970s, by the end of the 1970s, 
widespread rural debt that had been incurred because of modernization projects and the 
commercialization of agriculture effectively wiped out much of the income gains, placing rural 
Koreans at an even more impoverished position in absolute terms in comparison with urban 
industrial workers (Boyer and Ahn 1991; Nemeth 1988). Furthermore, infrastructural 
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improvements in villages were unsuccessful in stemming the tide of migration to the industrial 
urban areas in Korea (Boyer and Ahn 1991). However, as an engine of transformation of rural 
residents to pro-development attitudes, the movement was a wide success (Sonn and Gimm 
2013). Village residents reported that the New Village Movement had made them “more diligent 
and comfortable” and that it had increased their own wealth and the wealth of their town (Boyer 
and Ahn 1991).  
 Jeju Islanders in rural villages were enthusiastic participants in the New Village 
Movement. In addition to village infrastructure improvement, Jeju agriculture was transformed 
during this time through the introduction of commercial citrus farming and agricultural 
innovations like the “walking tractor” (Nemeth 1988). Among the older longtime residents of 
Jeju Island that I interviewed, they expressed overwhelmingly positive attitudes towards the 
economic development of the New Village Movement, often crediting President Park Chung Hee 
as having raised postwar Jeju out of poverty. In spite of criticisms of the material and economic 
effectiveness of the New Village Movement (Nemeth 1988; Lie 1998), the spirit of participating 
in development and modernization that it created among rural residents throughout Korea, 
including Jeju, was effective for mobilizing feelings of nationalism. Sonn and Gimm (2013) 
describe the New Village Movement as “an apparatus that diffused developmentalist 
governmentality to rural communities, the governmentality that had already been established in 
major industrialized cities such as Seoul.” The New Village Movement was a successful 
technique for recruiting Jejuans into the national body.         
Through tourism development and rural development, Jeju became a Korean space, and 
Jeju Islanders Korean subjects, who, like other Koreans on the mainland were buying into the 
ethos of development. Koh and Barclay (2007) argue that when compared to Jeju Islanders living 
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in Japan who migrated to Japan before World War II who have much more abstract ties to 
Koreanness and a much stronger identity as Jeju Islanders, contemporary Jeju Islanders have a 
clearer sense of identity as Korean and a weaker regional Jeju identity. For many islanders, it is 
likely that developmental ideology was powerful and convincing. Lee (2010) argues that 
President Park had the advantage of having at his disposal the very convincing rhetoric of 
overcoming Korea’s history of oppression from larger nations. Slogans from the era such as 
“Let’s Live Better!” and “If We Try, We Can Do It!” had the effect of placing all Koreans 
together in one upwardly mobile arc. This levelled Koreans of all classes and regions, including 
Jeju Islanders. Nelson (2000) makes the point that, “with nationalism as the fuel for South 
Korean industrialization, the emphasis on an imagined future as the site of the ‘real’ nation 
helped to defer judgment on the success and fairness of economic and political policies.” In other 
words, the there was a sense in which Koreans – and Jeju Islander included – were able to endure 
the injustice and economic unevenness of the present in order to reap benefits later.  
 
Discontent 
This is not to say that there was no resistance to the central state on Jeju during this 
period; Jeju newspapers reveal particular moments of concerted efforts to reclaim space as 
Jejuian and local, as well as cultural resistance against the moral turpitude that tourism brought. 
There was also public protest against kisaeng tourism establishments. In 1978, a service woman 
“escaped” from a kisaeng establishment and made her story public. The Jeju public was 
horrified. The escapee told of women being forcibly confined in these establishments through a 
culture of mutual surveillance and torture. Upon investigation, the business owners of the 
kisaeng establishment where the woman escaped from were arrested and tried. Other venues 
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were investigated as well. There was outcry from the Jeju public such that the offending owners 
were quickly tried, found guilty and punished.17  The event caused a public outcry; however, 
even afterwards, the kisaeng businesses in Jeju, for the most part, remained open and 
functioning. It was only in the early 2000’s that kisaeng establishments really disappeared on 
Jeju. Controversies like this one and the stories surrounding the assault of local girls were most 
likely very painful to Jeju people – symbolic of their inability to protect the most vulnerable 
members of their society from becoming victims of the tourism industry. And yet throughout the 
military dictatorship, they had almost no political or economic agency with which to protest.   
There were also some instances of more active protest. In 1970, for example, construction 
began on a hotel and golf course resort on Sŏngsan Ilch'ul Bong, a beautiful natural volcano 
formation on Jeju. However, as construction began, local haenyŏ (women divers) took notice and 
began to protest, discovering that the resort blocked the road to an important fishing ground. 
When the developers ignored their protest – amplified later by 400 villagers who joined in – they 
took their grievances to Jeju City Hall. In looking at the paperwork, they found that the deal had 
been misrepresented to them when they agreed to let the development project proceed and that 
their consent had in effect been given without their knowledge. However, there was not much 
political redress that the villagers could muster and the development project proceeded. The 
conflict tore the local villages apart, with some villagers supporting the builders and some 
opposing.18   
These failed attempts at protest reveal a crucial factor that contributed to Jeju Islanders 
acquiescence to the state-led development plans: Jeju Islanders had been thoroughly stripped of 
                                                 
17 Jeju Shinmun, August 3, 1978; Jeju Shinmun, August 7, 1978; Jeju Shinmun, August 8, 1978; Jeju Shinmun, 
November 15, 1978. 
18 Jeju Shinmun, June 23, 1970; Jeju Shinmun, July 16, 1970. 
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political power or any means of civil protest after the April 3rd Uprising and in the years 
following the war. In effect, they had no real choice but to acquiesce to the central government 
politically; they also lacked any political or economic power to draw from. One New York 
Times article describes a telling interaction with a local Jeju Islander: “One islander explained 
that the island’s support for the Government was natural because Jeju relies heavily on assistance 
from the central administration. If the islanders send opposition members to the Assembly, they 
are unlikely to get much consideration, he said.”19 Jeju representatives had very little voice in the 
National Assembly. Furthermore, in practice, the Park administration had full command over 
how Jeju land and resources were used and developed. The ease and speed with which President 
Park could control Jeju resources at will is clear in the example of Park’s enthusiastic offer to the 
American military in 1968 to use Jeju land to build its new base in the event that they had to 
leave Okinawa. Without the consent of Jeju people, Park invited American military officials to 
do several rounds of inspections and surveys to assess the suitability of Jeju. Park held nothing 
back in offering Jeju as a site for nuclear-ready bases – both sea and air bases.20  Although the 
bases didn’t end up being relocated to Jeju, this offer by the president shows just how willing and 
able Park was to parcel out Jeju land at his own whim. Jeju natives’ lack of any voice to resist 
something like this points to the complete lack of local political agency that Jejuans held at the 
time.    
 In these sections on developmental era Jeju Island, I have outlined the process of tourist 
development and rural development on Jeju, the function that this development played in the 
larger developmental plan of Korea, how it shifted the subjectivity of Jeju Islanders, and possible 
explanations for islanders’ widespread acquiescence to state-led development plans. I also 
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20 Kyŏnghyang Shinmun, June 18, 1968; Kyŏnghyang Shinmun, June 2, 1969. 
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looked for evidence of civil society on Jeju during the Park Chung Hee era, finding societal 
discontent, cultural resistance, or unrealized protests in newspaper accounts where I could. 
Secondary sources attest that the latent presence of these oppositional discourses, while 
unrealized during the Park era, fortified the resistant voice in Jeju when it did arrive after the late 
1980s (Han 2004; O 2003).   
 
Post-Democratic Movement Jeju  
 After the Democratic Movement in South Korea in the late 1980s, when civil society 
finally did find a voice on Jeju Island, one of the first things that citizens’ groups rallied against 
was tourism development. According to O (2003), the dawning of the Jeju citizens’ movement 
came during a controversy surrounding the development of Tapdong, a historical town in Jeju. 
Citizens expressed their frustration with the senseless business practices of the developers in the 
form of protest in the late 1980s. This anti-tourism sentiment circulated on the island. It inspired 
other protests of development projects. Discourse about the dispossession of local people from 
their land, from the profits of the development projects, and from any agency in political 
decisions surrounding tourism spread among newly forming citizens groups.  
 However, what really united the Jeju citizens’ movement was its collective action during 
the legislation of the Jeju Development Special Law in 1991. When the law was first drafted, 
there was no consultation of Jeju citizens’ opinions. As in the past, the central government 
appeared to put decision making power into the hands of the local government but was actually 
controlling everything from behind the scenes. When a draft of the bill was published in a local 
newspaper, almost all citizens groups came out in opposition to it. The language of the bill was 
written such that the ostensive purpose of the bill was to enhance the lives of citizens, and yet 
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vague language made citizens’ groups suspicious about the purpose, motivations, administrative 
organization, and ultimately the main agentive force of the bill. In short, they thought that local 
agency was being cut out of the bill as it always had been in the past. Through their protest, they 
were able to force changes in the legislative process that led to an amendment of the bill.  
There was a lot of mistrust of state-led development in Jeju; in the past, policy makers 
had protected developers and interest groups in any legislative processes. Citizens’ protests 
proceeded for a year and a half. The Special Law was originally passed in December of 1991, 
but after push back from Jeju citizens, the law was amended and ratified again in 1994. Many of 
the citizens’ needs and opinions were addressed; this was the first time the central government 
had seriously considered Jeju citizens’ opinions in creating legislation. It gave Jeju residents 
motivation to participate in Jeju development in a newly agentive way. O (2003) called this 
moment a “cornerstone” in changing the shape of development on Jeju.  
 The fact that agency in the law was the point that citizens’ groups rallied around during 
the protests surrounding the Jeju Development Special Law is telling. It points to a shared 
experience of dispossession and severe lack of agency during the military dictatorship years. It is 
no surprise that Jeju people demanded agency in the development process as soon as they were 
able to unite their voices in protest. They also began to reclaim historical agency during the same 
period. In 1991, a Special Committee for the Jeju April 3rd Incident was established in the Jeju 
provincial assembly and a public inquiry in the truth of the incident began. In 1999, a Special 
Act for the Investigation and Recovering the Honor of Victims of the Jeju April 3rd Incident was 
enacted by parliament and promulgated in January of 2000; in October of the same year, 
President Roh Moo-hyun officially apologized to the relatives of the victims of the incident, 
admitting the mistakes of the state (H. J. Kim 2014; S. Suh 2007).  
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Jeju and Globalization  
 Since the flowering of civil society on Jeju and South Korea’s globalization campaign, 
Jeju has undergone many changes. The most recent iteration of ‘development’ on Jeju has been 
the formation of the Jeju Free International City in 2002. Some mark the establishment of the 
Jeju Free International City as the first fully locally-driven development project (Han 2004; B.-
G. Park 2005). The Jeju Free International City (JFIC) project aims to draw foreign capital and 
domestic corporations into the island through relaxed regulations on international firms, tax 
incentives, and easier access to tourist visas and even permanent residency. Some argue that this 
is the arrival of neoliberal governing policies to the island. In an article about globalization and 
its relationship to local political economy, Park (2005) uses the example of Jeju Free 
International City to argue that it was in fact the local businesses and officials invested in the 
tourist industry on Jeju who used the “extra-local ideological environment,” i.e., the enthusiasm 
surrounding globalization and burgeoning international trends toward economic liberalization, to 
gain political momentum for support of the growth of the industry in the face of local opposition. 
In the 1990s, when the tourist industry on Jeju was floundering, some local business owners 
wanted the government to invest in several mega-development projects to revitalize the industry. 
However, there was opposition from local political forces and environmental and citizens’ NGOs 
who thought that this kind of expansion would have a negative effect on local agriculture and 
fishing industries as well as on Jeju’s identity as a unique rural community. In the face of local 
opposition, pro-development groups in Jeju reshaped their plans for expansion to fit the frame of 
“international free city” and to align with the national discourse of globalization so that they 
could mobilize the support of local opponents, and gain support from the central government.  
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The central government had its own motivations for supporting the Jeju project. Since the 
mid-1990s, the Korean government shifted from being a protectionist economy towards 
economic liberalization and deregulation. However, because of strong social and political 
resistance to these changes and its subsequent inability to impose them across the board in 
Korea, the Korean government strategized to put into place “spatially selective liberalization” 
and create special economic zones to implement these new deregulatory policies. Through the 
petition of local businesses and officials on Jeju, one such special economic zone became the 
Jeju Free International City. Park (2005) argues that this local “jumping up” strategy of 
mobilizing globalizing and deregulation discourse was a successful way to weaken local anti-
development forces on the island. In effect, a local battle was scaled up to national and global 
levels. In other words, the tables were turned in the sense that local forces were now using the 
national government support to their own ends.  
However, some contend that even regarding policies like the JFIC, real local voices – the 
dissenting voices of citizens – are not being heard. Han (2004) argues that although the JFIC was 
an ostensibly locally-driven movement, it was the pro-development growth coalition and local 
politicians and newspapers who drove the movement with the calculated “tacit support” of 
citizens. By only surveying Jeju citizens very early on in the development of the project and 
giving them incomplete information about it, they were able to get a wide base of support for the 
project, even though, according to Han, it did not necessarily serve the interests of local people. 
Although there were many voices of dissent from NGOs who argued the JFIC still leaned too 
heavily on the power structures of the central government, they failed to rally the support or 
interest of Jeju people, and so were overcome by pro-JFIC voices. Han (2004) points to the 
limitations that oppositional civil society still faces in Jeju; although there is new autonomy for 
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local political forces in Jeju, there still seems to be a dependency on the central government, and 
an unwillingness to go against the grain of development policy. 
It is an accomplishment that in post-Democratic Movement South Korea a localization 
process has happened in Jeju – one that has officially put control of development back into the 
hands of the local government. However, the irony here is that rather than representing the 
desires and will of the local people, in the first moments of the flowering of regional political 
agency, local politicians instead appealed to a global ideal in order to justify moneyed and 
capitalist interests. Tommy Tran’s dissertation on Jeju Island (2017), which focuses in part on 
the development and construction of the Jeju Free International City, describes the lack of 
creativity and local distinctiveness in these now ubiquitous culture and arts driven development 
projects like the JFIC. Rather than drawing attention to the unique features of Jeju as a local 
place, generic “global” aspirations and cookie cutter development plans flatten it, making it just 
another opportunity for local elites and outside investors to turn a profit.  
Although the Jeju Free International City project has in a sense localized tourism 
development in Jeju, the continued expansion of a pro-development agenda increases the 
concentration of capital in the hands of fewer and fewer people on Jeju. Jeju Island, once a 
community-oriented agrarian society which prided itself on its egalitarianism, is becoming 
increasingly class-stratified. Those who are connected to the Free International City or other big 
tourism ventures are enriched, and an older generation of farmers and fishermen and haenyŏ are 
increasingly left behind. In addition, although the Jeju Free International City sponsors projects 
all around the island, because Jeju City is the administrative center of the project and also the site 
of some of the major developments, it encourages the continuation of an island-wide 
urbanization process, where people from rural villages in Jeju move to Jeju City. While the Jeju 
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Free International City draws Jeju into neoliberal Korea, Jeju’s rural areas are left behind across 
an ever widening economic divide. In spite of the economic development efforts like the New 
Village Movement, rural areas in Jeju remain some of the most depressed in the entire country. 
It was these depressed and dispossessed rural areas that the first wave of millennial 
migrants from Seoul first encountered and settled into. The first wave of millennial migrants 
from Seoul found the rent prices in rural Jeju to be some of the cheapest in the country. Some 
were able to buy houses or even buy land and have their own houses built. In part it is this 
encounter with this sudden availability of space that has fueled the urban to rural migration to 
Jeju. Before the creation of the Olle Trail, for Seoulites Jeju was a peripheral space, known to 
them only in their trips to Jeju in which they were used to hopping from one tourist site to 
another. Rural Jeju was completely off their cognitive map of South Korea – so far removed was 
it from significance to Korean urbanites. After the encounter with rural Jeju that the Olle Trail 
provided, however, the dispossessed space of Jeju offered an unexpected exit from the Seoul rat 
race. The dispossession of rural Jeju has, ironically, set Jeju up for repossession and remaking by 
a young generation of downwardly mobile middle-class millennials, a process I outline in the 











CHAPTER 2: HOME ALONE: BUILDING ALTERNATIVES  




I am not jealous of people with money, with nice clothes, a nice car. To me, my house is like a 
penthouse. I can see the sea from my house . . . I think this is the best place. Better than a hotel. 
Taking the village bus gives me freedom. I don't have to worry about driving and I can think 
during that time instead .. .  My thoughts are my fortune. I also gain energy and strength from 
trying to give healing to others.  
 
This is a quote from Miyŏn, a young single woman who, in 2009, travelled to Jeju after a 
bad falling out with her parents. One day during her trip, as Miyŏn walked the newly established 
Olle Trail (a system of walking trails that hugs the Jeju coastline), she came upon a vacated rural 
house that had neither electricity nor running water. In a moment, she saw a vision of herself 
moving to Jeju and living in this small, cozy house on the Jeju shore. She located the owner as 
soon as she could, and to her surprise, she gained permission to live in the house for free, as long 
as she agreed to take care of it. Miyŏn eventually renovated the house and decorated it to her 
own taste, making it into a personal refuge. She later began to take guests into her home when 
she opened it up as a guesthouse, taking to calling it her house “Mongdol House,” which 
translates to “House of the Smooth Stones.”   
Miyŏn was part of what migrants colloquially termed the “first generation” (ilsedae) of 
migrants from Seoul, those who relocated to Jeju after the opening of the Olle Trail in 2007 but 
before the 2013 rush, when the net number of incoming migrants reached nearly 1000 a month. 
Migrants of the first generation were sometimes seen as pioneers, cutting out a path for others to 
follow. They were driven, though, by a very different affect than later “generations” of migrants 
to Jeju. While post-2013 migrants to Jeju were triumphant in their rejection of neoliberal Seoul 
life and gushed about an affective connection to the space of Jeju, migrants in the early days of 
the migration cited failures and a sense of desperation as having pushed them to move to Jeju. I 
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argue in this chapter that it is through the first generation’s material remaking of Jeju – especially 
the remaking of the built environment of Jeju’s rural villages – that later generations were able to 
celebrate an alternative life in Jeju and enact an engaged exodus from Seoul.  I feature Miyŏn’s 
story at length in this chapter as a way to show how the discovery and material remaking of the 
Jeju house helped young people etch out a new social existence that allowed them and others that 
followed to make a triumphant exodus from middle class Seoul.  
I show in this chapter that the exodus to Jeju did not come about because of an organized 
decision to act against the state. Instead, my ethnographic findings showed that it was a 
relocation to Jeju and the creation of materialized and localized alternatives in place that 
precipitated a politically engaged refusal of normative South Korean middle-class life and by 
extension economic and social structures formed by state and capital. In other words, alternatives 
created in place in Jeju turned what would have been a small and inconsequential migration into 
a politically engaged exodus. 
Specifically, in this chapter, I argue that a radical break from mainstream middle-class 
society was, in part, created in the Jeju house/home. In houses in Jeju, millennials were able to 
create materialized and localized alternatives to normative Seoul middle class life. In Seoul, 
these young people had been middle class only by association; in reality, they were downwardly 
mobile, part of the growing segmented lower middle class among the millennial generation. 
Unable to secure full-time professional jobs, they couldn’t afford independent housing in Seoul 
or launch adult lives of their own. In rural Jeju, however, they encountered affordable housing 
and a sudden availability of space. In the temporary refuge and security that they found in the 
Jeju house/home, they began to actively reject the hegemonic middle-class standards that had 
increasingly become out of reach for them in Seoul. Rather than reproduce an urban middle 
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classness in these homes in Jeju, they, instead, celebrated not working, not getting married and 
starting families, and not achieving the economic benchmarks of the middle class. In discovering 
and inhabiting and then renovating, redesigning and resignifying their houses/homes in Jeju, they 
created positive alternatives to hegemonic Korean middle-class normativity. They remade 
kinship structures, forms of selfhood, and recreated sociality from the ground up. The Jeju 
house/home, then, became a space to create a positive and competing social existence from the 
one they had known in Seoul.  
It is important to note that this migration was predicated on the dispossession of the Jeju 
countryside that I outlined in Chapter 1. It was only because of uneven development projects and 
policies that favored migration both to urban areas on the mainland and intra-island urbanization 
within Jeju that rural Jeju was left behind, underpopulated and in the post-2008 popularization of 
the Olle Trail, “discovered” as an affordable place to relocate to for urban millennials.  
As early migrants transformed their houses in Jeju into hospitality spaces like 
guesthouses, restaurants, and cafes, and attracted stressed-out and dissatisfied millennials from 
Seoul who came to Jeju to take a break, these spaces became a semi-public infrastructure that 
solidified the path of exodus for more like-minded downwardly mobile middle-class millennials 
from Seoul. These spaces within this Seoul millennial-led hospitality circuit became meeting 
grounds for airing grievances about life in Seoul, for modeling a new life in Jeju for would-be 
migrants, and for solidifying a cultural milieu of refusal and rebellion against Korean middle-
class normativity. As more of these spaces opened up, the trickle of migrants that had begun this 
movement grew into a steady flow. An exodus was crafted in the founding of spatial alternatives 




Anthropology of the House/Home 
The literature in anthropology about the house/home has brought to life a tension 
between house/home as an intensely social space that reproduces the dramas of outside social 
and political life versus the house/home as a site of refuge from society and potential site of 
resistance to society’s structures and strictures (Birdwell-Pheasant and Lawrence-Zuniga 1999; 
Cieraad 1999; Fehervary 2013; D. Miller 2001; Orta 2004). (I use ‘house/home’ here to draw 
attention to the fact that both materiality and meaning constitute human dwellings – and that both 
aspects factor into the analysis at hand.) On the one hand, the house/home is structurally 
constituted by kinship relationships, symbolically crisscrossed by power differentials across 
generation and gender. In addition, the house is a space that is shaped by wider social norms and 
class striving. The location of a house, its built form, and its internal furnishings can all be 
markers of social status.  The vast literature on Levi-Strauss’s “house societies” elucidates the 
complex intertwining of kin and class in descent based corporate dwellings (Errington 1989; 
Carsten and Hugh-Jones 1995; Joyce and Gillespie 2000; Levi-Strauss 1982). Furthermore, in 
the modern era, the house is increasingly a site for the intrusion of the state and commodification 
by the market. Political shifts, social reform, and modernization projects spearheaded by the state 
often begin at the level of the house and household to enact visions of progress for the future. 
Remaking the house/home and by extension society has been a cite of social engineering for 
those who wish to rebuild society from the ground up (Ghannam 2002; Fehervary 2013). 
However, on the other hand, the house has also long functioned as a safe space or refuge 
from the world, with potential to become a counterhegemonic space of resistance. State projects 
of reform of the house/home are rarely met with acquiescence (Ghannam 2002). In other cases, 
state-driven projects of housing are appropriated by those who inhabit the dwellings, as they 
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bend physical spaces to their own will and purposes (Fennell 2015; Shabazz 2015; Fehervary 
2013). Krisztina Fehervary, in her work on socialist and postsocialist materialities in Hungary, 
for example, contends that private domestic spaces – both standard panel apartments left over 
from the socialist era and single-unit family homes – often became “anti-socialist heterotopia,” 
safe havens and contrasts to the larger messy and uncontrollable world that people found 
themselves in (Fehervary 2013).  Houses have also functioned as safe havens for minority 
populations that face a hostile outside world. bell hooks describes what she calls “homeplace” 
for African-Americans as “the one site where one could freely confront the issue of 
humanization, where one could resist . . . where we could restore to ourselves the dignity denied 
us on the outside in the public world.” (hooks 1991).  
In this chapter I build on the idea of houses/homes as sites of reversals of the world – 
places to experiment with counterhegemonic projects, rather than reproduce or bolster outside 
social order and structure. Crucially, in this chapter, I focus on a bottom-up material remaking of 
the house that in turn radically questions the meaning of the home in Korean society. I suggest 
that through the material process of renovating and redesigning a house, ideals about the home 
could be radically resignified and challenge the normative notions of family and nation in South 
Korea.   
 
The House/Home in Korean Ethnography 
Classic ethnography about the house/home in South Korean anthropology typically 
conducted structural analysis of the rural house, unpacking the reproduction of larger systems of 
gender, kinship, and political and spiritual organization in the physical and symbolic structures 
of the traditional Korean home. In the 1960s and 1970s when this research was being carried out, 
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South Korea was just beginning to transition out of being a rural agrarian nation, where houses 
had been both important nodes in local spiritual geographies (Kendall 1985) and also sites of 
ritual that paid homage to patrilineal ancestors and constituted a Neo-Confucian social order 
(Brandt 1990; Kendall 1985; Janelli and Janelli 1982). With the rapid industrialization and 
urbanization of the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s the house/home changed in dramatic ways. Massive 
rural to urban migration swelled the population of cities, especially Seoul, as factories attracted 
young men and women looking for new opportunities and families looking for a better standard 
of living.   
This period of urbanization in South Korea overlapped with a state-promulgated 
developmentalist rhetoric of collective rise. Urbanization and industrialization produced drastic 
shifts in employment sectors – movement from agricultural labor to factory jobs and other urban 
employment – that were often equated, by state rhetoric, with individual and family class 
mobility. While there is evidence that there was some degree of pronounced open mobility in the 
early 1960s just as the industrialization and urbanization period were kicking off, educational 
credentials were standardized and became inflated rather quickly following this period, making 
educational capital crucial to middle class achievement and hardening classed advantages in the 
Korean labor market (Abelmann 2003). However, the rhetoric that upward mobility was taking 
place – and particularly that the middle class was expanding – continued well into the 1990s.  
As Korea sought to groom itself for entry into the global economy, it was necessary that 
Seoul – the economic, political, and cultural center of South Korea – reflect spatially the 
upwardly mobile aspirations of the nation. To this end, the Seoul government and construction 
companies teamed up to make life in high-rise apartment buildings the symbol and standard of 
modern middle class living. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, the government passed laws to 
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facilitate faster and more expedient redevelopment in Seoul, which often meant the destruction 
of low-cost housing. It also continued to market high-rise apartments as the “modern” choice for 
aspirants of the middle class, stressing the increases in efficiency and safety, cutting-edge 
amenities, and location in up and coming neighborhoods of Seoul’s best and brightest. It 
continued to direct redevelopment projects for increasingly more expensive high-rise projects 
while neglecting to support the development of low-cost housing for the many new migrants to 
the city who could not afford to buy a place in these new high rises. As for commercial interests, 
the profits in building high-rise apartment complexes were much more lucrative, and so there 
was little motivation for construction companies to invest in affordable housing for the vast 
swathes of low-income newcomers to the city. And so the construction of increasingly expensive 
middle-class high-rise apartments continued alongside the growth of illicit slums in the 
mountainous edges of the cities (Nelson 2000). Because of the intense national interest and 
capital investment in the high-rise apartment as a crucial building block of modernity and 
upward mobility, owning a unit in a tall modern apartment building became the uncontested gold 
standard of middle class achievement by the 1980s (Gelézeau 2007; J. Song 2014; Nelson 2000; 
Lett 1998).  
In addition to being a symbol of modernity and middle-class living, the apartment unit in 
the city was also one of the only modes of secure financial investment that middle-class families 
in the developmental era could access. Because of rapid urbanization as well as investment from 
chaebŏls (South Korean conglomerates that drove the growth of the economy during the 
developmental era) in the real estate market, real estate prices in Seoul and other large cities in 
South Korea rose sharply starting in the 1970s, increasing much faster than the consumer price 
index and wages. With the lack of job security and absence of government or corporate support 
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for retirement, investment in real estate became virtually the only mode of legitimate investment 
for Korean households (Nelson 2000). Owning an apartment in the city symbolized upward 
mobility; it also meant economic stability. 
The economic and social pattern that tied middle class achievement to the purchase of a 
high-rise apartment in the city, along with a regular well-paid job to pay for it, had not changed 
by the time I started to do research in 2015. For a young man, owning an apartment meant that 
he could marry and launch a middle-class life. Owning a Seoul apartment in the right part of 
town also signaled that he had a job good enough to finance the place and maintain a middle-
class existence. Without an apartment it would be hard to earn the approval of his girlfriend’s 
parents to marry. After marriage, owning a high-rise apartment in the right area also meant an 
adequate education for a couple’s future children and proper aspiring middle-class playmates for 
them. It paved the way for middle class reproduction. Apartment ownership transparently 
displayed achievement of middle-class status or lack thereof. Furthermore, the exact location and 
size of a family’s apartment filled out an even more nuanced picture of micro-class identity.   
However, when young people were unable to reach the high bar of the normative middle-
class standard, whether because they were underemployed, unemployed, or uninterested in 
marriage and starting a family, they became stuck in an in between phase, unable to launch 
independent lives. The housing system was especially disadvantageous to young single women 
who wished to venture out on their own without getting married. Although the millennial 
generation as a whole has been hit hard by structural adjustments in the economy, young women 
have been more affected than young men because flexibilization of labor in Korea has hit 
feminized labor sectors harder and faster than male-dominated labor sectors. As a result, young 
single women are even less likely than young single men to be able to make enough money to 
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afford independent housing or even to qualify for a loan for rental housing (J. Song 2014). 
Jesook Song’s eye-opening ethnography of young single women and housing in contemporary 
Seoul reveals the barriers to young single women’s achievement of residential autonomy in the 
city in spite of their educational capital and desire to embrace the liberal ethos of independent 
living (2014). Effectively, most middle-class young people in Seoul who do not either marry 
someone with a steady middle-class income, or who can land a secure higher income job 
themselves, continue to live with their parents, unable to venture out to start independent lives. In 
a nearly totalizing national project of investment, future security, and upward mobility, most 
young people lack means and pathways for veering outside of the pattern set out for them by 
their middle class upbringing and educational preparation even though they fail to reach the 
benchmarks laid out for them. 
 
Migration to Jeju  
The millennials that I studied – a downwardly mobile cohort of a generation of young 
people who had come of age in post-IMF crisis South Korea – were mostly from Seoul and had 
largely been raised in middle-class dwellings in the city, educated in four-year institutions with 
varying degrees of prestige, and were expected to go on to reproduce the normative middle class 
social pattern of full-time employment, marriage, and purchase of an urban apartment. However, 
as I outline at length in the Introduction, because of structural adjustments after the 1997 IMF 
crisis that led to the casualization of labor, many among this well-educated stratum of young 
adults were chronically underemployed or unemployed (Cho 2015; J. Song 2014; U and Pak 
2007). This meant that they lacked the funds to purchase a home in the city or to put down the 
large required lump-sum down payment necessary to live in rental housing. Furthermore, 
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because of the gaze from close-knit and classed networks of kin, work colleagues, and fellow 
alum, moving into neighborhoods that went down in the hierarchy within class-stratified Seoul 
was not an option, even if it had been affordable to them (which in many cases it was not). The 
majority of my interlocutors were single and still living with their parents back in Seoul or other 
urban areas before they moved to Jeju, unable to launch independent lives. They talked about 
having longed to strike out on their own, but feeling trapped and economically unprepared to 
find independent housing of their own. The married couples in my sample were largely getting 
by in cheaper rental properties.  
Beyond the desire to be independent, my interlocutors felt constricted in Seoul at both a 
physical and psychological level.  Many of my interlocutors described the suffocation they felt 
riding a packed “subway from hell” to work, being exposed to the air pollution and constant 
traffic, and enduring a chronic lack of green spaces in the city. They also suffered from the 
physical and emotional stress of being overworked and underpaid. As many of them had to work 
multiple contract jobs in order to make ends meet, endure the condescension of the corporate 
hierarchy, and face job insecurity, many of them felt constantly exhausted and frustrated, not to 
mention inadequate and ashamed for not being able to land regular jobs and to launch into 
independent living.  Psychologically, a lack of personal space – whether in public or even in their 
crowded urban dwellings – also deeply affected them. One woman explained to me that in Seoul, 
people didn’t even have enough private space to find a place to cry.  
These descriptions of physical and especially emotional and psychological suffering were 
in part encouraged by a rising discourse in Korea that centered around the paired experiences of 
being “wounded” (sangch'ŏ padasŏ) and the antidote of “healing” (hilling) that I outlined in the 
Introduction. The concept of “healing” as it took shape in Korea indexed a specific restoration 
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that was necessary because of the psychological or emotional “wounds” that came from a society 
of excessive competition. Park (2016) characterizes the woundedness of this discourse as 
“’social wounds,’ i.e., the wounds caused by social and structural problems” (383). Although 
healing was largely presented as a universal and generalized pain that anyone could experience, 
the idea of woundedness – especially a sense of social woundedness – resonated especially well 
among the millennial generation who faced stiff competition in successive contests of life: the 
college entrance exam, acquiring a regular job, surviving the brutal workplace, being able to 
afford the right kind of housing, saving up enough for retirement, and getting their kids into the 
best schools. Those who were “in pain” because of the trials of competitive Korean life, who felt 
frustration, anxiety and a sense of failure, were encouraged to find sources of “healing.”  
“Healing” was the provision of comfort, encouragement, sympathy, rest, and relaxation as solace 
and restoration for these wounds of modern post-IMF life. 
Relocating to Jeju, for the early pre-2013 generation of migrants, was not a premeditated, 
politicized statement against neoliberal Seoul. Rather, the initial impulse to travel to Jeju was 
influenced by the therapeutic discourse of “healing” and stemmed from a strong desire to hide 
away and lick one’s wounds after fighting a losing battle of middle-class achievement in Seoul.  
Lacking spatial alternatives in the city and primed by the discourse of pausing and taking a 
break, travelling to Jeju became a temporary – and largely apolitical – means to reflect and 
regroup.  
It was only after they began to settle on Jeju Island that these young people were able to 
begin to construct the counterhegemonic lifestyles and attitudes that lay the groundwork for a 
politically engaged refusal and exodus from middle class Korean society. I argue that the exodus 
was only full-fledged when a materialized alternative had been built in localized spaces on Jeju 
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Island. Spatial alternatives had to be built on Jeju Island before a real break from middle class 
society could take place. Paolo Virno has written about exodus as the founding of a non-state 
alternative that refuses the rules and limitations of state systems. He stresses, though, that “only 
those who do the founding will succeed in finding the parting of waters by which they will be 
able to leave Egypt” (Virno 1996, 196).  In other words, the founding of positive alternative 
structures is necessary before the road to exodus can be laid down. Taking inspiration from 
Virno, in this chapter I argue that the discovery of the Jeju house as an affordable housing option 
and then the subsequent material remaking and refashioning of its meaning to create subversive 
modes of sociality, kinship structures, and understandings of self, was crucial for the emergence 
of politically engaged exodus to Jeju Island. I turn now to the story of Miyŏn and her small rural 
stone house on Jeju Island to unpack the materialized and localized formation of the politically 
engaged withdrawal from Seoul.  
 
Miyŏn’s Story 
Miyŏn was a member of what some called the “first” generation – part of the group of 
millennial migrants who moved to Jeju before the 2013 rush, before the migration had morphed 
from defeatist slinking away to a celebratory choice. I first met Miyŏn through a Korean 
researcher friend who was staying at her guesthouse for a few nights while she spent time doing 
field research in the town where Miyŏn lived. She told me that Miyŏn often had informal 
gatherings at her house with migrant friends from the mainland and guests who were staying at 
her guesthouse. She invited me along and I joined for food, drinks, and storytelling. I was soon 
folded into Miyŏn’s social circle, and I often went back to spend time with her and whoever 
happened to be gathered at her guesthouse that evening. Miyŏn was a thoughtful and gregarious 
host and she exuded a cool laissez faire attitude about friends that gave her a special kind of 
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magnetism. I begin my analysis here by recounting Miyŏn’s story, gleaned from the time that I 
spent hanging out with her and others in her house. Every time I went back, Miyŏn would add 
more layers to the story she pieced together about her life – past, present, and future.21   
Like others of her generation, Miyŏn was first driven to Jeju for a temporary break by a 
combination of frustration, stress, and feelings of inadequacy about her life in Seoul. She herself 
insisted that her initial trip to Jeju Island was born of an experience of “failure.” She described 
her pre-Jeju life as a serial failure of her career and then her family life. Like other educated and 
ambitious young people of her generation, as a college student Miyŏn had dreamed of launching 
a career in a large Korean company.  Catching the study abroad trend in its very early stages, 
Miyŏn attended design school in Italy and then landed a job at a big interior design firm in Seoul. 
She had always dreamed of a life in a big firm in Seoul; she imagined herself producing creative 
floorplans, transforming interior spaces through clever design, and working with a dynamic team 
– all while wearing stylish clothing. However, the reality of the job was much less glamorous 
than she realized, with many late nights spent at field sites and responsibility to manage a large 
group of often disgruntled workmen. Miyŏn also disliked the dishonesty that came with having 
to cover for her firm when up it made mistakes. She also felt unsuited to shaming and bullying 
the workman that she managed in the way that she was instructed to. She felt that the job was far 
from the creative work that she had been trained to do. Concluding that she was not cut out for 
                                                 
21 Miyŏn’s migration story was representative of those who came to Jeju in the early days of the migration. I 
encountered the patterned narrative structure of Miyŏn’s story in the stories of other migrants that I met; there was 
the familiar sequence of hitting rock bottom in Seoul, taking an extended journey to Jeju to walk the Olle Trail and 
to figure out next steps, and then the rash decision to move permanently to Jeju and a quick relocation without a 
clear plan. Miyŏn’s story echoed a common trajectory and was co-crafted with others in the migrational cohort in a 
specific historical moment, within the chronotopic contrasts that Seoul and Jeju presented. Over time, this migration 
narrative – what I call the “Jeju migration narrative” – took on increasingly entextualized form. I address the 
common structure of the narrative in Chapter 4 of this dissertation. In this chapter, however, I analyze in Miyŏn’s 
story the materialized and localized alternatives to normative Seoul middle class life that she contributed as her life 
unfolded in Jeju. 
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the Korean corporate world, at 32, Miyŏn quit her job. She spent the next few years 
intermittently working part-time service jobs and traveling the world with the money she had 
saved while working in the design firm.  
Around this time, Miyŏn’s father retired from his job in raw materials production and 
needed to support his retirement by opening up a business. Together Miyŏn’s parents opened up 
a barbeque restaurant in Seoul. They needed the contribution of Miyŏn’s labor in order to stay 
afloat. As Miyŏn was living with her parents and wanted to help them out since they were getting 
older, she began to work diligently at the restaurant, taking on the role of manager and working 
hard to do what she could to make the business a success. However, she soon began to butt heads 
with her parents, who usually rejected her more creative ideas for business improvement. She 
understood her work for her parents as sacrifice for the sake of family success. Instead of getting 
another job in her field, she was using her youth and energy to help the family business. 
However, she started to feel more and more that her efforts went unappreciated by her parents 
and that they were taking her for granted. Finally, in a dramatic moment of frustration and built-
up tension, Miyŏn summarily quit the managerial work she had been doing for her parents. She 
told me that she simply could no longer bear putting her own dreams and ideas on the back 
burner and being disrespected by her own parents. Even so, on the inside, she felt that quitting 
the business was tantamount to quitting her family. 
This broken relationship with her family, on top of her curtailed career as a designer, 
made Miyŏn feel as if she had been defeated. She called herself a failure. Her career as a 
designer and then her status as a good daughter and sacrificial worker had been markers of 
identity for Miyŏn , defining her as a productive member of society in middle class Seoul and 
giving her a ledge from which to hope to climb into a stable middle class life – to work, to marry, 
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to have children, to thrive in Korean society. When at first she had given up her white collar 
career, she had consoled herself by being a good daughter to her parents – and through her filial 
loyalty she endeavored to create a unit of productivity within the family. But with the 
relationship with her parents nearly severed, Miyŏn no longer had acceptable forms of identity 
within middle class Seoul.  
Miyŏn lost footing in the city. Jobless and with severed family ties, there was literally 
nowhere for Miyŏn to live in Seoul any longer. She couldn’t stay with her parents after the 
fallout, and she couldn’t afford to live on her own. Miyŏn described feeling lost and unmoored. 
Her first instinct was to run away. She wanted a place to hide. At a loss for what to do next, 
Miyŏn booked a month-long visit to a place she could visit cheaply and buy some time to plan 
her next move: Jeju Island.  It was 2009, and the Jeju boom had not yet taken off in earnest. The 
Olle walking trails – meditative walking trails that encircle the island – had just begun to be 
developed.  
Miyŏn landed in Jeju without much of a plan, except to relax, spend some time in 
reflection and figure out what to do next. She ended up spending a lot of her time walking the 
island – especially the Olle trails that were being built along Jeju’s coast. On one of these walks, 
she happened to wander away from the main trail for a little bit and chanced upon a small 
traditional Jeju home. Intrigued by the look of it and its location tucked away from the main 
drag, Miyŏn thought she might try to figure out who lived there. She discovered that the house 
was vacant. The wheels in her head began to turn. She imagined what it might be like to live in 
this small house, steps away from the Jeju shore. With the help of a new friend, who like her was 
a migrant from Seoul, she tracked down the owner of the house and found that the house had 
recently been vacated. The owner agreed to let her live there. Miyŏn returned to Seoul for a week 
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or so to settle her life there and then moved into her new home in Jeju. By 2009 when Miyŏn 
moved to Jeju, the development of the tourism industry and intra-island urbanization had left 
rural villages economically lagging and often in a state of dispossession and disrepair. The house 
that Miyŏn chanced upon lacked electricity and an attached bathroom and kitchen. For the owner 
of the house, which had been his childhood home and the home of his late mother, charging rent 
for a worn-out rural house in Jeju was unthinkable.  He was simply happy to have someone 
living in the home to prevent it from falling into more disrepair. Miyŏn was allowed to live in the 
house rent-free, provided that she take care of it.  
For Miyŏn, the sudden availability of a house, this tucked away place to live, was a huge 
relief. Spatially, she had been at an impasse, with nowhere to live and no alternative options. 
This Jeju house provided refuge and sustenance in her time of need.  She said in one of our chats, 
“If you have a place, even though your body is sick or people are tormenting you, you are still a 
person who has a house. When you go into your house, the one hundred worries that you have 
swirling around in your head are suddenly solved. I can come in here and if I am just still, I can 
be fed and kept alive.” For a generation of middling millennials in the city, a lack of affordable 
housing was one of the biggest barriers to living independently. With this problem unexpectedly 
solved, Miyŏn could move forward with her life. Away from Seoul and the prying eyes and 
opinions of her large social network, she could diverge from the well-worn path she had been 
raised to follow. Miyŏn’s house in Jeju became a foundation for a new life, one that she would 
determine according to her own designs. In this Jeju house lay an opportunity to radically 
resignify her life – in ways that were impossible in Seoul.  
Miyŏn moved in as soon as the deal was sealed with the landlord. Although the house 
was livable, it needed some major renovations – none of which Miyŏn had the funds or the 
81 
 
know-how to carry out. The house lacked electricity and an enclosed kitchen and bathroom. 
However, by chance, through what Miyŏn called inyŏn, a Korean word for a social tie or 
connection that is established by a force of destiny or providence, Miyŏn found some help. 
Miyŏn explained that in Jeju she had met some friends, who had moved down to Jeju from the 
mainland either before her or around the same time, carrying similar affective baggage. They too 
were down and out – either psychologically because of failed relationships or financially because 
of a failed business venture or career. This motley crew of “crazies” (torai), or “hippies” (hip'i), 
as she affectionately called them, looked out for each other during their early years in Jeju. Some 
of these friends had experience remodeling their own makeshift living spaces on Jeju or had 
worked day jobs in construction. Because of the connection that sprang up between them, these 
friends offered to help Miyŏn renovate her home. Miyŏn bought the material for the renovations 
– the plywood, the drywall, the electrical wiring, and paint – and supplied food on work days; 
her friends volunteered their labor, renovated, and in some cases nearly rebuilt parts of Miyŏn’s 
home.  
Miyŏn’s relationship with these new friends on Jeju was forged as they put up the new 
walls and connected the new wiring of her Jeju house together. Miyŏn knew that this relationship 
was built on a reciprocal give and take. They helped her now, but she would lend a hand when 
they needed help on another renovation project or when they needed a place to crash for a few 
days.  These friends became the closet thing that Miyŏn had to kin ties in Jeju. She said that 
these were the friends who were going to bury her when she passed away. However, Miyŏn took 
the opportunity to make these new relationships different from the ones she had left behind in 
Seoul. It was a chance to start over again with a new set of chosen kin, constructing a tentatively 
new mode of sociality. These relationships were consciously crafted in contradistinction to kin 
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and other intimate ties that characterized the developmental and contemporary eras in South 
Korea.  
From the 1960s onward, as South Korea began to rapidly industrialize, state-promoted 
propaganda knit the nation together through the idiom of the family as a way to promote 
collective economic rise (Abelmann 2003; Nelson 2000; J. Lee 2010). Factories and offices were 
also structured after family relationships and sacrifices by individuals were called upon to reap 
collective benefits for the company and ultimately for the nation.  Alumni networks developed 
tight relationships as groups would meet together regularly and aid each other in making 
professional connections. The family, the factory, the school, the office, the city, and the nation 
were like concentric circles of kin relations within which people could depend on one another as 
they made new lives amidst shifting conditions. People had thick social relationships to call on in 
times of need and there was the idea of working within these relationships to move together – 
always in an upward arc. However, after the IMF crisis in the late 1990s, the growth of the 
middle class slowed and eventually began to be reversed. As competition for educational 
achievement and stable jobs ramped up, these close social ties that had once been so celebrated 
sometimes became burdensome or were exploited for individual gain.  
Miyŏn explained that getting too close to people had caused her a lot of pain in her life – 
tumbling nearly her whole life when distrust would spring up because of the competition, 
jealousy, or exploitation of intimate relationships. In the economic down times that they were in, 
relationships were especially fraught, as the stress of limited opportunities and the threat of 
downward mobility created tensions in the closest relationships. Because of her family’s 
economic condition and her lack of a professional job, Miyŏn felt compelled to work closely 
with her parents in their family business, although she was happy to be offering her help in the 
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beginning. However, as time went on, she felt that her good intentions and care for her parents 
were being exploited. The resulting falling out with her parents left emotional deep wounds in 
Miyŏn. Because of this, in Jeju, Miyŏn had retracted from intimate ties. She began to think that it 
was wiser to keep distance from even your closest relationships, to draw apart. This more distant 
way of relating informed her relationship with her hippie friends in Jeju. They kept their space 
from one another. They didn’t meet often and they didn’t share everything that was going on in 
their lives. But they were there for each other in important moments and able to help in times of 
need. From Miyŏn’s perspective, this was a more realistic and sustainable sociality. Her hippie 
friends seemed to see it the same way.  
However, even more important than the new social ties that she was building, in her new 
home in Jeju, Miyŏn relished the new relationship she was discovering with herself. Without the 
burden of having to pay rent, Miyŏn had no obligation to work a regular job in her early years in 
Jeju. She had also saved some money from her working days in Seoul to use for monthly 
expenses. So when she first began to live in Jeju one of the biggest transformations for her was 
the transition from being a productive worker to being a willfully unproductive member of 
society. Unmoored from the life of ceaseless production in Seoul, Miyŏn was excited upon her 
arrival to Jeju about doing “absolutely nothing” (amugŏtto an hada). However, having spent 
nearly her whole life working, with occasional breaks for travel with friends, Miyŏn realized that 
she had no idea how to “play” (nolta) alone.  Alone now in Jeju with an abundance free time, she 
felt ill equipped to enjoy life. She realized that she had no hobbies, no schemes for personal 
enjoyment. Not knowing where to begin, she decided to start by taking a walk every day on the 
Olle trail closet to her. Eventually she developed other leisure activities as well – taking photos, 
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writing, remodeling and decorating her house, tending her garden. Slowly she began to learn 
how not to work – how to intentionally live a life of leisure.  
Instead of being a productive node in a system of collective rise, Miyŏn began to cut out 
a new path in Jeju. She began to focus on restoration of the self. Miyŏn’s daily walks and new 
home in a Jeju village helped her to turn her attention onto herself.  The time alone and the long 
walks helped her to think through and come to terms with the hurts that she had experienced 
during her life in Seoul, especially the bruised relationship with her parents. Miyŏn explained to 
me the affective work that had gone into restoring herself from the wounds of life in Seoul. She 
took to calling her house “Mongdol House.” Mongdol is the Korea word for smooth, rounded 
stones that are usually found on the ocean shore. Miyŏn explained that a mongdol did not start its 
life as a smooth stone, but was originally a jagged rock, broken off from a bigger stone. “In order 
for it to become a smooth stone, it had to experience a lot of hardships. It had to experience pain, 
wounds, trials; and it had to get rained on and struck by lightning. A lot of time had to pass for it 
to become a smooth stone. It might have taken ten, twenty years for it to become a mongdol.”   
Miyŏn realized that the wounds and trials she had experienced made her the person she 
was today – at peace and without her rough edges. It took the work of moving away from all of 
the central people in her life and several years of reflecting on all this in her Jeju home to come 
to this point. Spending time in her house, alone, and “doing nothing” proved to Miyŏn to be the 
most effective means of making sense of her life and overcoming the pains that she had 
experienced. Miyŏn said,  
The thing that gave me the most stimulation was reducing my life as much as possible. . . 
In order to achieve what you want and to [make sense of things] you have to empty 
yourself out and be still and alone. And then all kinds of thoughts come to you. During 
this process, all of your worries, thoughts and sorrows – from the past until now – crowd 
you like a rainstorm. And in that moment you can also deal with all of these things – they 




 With a lot of alone time and a will to face painful and difficult thoughts, Miyŏn was able to 
make sense of her life and reach a level of peace. Although she was still a work in progress, she 
drew ever closer to being the mongdol that she so admired.  
Miyŏn explained that this healing and restoration was only possible in this small tucked 
away house in a coastal village in Jeju where she had neither family, nor fellow alum, old 
colleagues or even old friends.  In inhabiting her new Jeju house, Miyŏn was remapping a 
geography of social ties that began with herself. Instead of signaling isolation or leading to 
feelings of loneliness, the idea of being alone in Jeju was a welcome break from the 
oppressiveness of social ties in Korea. The ability to successfully be alone had the function of 
separating Miyŏn (and other migrants like her) from the society that they wanted to reject and 
depart from. In the wake of this separation, Miyŏn could remake herself newly. In Jeju, Miyŏn 
began to build a life that celebrated the experience of spending time alone. She would give gifts 
to herself on her birthday and compliment herself when she was feeling down. She cherished the 
time she could spend by herself, relishing the new perspectives she gained when she was alone.  
Furthermore, Miyŏn put much of her newfound energies and time into decorating her 
house, her newfound personal space. Although Miyŏn had been trained as an interior designer, 
she felt that her creative passions had been wasted and unappreciated at the design company that 
she had worked for and even when she worked with her parents to get the small restaurant off the 
ground. In both cases, she felt unable to fully express herself creatively because she was giving 
her labor over to the aims of the company or the family. However, because she lived alone in her 
house in Jeju, Miyŏn had free reign to design and decorate according to her own whims and 
desires. She redid the big window in her living room to resemble the windows in the houses she 
had drawn as a child – with a cross and four big windowpanes. She painted her walls in pastel 
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purples, greens and blues to reflect the dreamy peacefulness she felt living there. She spread her 
knickknacks from her world travels all around her house – where they used to sit in boxes in her 
room at her parents’ place. She transformed an old grandfather clock into an attractive display 
case for more of her trinkets from her travels. She remodeled the old storage shed behind her 
house to become her craft room/study, cutting a hole in one of the walls so as to be able to gaze 
out to the ocean as she worked. Room by room, her house became a materialized expression of 
herself. Miyŏn had finally found the right canvas for her creative energies. She was turning her 
creative labor away from the company and the family and devoting it fully to her own free 
expression. 
Furthermore, as Miyŏn settled into her house in Jeju, she was emboldened to declare that 
she was unashamedly single – and was determined to remain so. Although as a young girl, 
Miyŏn had always dreamed of getting married and having her own family, she had become 
critical of the idea of the Korean family over time, especially the reality that she would probably 
have to take up the work of cooking for and serving her in-laws during holidays and perhaps 
later in life. She thought that marriage in Korea was an institution that still heavily favored men. 
In Jeju she was able to withdraw from her dream of marriage and family, declaring that she 
didn’t want to “create another family” within the Korean system. Having achieved independence 
in her house without having to marry, Miyŏn decided that she would pursue romantic 
relationships that interested her but steer away from marriage. Instead of being a site for social 
reproduction, Miyŏn’s house became a space for production of a radical form of being alone, one 
that was unmoored from traditional kinship ties and class making in South Korea. Miyŏn’s house 
came to embody a refusal of both middle-class production and middle class social reproduction. 
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Starting from scratch in Jeju, having zero social ties, Miyŏn was able to build a set of 
alternative social connections that stood in stark contrast to those of the normative middle class 
in Seoul. The loose sociality of her ties with her migrant friends represented what she understood 
to be a less problematic and more humane mode of sociality, while still fulfilling her need for a 
social safety net that would be available for her in times of need. It was a new and improved 
chosen kin network – shaved down to a bare minimum. It also offered her the company of like-
minded people who had similar affective stances with her.  However, what really made life in 
Jeju liberating for Miyŏn was her freedom to build a new existence on Jeju that focused on the 
self rather than external networks of collective identity making. In learning to spend time alone, 
in engaging in self-rehabilitation, and in creating a space that could reflect and express her own 
identity and experiences, Miyŏn was building a radical aloneness in her home in Jeju. By exiting 
from not only the world of middle-class production (i.e., a regular job) but also refusing the 
process of social reproduction, Miyŏn was radically resignifying the home, and by extension her 
place in the world.   
 
The Guesthouse in Jeju  
 To get to Miyŏn’s house, I would walk through the village center in the coastal town in 
southwest Jeju where she lived, and turn down a road that passed through green garlic fields 
before meeting the sea. Just before the road reached the shore, I would wander off to the right 
down an olle that would take me to Miyŏn’s house. ‘Olle’ is a word in the Jeju dialect that refers 
to a narrow typically stone wall-lined pathway that connects a road to the front of a house. The 
meandering olle kept Miyŏn’s house tucked away from the village and it felt like a bit of a secret 
to come upon her small traditional white house with purple trim. Often there was an orange cat 
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sunning itself on the small patio in front of the house, amidst a collection of shells that Miyŏn 
has gathered from the ocean, and smooth stones (mongdol) of various sizes – some painted with 
pastel colors.  
I got used to dropping by Miyŏn’s place when I was in the area, knocking on the 
unlocked sliding door and then popping my head in if I didn’t hear anything, calling out “ Ŏnni!” 
or “Mongdol Ŏnni!”  to make sure she heard me. This was regular practice among her friends 
and later guesthouse guests. After I met Miyŏn for the first time, she told me to call her 
“mongdol ŏnni,” which is a kin term with a descriptive modifier. ‘Ŏnni’ means “older sister” in 
Korean and ‘mongdol’ is a descriptive term that references her house – which had come to define 
her among her friends and guests. I would often bring a snack or dessert to share. Sharing treats 
was one of the ways we maintained the thread of our relationship over sometimes long stretches 
of absence. The first time I met Miyŏn she sent me home with a small tub of homemade tea that 
she had made, telling me that I would have to find another time to visit so that I could return the 
tub and maybe get a refill. She told me about a guest of hers who returned every year just for her 
tea. These small acts of reciprocity buoyed the relationships that Miyŏn formed in her home, 
creating the loose kin-like bonds that Miyŏn was cultivating in her new life in Jeju.  
After her first year of living in Jeju without earning any money, Miyŏn began to 
experiment with ways to support her humble lifestyle in Jeju. She had picked up on the 
guesthouse trend in Jeju and wanted to see if it would work to run one out of her home. What 
Koreans called “guesthouses” (kesŭt'ŭhausŭ) are small-scale bed and breakfast type businesses – 
typically run out of people’s homes. Miyŏn had already started a blog – filled with her daily 
thoughts, pictures, and poems that she had been inspired to write since relocating to Jeju – and 
had gained a small readership. She started to post information and pictures about her house and 
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opened up the only extra room in her house to female guests. She was surprised by the response 
she got. Guests started to arrive and they loved her place near the ocean. Between May and 
August of that first year, her room was booked nearly every day. A couple years later, she 
remodeled the old cowshed behind her house to make another room that could take guests in the 
summer. By then, her landlord had wised up to the trend of urban to rural migration to Jeju and 
started to charge her a modest rent. Her guesthouse business brought in some money to live on, 
and she supplemented it with day jobs that she took from time to time, helping to renovate other 
homes with her hippie friends.  
The Jeju house where Miyŏn had settled – once a center for the reproduction of the 
family – became a site of production of a very different kind. Having put in the affective of work 
of rehabilitating herself after the pain of Seoul life and learning how to be alone, she began, in 
turn, to produce these things for her guests. Miyŏn explained that after she spent the time to sift 
through her own past and make sense of the wounds she had experienced, she had become 
skilled at seeing others’ pain, especially that of her guests. She would chat with her guests over 
breakfast, asking them a few questions about their lives and they would sometimes talk for three 
or four hours afterwards, revealing some of the personal issues that were weighing them down. 
By talking things over, she would help them sort through personal problems and they would 
leave her home feeling refreshed. Some guests came down for repeat trips and more chats and 
sent her postcards and letters thanking her for the emotional support that she offered them. In this 
way, Miyŏn created an affective community of healing among her guests. Like her migrant 
friends in Jeju, Miyŏn believed that her guests were bound to her by this mysterious force of fate 
and providence, inyŏn, but limited in depth. Their interactions were limited, sometimes only 
lasting a day, but this was enough for Miyŏn. She was happy that she could get to know them 
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and help them, but also happy that there was built-in distance in these relationships. They 
embodied for her the new kinds of low investment social ties that she was after. She called her 
guests her iril kajok, or her “family for the day.” Just as she told me upon our first meeting, she 
often instructed the guests that she connected with to call her by the kin term “older sister” (ŏnni, 
for women, nuna for men).22 
Materially, Miyŏn’s house reflected the looser forms of sociality that she formed in Jeju 
that had replaced the deeper ties that she had left behind in Seoul. Her walls were full of the 
handwritten postcards and letters that her guests had written to her, often addressed to “mongdol 
ŏnni.” Her guests thanked her for the warmth and hospitality she had provided and for the 
healing companionship and conversation she had offered. Miyŏn collected and displayed these 
strands of connection to her guests as material evidence of the myriad relationships that, though 
lacking the intensity and depth of the ties she had relinquished in Seoul, had come to fill her life. 
Similarly, when prompted, Miyŏn would tell stories stirred up by the knickknacks that decorated 
every shelf, ledge, and free surface in her house. These artifacts – a book of prayers, a small 
incense holder, figurines, sand collected from the Thar dessert, and many more – were souvenirs 
of her travel, but also of the fleeting memories she had of people she had met on her journeys. A 
figurine was a gift that a friend who she had spent several days travelling with her had gifted to 
her when they parted; the book of prayers she had acquired from a local family that she had 
ended up staying with for a week because of a series of unlikely happenstances. Even though she 
lived alone, Miyŏn filled her house with material reminders of the variety of the connections – 
however temporary – that constituted her daily life.  
                                                 
22 For guests who were older than her, Miyŏn did not have guests use a kin term, as there are no kin terms in the 
Korean language for younger siblings. Younger siblings are simply addressed by their first names by their older 
siblings and parents.   
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At Mongdol House, Miyŏn offered her guests initiation into the alternative sociality that 
she and others were building in Jeju. Since the inception of the Olle Trail and the new small-
scale infrastructure of guesthouses and coffee shops that grew around it, lone travel had come to 
be encouraged in Jeju. Breaking away and finding yourself as you walked alone on the trail 
became a romantic ideal among young Seoulites. Restaurants were set up with tiny tables 
designed for lone, pensive travelers. “Lone travel” (honjayŏhaeng) became a buzzword in the 
Jeju blogosphere. Healing and meditation centers abounded. The new Jeju infrastructure was 
teaching a generation of people who had typically grown up within the close social networks of 
family, school and the company how to restore themselves after the wounds of urban life and 
how to be alone. Through their lives and stories, Miyŏn and others became models for how to 
not only vacation alone but to do life alone. Through her informal counseling, Miyŏn encouraged 
her guests to get to know their inner selves, to take walks and dialogue with themselves, to turn 
the focus of their lives away from the social relationships that they were enmeshed in and onto 
themselves. She helped them rehabilitate their selves, to be alone. She would help them with the 
things they were working through at the moment and sometimes stayed in touch over the years. 
However, crucially for Miyŏn, it was a friendship that had limits. It allowed her to be connected 
with her guests but distant at the same time. Producing this new mode of sociality became part of 
the experience that Miyŏn sold in her guesthouse, part of the affective labor that she was 
engaged in.  
In her house on Jeju Island, Miyŏn was restructuring the Korean home from the ground 
up – erasing all the expectations that had become entangled in it over the years (i.e., financial 
investment, class-making, social reproduction, gendered expectations). In Jeju, Miyŏn had 
discovered a little house that, for a short amount of time, was up for grabs; it had been left 
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behind in the capitalist system of development and redevelopment. Because of development of 
high-rise apartments in the two regional cities in Jeju in the 1990s and early 2000s, houses in 
rural areas were emptying out and often losing value. The house that Miyŏn “discovered” had 
temporarily fallen through the cracks in the capitalist economy of value. When Miyŏn first came 
upon it, she was able to live in it completely free of charge. And then, in renovating it, 
redecorating it, and resignifying its meaning through her story and through her guesthouse 
business, Miyŏn created a new haven for herself and others like her. Miyŏn’s Mongdol House 
was a bottom-up restructuring of space that contrasted sharply with the top-down structuring of 
housing in Seoul.  
Miyŏn was not the only one creating these spaces. Many of the young adult migrants that 
I encountered during fieldwork participated in this new iteration of the tourism industry that 
involved guesthouses and other small-scale spaces of leisure including coffee shops, restaurants, 
and small art galleries. These businesses popped up near the Olle Trail that was drawing 
domestic tourists to walk slowly through the beauty of Jeju Island. Often, migrants quit their jobs 
on the mainland rashly and relocated to Jeju quickly; as a result, they didn’t prepare much before 
relocating. As they looked for convenient ways to support themselves and also sought to have a 
living space of their own, the idea of having a home in Jeju that could double as a business was 
very appealing. Guesthouses were the most common of these kinds of businesses, because they 
could be run right out of the home. But small-scale restaurants and cafes were also common. 
Land and house prices in Jeju were low enough at the beginning of the migration trend that some 
of them could afford to buy a house in a small town at an affordable price. Those who couldn’t 
found low-rent housing to launch their guesthouses. A handful of them, like Miyŏn, found rent-
free housing, although this became increasingly rare as the migration trend continued.   
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Crawford (2008a) has written about “everyday space” as having the potential to become 
“places where lived experience and political expression come together” (28). These are spaces 
that exist “in the junctures between private, commercial, and domestic” (28) that can become 
sites of public protest or small-scale political or social reformations. Often these spaces are 
“ambiguous or unstable” (28) and so can be restructured and reorganized according to the whim 
of those who come across them. In these spaces, Crawford sees potential for the creation of 
small-scale counterhegemonic forms that can begin to break down the hierarchical and top-down 
structures of everyday life (Crawford 2008a).    
Guesthouses – and small-scale restaurants, cafes and galleries – in Jeju effectively 
captured everyday spaces in Jeju that had temporarily fallen into disrepair and disuse. Because of 
a declining rural population, everyday buildings in small villages in Jeju, like houses, 
warehouses, and community centers, were sometimes underused or vacated, lacking any 
immediate local utility.  Migrants bought, rented, or gained permission to use these spaces freely 
for a temporary period and then moved into them as homes or redesigned them as businesses or 
studios. Over time, this circuit of migrant-designed spaces together created a new semi-public 
infrastructure around which young people who moved down to Jeju or were contemplating 
moving down to Jeju could live differently and experiment with lives that diverged from the 
Seoul middle class standard.  
This emergent shadow tourist industry was built upon a very different ideology of rest 
than the original tourist industry in Jeju. Rather than promoting the generic state-developed 
concept of vacation reminiscent of large-scale production that involved opulent resorts and hotels 
and provided ample space for all kinds of leisure activities, these new businesses were tied to the 
particular experiences of individual escapees from Seoul. And rather than being designed to help 
94 
 
guests to recharge so as to reenter the productive workforce, guesthouses, as material expressions 
of their owners’ turning away from the Korean daily grind, often prompted deeper reflection in 
their guests and an opportunity to reevaluate their own lives. Guesthouses reflected the style, 
biography, and ideals of owners who opened them. In fact, it was common practice for 
guesthouse owners to share their “how I moved to Jeju” stories with their guests on their first or 
second evening as guests, while tying it to the style, name, or ambiance of their guesthouses.  
Guests could read the alternative pathways that their hosts had taken in the physical guesthouses 
where they were staying and gain inspiration to perhaps plan their own mode of escape.  
For example, Chunho and Sŏnyŏng welcomed me warmly the first time I stayed at their 
guesthouse overnight and shared the story of their alternative lives. Chunho and Sŏnyŏng had 
met each other during long-term travel to Jeju, both in transition and trying to figure out what to 
do with their lives. After they met, fell in love, and decided to make their lives together, they 
decided that Jeju was an ideal place for them to settle down. Chunho’s longed to be able to do 
what he wanted without pressure to conform to society’s rules. In Jeju he could wear his hair 
long and wear bohemian clothing and not work at a big corporation. Both Chunho and Sŏnyŏng 
thought Jeju offered an ideal mix of freedom and adventure without having to move abroad. And 
so they decided to open a guesthouse together in Jeju. Dodging pressure from their parents to 
have a wedding ceremony, they decided to use their money to pay for a house in Jeju that they 
could renovate instead of paying for a wedding. They had a courthouse wedding and then moved 
into the 100-year-old house they had bought in Jeju, spending the first six months of their 
marriage renovating the house together. Every month or so, Sŏnyŏng would put on a white dress 
and she and Chunho would take a picture of themselves in front of the slowly changing house. 
The finished guesthouse was decorated with these photos, along with other remnants from the 
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process of renovating the guesthouse – dried branches from the persimmon tree that had once 
stood in the yard and an artistic representation of the ivy that had covered the warehouse turned 
breakfast bar. These details along with the couple’s story and their bohemian sartorial styles gave 
the place its character. They had physically crafted an alternative place in society as they had 
renovated and redesigned their house in Jeju. In Jeju, they created a space where they could not 
follow the rules: not have a big wedding, not work at a big company, and live without the gaze of 
their middle-class social networks back on the mainland. Their guesthouse was a labor of love 
and sacrifice, but also a symbol of their deviance from the script laid out by their parents.  
Another couple who established a guesthouse in Jeju, Hyejin and Jonghyup, had 
backpacked through much of the world and worked in travel guide publication before moving to 
Jeju. Originally, they had planned to open a guesthouse in Tibet and wanted to host travelers 
from around the world, but because of the unstable political situation in Tibet moving there had 
proved not to be feasible. Instead, they settled for a small coastal town in Jeju and brought in 
decorations that they handpicked on their travels to Tibet. They named their guesthouse “Tibet 
Scenery,” aiming to recreate the hippie, freewheeling, backpacking culture that they had found 
among travelers in Tibet.  
In guesthouses in Jeju, owner, narrative, and living space were all of one piece, all 
blended into one testimonial against mainstream Seoul life. For young Seoulites who were 
picking up on the trend of travelling to Jeju for a few days or weeks to get deeper rest between 
stints of work or to recuperate from loss or personal stress, guesthouses became not only places 
to stay but inchoate models for alternative modes of living. And guesthouse owners, with their 
Jeju migration narratives and their alternative lives far away from Seoul were inspiration and 
also potential guides for new “generations” of Jeju migrants. A new social field was emerging in 
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Jeju – one that was creating a cultural infrastructure for exit from Seoul. Together the circuit of 
guesthouses, cafes, and meditative trails that popped up around the island created an 
environment for reevaluation of life in Seoul. The infrastructure of rest and rebellion that 
guesthouses and other small-scale structures of a revamped hospitality industry produced in Jeju 
created a broader culture of dropping social obligations in order to seek personal rest and 
rehabilitation.  
Guests that I encountered in guesthouses around Jeju often commented on the attraction 
of the alternative communities that sprang up in guesthouses. Guesthouses were gathering spaces 
for both guests seeking a few days or weeks of rest from their urban lives, young people who had 
entered a longer period of temporary experimentation with Jeju life and were deciding about 
migration, and those who had taken the plunge and had permanently relocated to Jeju. 
Guesthouses where they had first been inspired to move to Jeju often became the anchor and 
center of new migrants’ social world upon beginning their Jeju lives. Although the flavor of 
every guesthouse was different, many guesthouse owners welcomed the community of refugees 
from Seoul at different stages in their migratory journeys as they congregated in the evenings to 
socialize, swap stories of Jeju life, and commiserate. These unique communities shepherded 
those who wanted to relocate through the process of transition to Jeju life. One woman told me 
about how on her first trip to Jeju she stayed at a guesthouse for two weeks; she ended up having 
so much fun at the guesthouse that she didn’t even feel the need to go sightseeing. At this 
guesthouse she was introduced to a community of strong women who had migrated to Jeju and 
felt immediately that she finally found a community of like-minded people who didn’t want to 
follow the traditional track of marriage, career, and children. During her extended stay at this 
guesthouse, she made a personal decision that she was going to relocate to Jeju and start a 
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“sharehouse” (sweŏhausŭ) in Jeju City – an urban community of like-minded women who would 
live together – and like the community at the guesthouse, be “alone but together.” She followed 
through on her plan a few months later.   
In addition, many guesthouses during these early years developed a system to help ease 
the transition of those who wanted to take the plunge of relocation to Jeju and needed a 
temporary place to stay while they landed on their feet. These young people would work in 
guesthouses, helping to clean, change bedding, and keep attached cafés and storefronts running, 
in exchange for free room and sometimes free board. This position was known as the “staff” 
(sŭt'aep'ŭ) of guesthouses. In other cases, guesthouse owners would let friends or acquaintances 
from migrant circles stay in guesthouses long-term for very little rent. In one guesthouse where I 
stayed for a few weeks, the owner let a couple build a makeshift yurt on her land to live in at a 
very low cost, while they also offered craft classes to interested guests at the guesthouse.     
Furthermore, guesthouse culture, centered as it was on a new subversive form of rest and 
rehabilitation from Seoul life, expanded the spaces for “healing,” increasing opportunities for 
encounter with nature, beauty, slowness and peace on Jeju Island.  These spaces primed guests to 
come to recognize – like the owners of the spaces had done – the gap between the peace of Jeju 
and the speed, competition and “pain” of Seoul life. Many of my interviewees described the 
moment at which they decided to move to Jeju as having taken place in a guesthouse. A repeated 
sentiment was that it was at a Jeju guesthouse that they could, for the first time in a long time, 
“really” rest. For some, until they rested at a Jeju guesthouse, they hadn’t even known that they 
were in pain in Seoul. The guesthouse environment often stimulated a recognition of pain, 
reevaluation of one’s former life, and then a decision to permanently relocate.  
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Migrants like Miyŏn who established early guesthouses as sites of new sociality and 
healing on Jeju Island became known as the “first generation” of urban migrants to Jeju. This 
group of people, whose narratives were so often tied up in failure and pain, laid the groundwork 
for later migrants to the island. The culture of healing and rest they consequently cultivated in 
their guesthouses helped influence more migrants to become cognizant of the pain and drudgery 
of Seoul life and to make the decision also to relocate to Jeju.  
These guesthouses and other migrant-designed sites within the Jeju circuit became a 
makeshift infrastructure that housed the emergent social existence of these downwardly mobile 
middle class young adults from Seoul. What had begun as affective experiences of failure to 
reproduce middle class life, disenchantment with Seoul work culture, and the pain of the 
exploitation of too-close social ties in a highly competitive and exploitative environment, found a 
space for expression in Jeju guesthouses. Lefebvre has written, “Any ‘social existence’ aspiring 
or claiming to be ‘real,’ but failing to produce its own space, would be a strange entity, a very 
peculiar kind of abstraction unable to escape from the ideological or even the ‘cultural’ realm” 
(1991, 53). The growing disaffection that plagued the young adult generation in Seoul who 
couldn’t keep up with the rising standards of middle class life found a spatial solution in these 
new Jeju homes and improvised centers of alternative sociality.  I argue here that it was because 
of the availability of houses in Jeju to be inhabited and remade by migrants that a path of 
politically engaged exodus from Seoul could open. What had before been inchoate disaffection 
and disappointment with Seoul life took on a political edge after new alternatives were inscribed 
in space in Jeju. Instead of feeling crushed, saddened, and discouraged, millennial migrants were 
now crafting subversive social alternatives that were celebratory and had political potential.  
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Evidence of the social and political congealing of relocation to Jeju as a kind of engaged 
exodus came in the transformed flavor of later generations of Jeju migrants. As the migrant 
community solidified as a cultural form through the guesthouse circuit, relocating to Jeju became 
a real choice – an alternative option with an alternative future. Unlike the early “generation” of 
migrants to Jeju whose “failure” in Seoul precipitated panic, a frantic scrambling and then 
chance encounter with rural Jeju, the unknown and yet undetermined edge of Korea, by the time 
later migrants started to arrive in 2013, guesthouse culture had solidified a cultural pattern of 
living in Jeju that had become a meaningful alternative to Seoul life.  
 Dropping out of Seoul society – “failing” at reproducing the middle-class standard, 
quitting a regular or irregular job in the city because of the raw deal that it offered, openly 
addressing the wounds that Seoul life inflicted – was starting to be an acceptable social and 
cultural pathway. It no longer had to be hidden from sight. One young man explained to me that 
in Jeju, he could finally admit that he was poor. He was an educated young man who had tried to 
start a career in publishing in Seoul but had recoiled at the prospect of sacrificing his dignity to 
climb the corporate hierarchy. He quit the publishing world and started up work in the underpaid 
service sector instead. As a result, when he was living in Seoul, he no longer had the money to 
go out to eat, drink and enjoy entertainment in the city with his friends. He often had to make 
excuses to get himself out of social gatherings. Like others, through travel, he eventually 
discovered Jeju. In Jeju now, where he was getting an organic farm off the ground with a friend, 
while also doing day labor jobs as needed to make ends meet, he felt that he was finally among a 
group of people among whom he could admit that he was poor. In Jeju there were plenty of 
things to do that didn’t require money. More importantly, there was a community of like-minded 
people who had come to terms with admitting that they were no longer part of the upwardly 
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mobile middle class. Through building alternatives in place in Jeju, they had built a viable path 
of exodus from middle class Seoul. 
This young man, like others who had moved to Jeju after the first generation of migrants 
had established early guesthouses that became centers of migrant sociality, benefitted from those 
in the early generation who had faced their “failures,” their disappointments, their wounds, and 
began to pull together spatial alternatives in Jeju where they could embrace these deviations from 
the mainstream, and even put them to use in the service of others who, like them, were hurting. 
They created spaces where others could come and openly choose to live out lives that were 
counter to the middle-class standard. Another young women Chiyŏng, had experienced some 
success in her career in computer engineering on the mainland. However, as a woman, she knew 
that there was a glass ceiling when it came to promotions into higher-tier management positions. 
She knew that she would eventually get too old to work in junior positions and yet would be 
effectively disqualified for further promotions because of her gender. At this point, the company 
would find a reason to fire her or pressure her into a very early retirement. Instead of waiting for 
the axe to drop, Chiyŏng decided to take her future into her own hands. She quit her work in the 
company and travelled a bit before she discovered the alternative community in Jeju. By this 
time –2014 – Jeju’s guesthouse infrastructure was very developed and there were many young 
people who had already relocated.  Chiyŏng chose to live in Jeju because of the alternative that it 
offered. She could work as a guesthouse manager and live out her values of living on less and 
enjoying everyday life in Jeju. Instead of being ashamed of not being able to work in her chosen 
profession, in Jeju, Chiyŏng could be proud to embrace a new path, proud to reject the standard 
middle-class trajectory.  
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There were clear shifts in the post-2013 generation of millennial migrants. The dominant 
narrative arc of migration stories in the post-2013 era shifted from focusing on the wounds and 
pains of Seoul life as push factors in the migration to the promise of Jeju as a pull factor in the 
migration. As I will unpack much more in Chapter 3, new affective connections with the place of 
Jeju marked the migration of later migrants. Rather than summarizing their migration story as, “I 
moved to Jeju because I was in pain” (sangch'ŏ padasŏ chejudoe naeryŏwassŏyo), later migrants 
were much more likely to say something like, “I moved to Jeju because I love Jeju” (Cheju-do 
saranghaesŏ naeryŏwassŏyo).  
 
Conclusion 
As Virno has written, exodus “modifies the conditions within which the conflict takes 
place, rather than presupposes it as an irremovable horizon; it changes the context within which a 
problem arises, rather than deals with the problem by choosing one or another of the alternative 
solutions already on offer” (1996, 198). When groups of people act en masse by exiting or 
retreating from the site of struggle, they can indirectly restructure political parties and other 
political infrastructure, just by virtue of the population displacement and demographic changes 
they bring (Daloz 2016). They can also destabilize class hierarchies, or by virtue of their 
abandonment of structures left behind, force changes in those very structures (Hirschman 1970). 
At the very least, they can temporarily throw off the chains of the hegemony of state and capital 
for a time while they regroup and restrategize (Graeber 2004; Wilson 1992). While the migration 
to Jeju did not emerge from a concerted effort at formal political mobilization, it had deeply 
political implications. The transgressive social forms that millennial migrants built in Jeju 
undercut the hegemonic hold of middle-class normativity and threatened to change the flavor of 
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the status quo in South Korea. With the Jeju alternative now an option for young people, there 
was another crack in the nearly totalizing Seoul system.   
I stress in this chapter that the transgressions of the status quo and this engaged exodus 
was tightly linked to an encounter with and then a remaking of available, temporarily up-for-
grabs spaces on Jeju. The spatial emergence of the new Jeju home and the guesthouse circuit 
landed the circulating discourse of dissatisfaction among the millennial generation, gave 
millennial migrants a new grounded social existence, and with it a base and potential to act 
politically.   
David Harvey has argued that alternative social and political forms – utopias – cannot 
come about through trying to approach perfected emancipatory processes or ideal spatial forms. 
Rather the task is to create an alternative “that is rooted in our present possibilities at the same 
time as it points towards different trajectories for human uneven geographical development 
(Harvey 2000, 196).”  Similarly, Chase et al. describe “everyday urbanism” as a multiplicity of 
responses to the structures of capitalism and postmodern life. They argue that the bottom-up 
resignification of places like garages, front lawns, sidewalks, and bus benches is an accretional 
approach to transformation. These small restructurings of public and private life can accumulate 
to break down and challenge hierarchies and structures of urban life in localized ways, that while 
may not revolutionize social and political order, can contribute to a kind of micropolitical 
struggle against the status quo (Chase, Crawford, and Kaliski 2008). 
I see guesthouses in Jeju, especially during the early years of the migration, as what 
Crawford (Crawford 2008b) calls “micro-utopias” (10) – restructured small-scale places that 
exist within the larger neoliberal environment of South Korea, that in turn restructure social life, 
in small pockets, from the bottom up. For millennial migrants, Jeju emerged as a space to 
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express and live out long held but rarely acted upon feelings of discontentment and frustration 
with the South Korean status quo and to construct alternative modes of living. It was in these 
























CHAPTER 3: DIVERGING PERSPECTIVES IN JEJU’S VILLAGES: 





I came to Jeju on a short trip to run a film screening for a project I was involved in. The next 
day, I took a walk in the town and came upon Kurŏmbi Rock and was shocked when I stepped 
onto it. The reality of the rock before me was so different from what I had read about and seen in 
magazines and in the newspaper while I was on the mainland. It was shocking. My shock was 
even greater when I realized that it was so much more beautiful than I could have imagined.  
 
 This is a quote from an interview with Yuna, whom I met in 2013 during one of my first 
research trips to Jeju Island. Yuna was 38 and had moved to Jeju a couple of years earlier, in part 
to join a protest movement against the development of a naval base on Jeju Island that was slated 
to destroy the Kurŏmbi Rock, a volcanic rock plateau on the shore of one of Jeju’s coastal towns. 
The beauty of the vast rock against the Jeju sea moved Yuna and she rashly decided to relocate 
to Jeju. She also gushed about her love of the grandness of Halla mountain and the beauty of 
Jeju’s orŭms, small hills formed by past volcanic eruptions that dotted the Jeju countryside. Yuna 
then went on to describe the living conditions that were pushing her out of Seoul:  
The city is a built environment that now it is very rapidly developing. I am not sure if it is 
developing or being destroyed. The conclusion to this is that you can only be fulfilled 
with money and capital [in Seoul]. In the end they put concrete on top of the earth, and 
then on top of the concrete they place more dirt and plant trees and this process repeats 
itself. So, in the end people flee city life and go to nature. I longed to leave Seoul 
constantly.. . . City life was too extreme. So I thought, “There is no future for me in the 
city.” . . . My body is also very sensitive and my personality is sensitive, and so I wanted 
to run away so that I could really start to live. Every day my eyes were red and bloodshot 
[in Seoul] and I was sensitive to the air. It was even hard to drink water. And I needed so 
much money just to buy food to eat. 
 
 Yuna felt the stress of Seoul life viscerally. The layers of concrete and the destruction of 
green spaces affected her psychologically. And the air pollution and debris from constant 
development hurt her eyes and damaged her health. Furthermore, economically Yuna barely had 
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enough to make ends meet in Seoul. Like other young people involved in the arts and cultural 
industry, she was working at short-term performance and film gigs that never amounted to a 
secure income. The encounter with the Kurŏmbi Rock on Jeju was the catalyst that she didn’t 
even know she was looking for. Once she experienced the beauty of Jeju firsthand, she 
immediately dropped her life in Seoul and moved to Jeju.  
 Yuna moved to Jeju in 2011, before the migration rush that started in 2013. As a part of 
the early generation of millennial migrants to the island, she was motivated to move to Jeju in 
large part due to the embodied wounds of city life and economic struggle. However, her story 
also shared a common theme with the later, post-2013 group of millennial migrants; she talked 
about how the beauty of the natural landscape of Jeju – in her case the Kurŏmbi Rock – had an 
inexplicable magnetism that drew her in.  
 The beauty of the natural Jeju landscape was a common impetus for migration among 
millennial migrants in the post-2013 period. In describing their migration, my interlocutors 
typically described a moment of encounter with the Jeju landscape at which they were suddenly 
convinced that they needed to move to Jeju now. For many it was the vastness of the ocean that 
they met while walking the Olle Trail. For others it was the view from the top of Halla mountain. 
Some described the clarity and beauty of the Jeju sky – so vibrant and embracing compared to 
the polluted gray sky in Seoul.  
I remember taking a winter hike with a friend, Yŏng-jin, a migrant from Seoul who 
insisted that winter was the only time to hike Halla mountain. We took the Tonnaek'o trail that 
originated on the southern part of the island and was the least trafficked of any of the trails 
leading up the mountain. Fresh snow had just fallen on the top of the mountain. It was a weekday 
and we were the first ones up the trail. Halfway up the mountain we came upon the freshly fallen 
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snow and as we walked, we broke a path through the snow. The larger trees and thinned out as 
we got higher and smaller spruces and shrubs lined the hiking path, clearing our view of the 
island. Everything was covered with a layer of freshly fallen snow. Near the highest point of the 
path, we caught a glimpse of Halla moutain’s peak and it prompted Yŏng-jin to exclaim, “Ah, 
this is the only way to live!” He marveled at the beauty of the view and the delicacy of the snow, 
which was now falling softly as we walked. I was admittedly stunned by the beauty of the scene. 
He insisted that we take a break to lay down in the soft snow. As he laid down, he told me that 
here on Mount Halla, reclining in the snow, he felt a deep sense of peace. It was the only time 
that he really felt like he could truly rest.     
Millennial migrants spoke affectively and intimately when describing their sudden new 
attachment to Jeju. They spoke of “falling in love” (sarang e ppajyŏtta) with Jeju, about being 
healed by Jeju, about reaching a level of peace that they had never experienced before. This 
intense bond that they felt in a moment’s encounter with the Jeju landscape made the decision to 
leave their life in the city behind easy. They were giving up jobs, the company of friends and 
family, and life in South Korea’s cultural capital, but they were gaining Jeju – a treasure many of 
them had not even known existed.  
 I argue in this chapter that affective and embodied bonds that millennial migrants formed 
with the Jeju landscape were crucial to the formation of subversive alternatives to South Korean 
middle-class normativity. The peace, healing, and feelings of love that the encounter with the 
Jeju landscape engendered moved migrants to take the shocking step of removing themselves 
completely from the labor regimes and social networks that had, until they relocated, constituted 
their worlds in Seoul. Many of them simply walked out on jobs, homes, familial responsibilities, 
and close-knit social networks to move to a place where they knew no one and had to scramble 
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to find a job. Their further cultivation of these affective and embodied relationships with the Jeju 
landscape in large part fueled the creation of alternative modes of sociality and labor that enabled 
them to fully reject the foundations and standards of middle-class Seoul. The Jeju landscape was 
a crucial space through which they enacted an engaged exodus from Seoul.     
However, millennial migrants’ new relationship with the Jeju landscape stood in stark 
contrast to the relationship that an older generation of longtime Jeju villagers had with the 
landscape. Whereas the openness and vastness of the Jeju landscape drew young adults from the 
city in a relationship of love, older longtime residents of the rural villages where migrants settled 
felt restricted by the Jeju land and sea, which had in the past barely yielded enough to feed their 
families. Whereas millennial migrants were fleeing dense social networks and competitive, 
polluted, and congested city environments that had caused them pain for the “pure,” natural 
landscape of Jeju, an older generation of longtime Jejuans celebrated the tight social bonds that 
had gotten them through hard times and longed for the “development” of the city, burdened by 
Jeju’s rocky fields and dangerous seas.23    
Using landscape as an analytic, in this chapter I analyze the varied emotional and 
embodied connections that these two groups formed with the Jeju land and sea. I also take a look 
at village level interactions between migrants and longtime Jejuans to analyze the diverging 
visions these two groups had for the future of Jeju. I argue that with the influx of millennial 
migrants to rural villages in Jeju, the ‘taskscape’ (Ingold 1993) of longtime Jejuans was being 
replaced with a ‘leisurescape’ (Tilley and Cameron-Daum 2017) cultivated by new migrants. In 
drawing out the differences in these two ways of engaging with the same space, I emphasize the 
                                                 
23 By creating this generational and perspectival contrast in this chapter, my aim is not to collapse the diversity or 
complexity within these groups. Rather I draw upon emic distinctions and comparisons that were made between 
these two self-identified groups – ‘migrants’ (ijumin) and ‘Jejuans’ (Cheju saram) – on the ground and the conflicts 
and cooperation that I observed among them.  
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irony of endeavoring to create a romantic escape from neoliberal Korea. In Jeju, millennial 
migrants mobilized the Jeju landscape to create alternative social forms and modes of work that 
gave them respite from the brutal competition of Seoul life. And yet, migrants were not able to 
extract themselves from capitalism and consumption even in Jeju. The alternative social forms 
that they created in Jeju were still enmeshed in modes of production and consumption, albeit of 
an alternative kind. While these modes of production and consumption – i.e., the leisurescape – 
contrasted sharply with what they had left behind in Seoul, they were not outside the neoliberal 
Korean system. The leisurescape – overlaid as it was on top of the existing production in the 
villages – couldn’t help but to affect, often negatively, local economic and social structures.   
 
Landscape 
I use landscape as an analytic concept in this chapter as a way to capture the emergent, 
ongoing constitution of the space of Jeju Island.  I take a phenomenological approach to 
analyzing the contemporary Jeju landscape. The phenomenological approach to landscape in 
anthropology was conceptualized as a response to geographers’ emphasis (in the 1980s) on 
landscape as a cultural image and pictorial representation, an ideological tool in the hands of 
those in power to control the land and those living on it (Cosgrove and Daniels 1988; Olwig 
1984). Anthropologists responded by arguing that this definition of landscape was Western and 
ethnocentric (Bender 1993; Hirsch 1995). Hirsch argues that our conceptual understanding of 
landscape should move beyond its Western, colonial, outsider-driven, visually-oriented 
dimensions. Instead of trying to hold onto landscape as something that is static and can be 
interpreted objectively, he argues that we should embrace landscape as process. He puts a 
Western notion of static and visual landscape into dialogue with other cross-cultural phenomena 
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of landscape, arguing that the tacking back and forth between an abstract, ideal, spiritual, and/or 
future-oriented view of the world and the here-and-nowness of everyday social life characterizes 
all societies. Landscape, he argues, is the process of forming these spatial contrasts, as societies 
deal with the tension between ‘the way we are now’ and ‘the way we might be’ (Hirsch 1995). 
Implicit in this argument is the idea that scholars have missed out on crucial, everyday lived 
dimensions of people’s relationship to the natural world.   
Other anthropologists who have studied ‘landscape’ in other parts of the world have 
found that the experience of landscape is constructed as much from an intimate experience with 
localized places and material form as it is from the gaze of the outsider or the capitalist; they 
argued that landscape is made through everyday interaction as much as it is made through 
circulating images and ideas set into motion by political authority and economic elite (Ingold 
1993; Tilley 1994). Moving away from an abstract, atemporal approach to landscape, proponents 
of this perspective began to look at landscape as process, and as constructed through everyday 
practice.   
For example, Humphrey (1995) describes the way in which Mongolians interact with the 
land they live on, letting it speak to them to guide them about where they settle, how they move, 
and what kinds of animals to keep; they do not try to contemplate or transform the landscape. 
Basso’s (1996) work similarly examines the way Western Apache everyday narratives constitute 
the local landscapes they live in, both connecting them with their ancestors and providing moral 
education for the next generation. Many other works in this vein examine people’s localized 
interaction with and constitution of landscapes; they examine how a sense of self and a sense of 
belonging is made through a being-in-the-world, everyday attachment to local landscapes. In 
more recent years this approach has drawn attention to the intimacy of the relationship between 
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people and the landscape they inhabit, stressing that individuals, far from being cogs in the 
machine, can make their mark on landscape through their daily interaction, their talk and 
aspirations about the land, and practices of care and affect (Basso 1996; Milton 2002; Tilley 
1994; Tilley and Cameron-Daum 2017). 
 ‘Landscape’ was not an emic term for my interlocutors on Jeju Island. Migrants to Jeju 
and longtime Jeju residents used other terms to refer to the Jeju landscape. Migrants often talked 
about “Jeju” or “Jeju itself” (Cheju chach'e) to index Jeju’s natural landscape, or talked about the 
specific features of the natural environment of Jeju that affected them, like the sea (pada), the 
mountains (san), or the hills (orŭmdŭl). Longtime residents, on the other hand, were more likely 
to refer to the natural landscape as “land” (ttang), indexing Jeju’s agricultural fields and forests, 
or the harsh “sea” (pada) where they toiled to make a living.  
 My use of the term ‘landscape’ however, is analytic, and used as a tool to get at the 
contemporary constitution and reconstitution of space in contemporary Jeju. I use Tilley’s (1994) 
definition of landscape as “the physical and visual form of the earth as an environment in which 
locales occur and in dialectical relation to which meanings are created, reproduced and 
transformed” (25). Implied in this definition is the idea that natural spaces are not “natural” by 
any stretch, but rather are impacted and constituted by the interaction of those who approach, 
apprehend, sense, enjoy, fear, and abstract them, even as physical forms in turn constitute and 
impact those who engage with them.  Like other scholars, I understand ‘landscape’ to be an 
intimate, material, and everyday experience of the land, contrasting it with the feeling of 
abstraction that concepts like ‘nature’ and ‘environment’ carry (Ingold 1993; Layton and Ucko 
1999; Tilley and Cameron-Daum 2017). Tilley and Cameron-Daum write, “But our concern is 
with landscape rather than environment. The former is biographical, social, historical, material, 
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specific, experiential, embodied. The latter term seems, all too often, to lend itself to abstracted, 
reductionist, rarefied, objectified and disembodied forms of analysis” (2017, 82).   
 Furthermore, taking a phenomenological approach landscape also allows for analysis of a 
multiplicity of perspectives. In this chapter I explore both the experience of millennial migrants 
to Jeju who experience Jeju newly, or as Barbara Bender describes it, as a “landscape on the 
move” (Bender 2001), and the experience of an older generation of longtime Jeju villagers who 
have lived on the land all their lives.  Diverging emotional and embodied connections among 
these two groups bring out the tensions inherent in a project of exodus. In creating alternative 
forms rooted in place in Jeju, millennial migrants risk unseating existing relationships that 
longtime Jeju villagers have formed with the landscape. 
 
Migrants and the Jeju Landscape  
 As described in Chapter 2, an early generation of migrants laid down the beginnings of an 
infrastructure of exodus in built spaces in Jeju that eventually led to a shift in the affective 
associations with migration to Jeju Island. While a cloud of sadness, pain and even feelings of 
shame marked the early group of migrants to Jeju, once the alternative infrastructure came into 
its own in Jeju, migrants increasingly celebrated their migration to Jeju, often expressing a love 
for Jeju as a motivating force behind their migration. Among those who had migrated later 
(typically after about 2013), I got used to hearing as a response to a basic “Why did you move to 
Jeju” inquiry, a simple, “Because I love Jeju” (Cheju saranghaesŏ). Most of these young people 
could recount a specific moment or maybe a short period of travel during which they had “fallen 
in love” with Jeju. Most often, the “love” they described was directed at the natural landscape of 
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Jeju. For Yuna in the opening vignette, it was a love that welled up for the Kurŏmbi rock. For 
others it was the Jeju sea, Halla mountain in the winter, or the clear blue Jeju sky.  
This surprising, unplanned and intense emotional attachment “with Jeju,” was not a 
passing thing; it became the foundation for the development of new alternative lives. This love 
became the starting point for an alternative life, one with a new goal of “getting to know Jeju” 
(Cheju rŭl alge toenŭn kŏt). Among the millennials that I spent time with in Jeju, the relationship 
they built (embodied, affective, aspirational) with the Jeju landscape by “getting to know Jeju” or 
“spending time with Jeju” became crucial to reordering forms of sociality and modes of labor in 
direct contradistinction to those they had enacted in Seoul.  
I argue again in this chapter for the importance of the existence of alternative spaces in 
enacting exodus. Specifically, through new affective and embodied bonds formed with the 
landscape of Jeju, millennial migrants created spatial alternatives to normative middle-class 
Seoul life. Like the Jeju house in the previous chapter, the Jeju landscape provided a materialized 
and localized base upon which to create alternative modes of sociality and labor that enabled 
them to fully exit from Seoul and reject the foundations and standards of middle-class 
normativity. 
Sŏngmin was an architect in his thirties who moved to Jeju in 2014. He was someone 
who had described falling in love with Jeju as his motivation for relocating. I met him in my 
haenyŏ training class, where we were both participants. Haenyŏ are female sea divers who 
practice an old form of diving to harvest shellfish from the ocean that they can sell at markets in 
Jeju. Haenyŏ often dive up to twenty meters deep without breathing equipment to get their catch. 
Although this traditional female mode of labor exists in other parts of Korea, especially the 
southern areas of the Korean peninsula, the most vibrant surviving communities of haenyŏ divers 
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are in Jeju and the haenyŏ has become an iconic figure of the Jeju sea and Jeju society. In recent 
years, the Jeju government has run a haenyŏ training course for those interested in learning the 
traditional practice in an attempt to revitalize the dying trade. Although traditionally a female 
trade, the haenyŏ training school also accepts men who are interested in learning the practice.24  
When I asked Sŏngmin why he applied for the haenyŏ course, he answered simply that it 
was one way in which he could “get to know Jeju.” He described his logic with the pithy phrase: 
“I love Jeju, but I don’t know Jeju.” I had come to recognize this as a common refrain for 
explaining the drive behind one’s activities in Jeju. It was often spoken as an almost self-evident 
truth and provided a naturalized organizing principle for one’s new Jeju life. 
Sŏngmin’s life in Seoul had been something of a disappointment to him, in spite of much 
striving on his part. After graduating from university (which he described as “not a good 
university”) Sŏngmin got a job at an architecture firm in Seoul but was fired soon afterwards 
because of downsizing. However, he was able to bounce back with another job in a more regular 
position in a firm in Seoul that gave him vacation time. During a couple vacations, he went down 
to visit Jeju and did a lot of hanging out at beaches and hiking. He also found that he liked 
hanging out with and chatting with longtime local Jeju people in Jeju’s rural villages. He felt 
drawn to the Jeju seascape, which he found to be cleaner and purer than seascapes on the 
peninsula. He dreamed of living in a house on the Jeju coast. Having “fallen in love” with Jeju, 
he made up his mind that he would someday move to Jeju. The next year, he got fired from his 
job again. He was distressed and decided to take a month-long road trip around the South Korean 
                                                 
24 Haenyŏ is a Korean word that literally means “woman of the sea” and refers to women sea divers. The proper 
name for a male traditional sea diver is haenam, which means “man of the sea.” Haenam are much more rare in Jeju 
society than haenyŏ, but not nonexistent.  
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peninsula that ended in Jeju.25 At the end of his trip, he found that he didn’t want to leave Jeju, 
and so he decided to make good on his decision to relocate permanently. He started to look for 
jobs in Jeju and found that he had quite a few options. He had to take a large pay cut to work in 
Jeju, but he was delighted that he had the luxury of choosing a job from an array of offerings.  
 Jeju offered Sŏngmin freedom from the pressure of the Seoul corporate world that had 
dominated his life since he graduated from university. Sŏngmin described himself as a person 
“who always had to be afraid of getting fired.” He was not from a rich family nor did he go to a 
top university, so he felt that his future was always in jeopardy. Job security was ever elusive. In 
Seoul, Sŏngmin spent all of his extra physical and mental energy trying to make himself more 
competitive so as to reach the elusive goal of job security. He would wake up early in the 
morning and go swimming in order to keep his body fit and attend a private institute that offered 
classes for new certifications that would make his skills slightly more marketable – all before 
starting his workday. He felt constant pressure from his parents to arrive at and keep a stable job. 
All around him people were always asking each other what kind of car they drove, or where they 
worked, or where they lived so as to compare themselves with one another. The fear of 
downward mobility, of not making it, haunted him. 
 In Jeju, there was a demand for architects because talented young professionals often 
were drawn away from the island to the mainland. Furthermore, Sŏngmin’s experience in the 
Seoul corporate world was impressive and the construction boom in Jeju meant a steady 
increased demand for home and business design work. Sŏngmin had his choice of firms to work 
for. In Jeju, he finally felt that his labor was secure. In addition, gone was the social pressure to 
constantly try to climb higher on the social ladder. In the Jeju milieu of millennial migrants and 
                                                 
25 There are several ferries that operate between the mainland and Jeju Island.  
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young local Jejuans that he found himself in, his achievements and professional profile were 
more than adequate. He even hinted to me that he was popular on the dating scene. Although it 
was not the life that he had imagined for himself when he had been living in Seoul, Sŏngmin 
finally felt content.  
Sŏngmin described to me the exciting changes in his lifestyle since moving to Jeju. He 
only worked from 9 to 6, and the rest of his time was truly his own. In Seoul, the official 
working day for Sŏngmin had been 9 to 6, but unofficially he was often expected to work until 9 
or 10 or even later, and then also pressured into socializing after the working day was over. All 
of this was over when he started to work in Jeju. No longer anxious about keeping in shape in 
order maintain competitiveness, he had gained some weight, which he didn’t mind. Instead of 
being forced to spend his extra time and energy on making himself more competitive, Sŏngmin 
spent his free time “getting to know Jeju,” cultivating a relationship with all things Jeju. Taking 
the haenyŏ training course was one way that he could get to know Jeju more. He loved 
swimming in the sea and was enchanted by the idea of eating catch that he himself had gathered 
with his own hands. He did other things to get to know Jeju more. During citrus harvest season, 
he worked part time at a mandarin orange orchard. The citrus industry and Jeju’s agricultural 
landscape was another unique aspect of Jeju Island that he was curious to know more about it; he 
wanted to have the experience of directly harvesting the fruit. He was proud to send boxes of 
oranges home to his parents as it indexed a newfound intimacy with Jeju.  
 Sŏngmin’s vision for his future involved, most centrally, a relationship with the Jeju 
landscape. Although he mentioned that he eventually wanted to marry a Jeju woman and have a 
family, when he talked about his dreams, he gushed the most about one day establishing a place 
in the idyllic Jeju countryside. Sŏngmin described his dream for me. He wanted to eventually 
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own a house near the Jeju ocean. In his future life, he imagined that he would wake up early and 
take a morning swim during which he would gather the morning’s catch. He would come in and 
clean up, eat his catch raw for breakfast, spend some time tending his outdoor garden and then 
leave for work. In the evening, he dreamed, he would come home to the sea, gazing over it as the 
sun set. The ability to dive for catch in the sea – a central part of his vision – would require him 
to gain entrance into one of the haenyŏ cooperatives. Diving along the Jeju coastline was 
regulated by haenyŏ cooperatives that lay claim to different section of the ocean. A unanimous 
vote from current members of the cooperative was necessary to inaugurate new members. 
Sŏngmin liked to try to scheme up ways to get close to the haenyŏ, so as to be invited into their 
community. He toyed with the idea of training to be able to work with light machinery that 
would help haenyŏ remove large and heavy harvests of seaweed from the sea, so as to make 
himself useful – and eventually indispensable – to them. Sŏngmin worked to know all he could 
about haenyŏ culture. After our class was over, he also planned to stay in touch with the haenyŏ 
community we had gotten to know there by doing volunteer clean-up of the shores from time to 
time. He was very passionate about entering into the foraging-based haenyŏ/haenam community 
in Jeju.  
 For Sŏngmin, a growing attachment to the Jeju landscape was the basis for building a 
path out of the battle for upward mobility that he felt he was always losing. Jeju as an object of 
affection – something to love, to draw close to, to know intimately – concretized new values for 
him. The enjoyment and development of this new relationship became a driving force in his life, 
replacing the desire to be successful and to keep up among social circles in Seoul. Instead of 
resting on his ability to achieve a certain job status or reach a certain level of material attainment, 
Sŏngmin’s identity was re-centered around his relationship with Jeju. The drastic changes in 
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Sŏngmin’s daily habits and mindsets reveal a transformation of somatic and affective orientation. 
Instead of swimming in a pool early in the morning before work in order to force his body to stay 
in shape, he looked forward to swimming in Jeju’s ocean as a future member of the 
haenyŏ/haenam community in the mornings, evenings and weekends during his time off. And 
instead of being bound to those in his social circles – his colleagues, his parents, his friends – 
through a relationship of competition, anxiety and fear, he was developing a relationship of love, 
joy, and intimacy with the Jeju landscape. A new and simplified relationship with Jeju replaced 
the complex social relationship he had had in Seoul. 
*** 
For Sujin, another millennial migrant that I met in Jeju, Jeju was also the site for 
launching a new social existence. Sujin had grown up in a small town in the southwestern region 
of Korea but had moved to Seoul for college. After college, she was lucky to get a full-time job 
working for the online arm of one of the biggest newspaper companies in Korea. She worked 
editing headlines and photos. She had a long-term boyfriend whom she was in love with and 
hoped to marry. She worked hard to support herself in Seoul and send money back to her parents 
and her sister who struggled financially.  
However, everything changed when her best friend was diagnosed with stage four 
stomach cancer. Shortly afterwards, Sujin found out that she herself had a rare eye disease that 
would most likely lead to blindness within ten to fifteen years. Her relationship with her 
boyfriend deteriorated as he couldn’t accept her sickness. She told her company that she needed 
a break. She wanted to help her friend as much as should could and her own illness left her with 
a craving to see the world. She felt that her life could no longer wait. Sujin was surprised that the 
company agreed to give her a leave from work and pay her a 20% salary if she wrote some 
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articles about her travels for their online site. She stuck around Seoul for a while, visiting her 
friend nearly daily for several months until she passed away. After a period of mourning, she 
took off for her year-long journey. Sujin travelled all around Southeast Asia and India, 
concluding her trip by spreading her friend’s ashes in the Himalayas.    
When she returned to Seoul Sujin returned to her company but was moved to a different 
department. In the new department with a new boss, she witnessed corruption that she hadn’t 
noticed before. She became aware of the fact that her boss was taking bribes to publish certain 
articles or run particular ads. Disappointed in the company she worked for and longing again for 
her freewheeling days of travelling adventure, Sujin and her new boyfriend planned a trip to Jeju. 
It was March 2014 and there was a domestic travel boom to Jeju. Sujin and her boyfriend rented 
bikes and within a few days travelled nearly halfway around the perimeter of the island on small 
coastal roads. Sujin was moved by the sight of the Jeju sea; the image lingered in her mind’s eye 
after she returned to Seoul. About a month after she returned to Seoul, the Sewŏl Ferry, which 
had been en route to Jeju from Incheon (a port city outside of Seoul) sank, killing 304 passengers 
in total, many of whom were high school students who were on their way to their final school 
trip before graduation. What became known as the “Sewŏl Ferry Disaster” launched a 
widespread social reaction of deep criticism of government policies that had led to relaxed safety 
regulations along with the government’s slow rescue efforts and attempts to hide culpability. 
Sujin’s newspaper company, like many of the big media outlets of the time, reported incorrectly 
that the passengers had been saved, at the behest of the government.26 The corrupt relationship 
between the government and newspapers began to sicken Sujin. Furthermore, after having 
                                                 
26 For an in-depth analysis of the structural causes and socio-political context that gave rise to the Sewŏl Ferry 
Disaster, see Challenges of Modernization and Governance in South Korea: The Sinking of the Sewol and Its Causes, 
co-edited by Jae-Jung Suh and Mikyoung Kim (2017).  
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traveled the world, she realized that she could no longer bear to continue life in what she called 
“grayscale” Seoul. She remembered that her doctor had told her that she needed to rest her eyes 
in order to slow down the deterioration of her vision, and that looking at blue and green colors 
for at least a half hour every day would benefit her eye health.  
A week after the Sewŏl disaster, Sujin decided to quit her job and move to Jeju. She 
couldn’t forget the Jeju sea, and after her deep disappointment with her company, she decided 
that her health and life of adventure would be new priorities. She didn’t know what she was 
going to do in Jeju, but she knew that is where she wanted to be. She wanted to return to the sea.  
In Jeju, Sujin found an apartment that was located on the Jeju coast and overlooked the 
sea. She enrolled in a haenyŏ training program where she learned the traditional practice of 
diving for seafood. She made new friends at the training program, mostly millennial migrants 
from the mainland like her, and she also met local haenyŏ women in her neighborhood and 
became friendly with them. She would visit them, tell them about her adventures at haenyŏ 
school and listen to their stories of growing up in Jeju. She also made friends with the local dogs 
in town, taking a walk nearly every day to bring each one a treat, giving special attention to the 
ones who were tied up outside all day.   
I met Sujin at the beginning of my longest stint of fieldwork in 2015. We hit it off right 
away and she invited me to live with her in her apartment overlooking the Jeju ocean as she had 
an extra room. I was looking for accommodations and her place ended up being the perfect place 
to live and work in my first months in Jeju. Having learned to swim through haenyŏ school, 
Sujin would wake up early every morning to swim out to the ocean outside our apartment, the 
translucent and calming blues and greens a balm for her eyes. She remembered the doctor’s 
recommendation to rest her eyes every day. Other times she met her friends from haenyŏ school 
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and they would go swimming and diving for catch together. She would invite me to come along 
and I discovered alongside her the calming power of the ocean. Jeju’s shores were striking for 
the contrast of the deep blue water against black volcanic rock that piled up in jagged formations 
on the shore. I remember tagging after Sujin as she swam out to a rock formation a bit away from 
the shore. It was mid-October but the sun was still shimming through the water. We swam under 
the surface and tried to look up through the water at the rocks and the sun above us. The vibrancy 
of the colors and cool of the water refreshed us as we twirled and dove. When we swam back to 
shore, Sujin exclaimed, “Now you can see why I have to do this every day!” I laughed and had to 
agree. When we returned, Sujin’s haenyŏ school friends, who we had been swimming with us 
that day, had already made a catch. Shinjŏng, a migrant woman who shared Sujin’s love of 
swimming, had caught a small octopus with her bare hands! There was a buzz of excitement as 
some scurried across the black rocks to prepare cooking equipment to boil spicy noodle soup in 
which to cook the octopus. A delicious meal ensued, and we all enjoyed the cloudless fall 
afternoon.     
Through her everyday encounter with the ocean, Sujin felt that the deterioration of her 
sight was slowing down. In other ways as well, she sensed her body healing from the stresses of 
Seoul life. She told me about stomach problems that she had started to have after she moved to 
Jeju. When she visited the Korean medicine doctor, he told her that while she was living in 
Seoul, she had been so busy working that her body had been unable to express its pain. Now that 
she was in Jeju and taking a break, her body was acting up, telling her that she needed rest in 
order to heal. She was amazed that Jeju revealed this need for restoration in her body, and with 
rest, she did indeed start to feel better.  
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 For work, Sujin tried different stints of full-time contract work – working for a tourism 
start-up, attempting to work for the Jeju government tourism department and then doing 
customer service work for an international hotel company – before deciding to stick with 
freelancing work instead. She tutored some students in English, did some translation work, and 
worked a couple times a week as a barista at a coffee shop. In Jeju, Sujin was able to embrace 
what she called “voluntary poverty” (chabalchŏk kanan) – a life of making less money but 
having more time for the things she wanted to do. Sujin explained that it was the laid-back 
atmosphere in Jeju that allowed her to live this kind of lifestyle:  
If I were living in Seoul, I would have to find a job, I would have to go to work. If I 
didn’t work, every time I would get on the bus or subway late at night or early in the 
morning, I would feel guilty. I would feel really guilty. Everybody is working really hard 
early in the morning and at late night. I am very easy person, you know. I would feel 
guilty every time. I easily feel guilty. But in Jeju I don’t need to. Actually, when I take a 
bus early in the morning [in Jeju] maybe some of the riders are workers, but most of them 
are travelers. [Laughs] I don’t feel guilty. But if I were in Seoul, I would definitely work. 
I would have to find a job and I would definitely work very hard. There would be no time 
for me. I would just keep working like a slave at a company. 
 
In Jeju, Sujin could reject the conventional work life that the Seoul atmosphere had made it 
impossible for her not to feel guilted into. Like Sŏngmin, Sujin felt in Jeju a freedom not to fall 
into the social pressure to overwork, to make money, and to consume. In Jeju, Sujin enjoyed the 
small things in life – swimming in the Jeju ocean, visiting her haenyŏ friends, walking around 
her neighborhood to feed the local dogs. These things didn’t require money. Sujin vowed to 
reject the pursuit of money, which had dominated her life back in Seoul.  
 The “voluntary poverty” that the Jeju landscape afforded her had another benefit as well. 
It freed her from the pressure that she had felt to support her parents and her sister financially. 
She described how she never had time to take care of herself when she was in Seoul because she 
was always working in order to have the funds to take care of others. She never asked herself if 
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she was happy or not. She cared much more about whether her family and her boyfriend were 
happy. She remembered that her best friend who had died young of stomach cancer had also 
worked herself to the bone, trying to take of others. Now that she was sick and had given up her 
job and moved to Jeju, her family didn’t expect her to contribute to their economic survival. 
Finally, Sujin was free to focus solely on herself. Now every night, Sujin asked herself whether 
she was doing what made her happy. In Jeju, she could answer with a resounding “Yes!” 
 In Jeju, Sujin found not just a measure of physical rest and healing, but healing from 
social wounds as well. In Seoul, she was tied to a corrupt organization and asked to overlook the 
mistakes of bosses because she felt that she needed the money to support others. Because her 
parents were not doing well financially, and as a “good daughter” she felt obligated to help them 
out, she felt like a slave to her work. It was only her sickness, along with her travels around the 
world and subsequent encounter with the Jeju landscape that freed her from these social 
entanglements. The Jeju landscape – with its blue ocean and laid-back vibe – projected a whole 
new set of expectations upon her. In Jeju, she could be “part worker, part traveler.” She knew 
that when she moved to Jeju, she could eschew the responsibilities that Seoul life had thrust onto 
her and choose to take care of herself rather than to work to take care of others. In the hardened, 
competitive, “grayscale” environment of Seoul, there was no room to extract oneself from social 
pressure and social burdens, no room to choose to take care of oneself. But the organic, natural, 
and therapeutic environment of Jeju had some give. It allowed Sujin time to heal physically and 
also socially and psychologically. Like Miyŏn in the last chapter, Jeju allowed her to be alone 
and to not feel guilty about taking care of herself.    
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Sujin described feeling liberated by this big shift in her life. Although she would never 
have chosen to be sick, she believed that her sickness led her to a life of freedom that she would 
never have been able to experience otherwise.  
Hirsch (1995) has theorized that landscape is a process by which people relate “a 
‘foreground’ everyday social life (‘us the way we are’) to a ‘background’ potential social 
existence (‘us the way we might be’)” (22). When Sujin changed her “background” by moving to 
Jeju, her everyday existence also changed. Like Sŏngmin, Sujin’ s new relationship with the Jeju 
natural world was the foundation for a completely new social existence. Jeju allowed her to live 
differently – allowed her to focus on herself, put aside the social pressures to make money and 
take care of her kin, and to engage in a therapeutic relationship with Jeju. By building the 
foreground of her everyday life against the background of the Jeju landscape, Sujin and others 
were cutting a real path of exodus from Seoul.  
I emphasize here the way in which an embodied and affective attachment to the Jeju 
landscape presented a pathway out of the hardships that these young people experienced in 
Seoul. An attachment to Jeju became a replacement for the myriad of complex attachments that 
they wanted to escape in Seoul. For Sŏngmin there was the suffering that came from his unstable 
position in the corporate world in Seoul, along with the social pressure to attain certain material 
markers of success, and the fear of disappointing his parents, whom he lived with in Seoul. His 
social networks in Seoul only made him aware of the decreasing returns of his Seoul life – of his 
tenuous class status. For Sujin, it was the struggle to endure the moral corruption of the 
workplace as a tradeoff for making enough money to support her life in Seoul and also send 
money home to her family in the countryside. When Sŏngmin and Sujin encountered Jeju – and 
discovered a completely different mode of connecting with the landscape– this new connection 
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compelled them to leave behind the life they knew in Seoul. Jeju presented a positive alternative, 
without which they would not have been empowered to leave. Furthermore, this attachment to 
the landscape also became a foundation for them to build a new social existence in Jeju.  They 
were able to exit Seoul’s demanding and corrupt labor regime and cut out work lives that were 
much more satisfying to them.  And a new and simplified relationship with Jeju replaced the 
complex social relationships they had had in Seoul.  
 
New forms of work 
 The Jeju landscape also inspired new forms of work for millennial migrants that 
drastically departed from the Seoul professional work scene. Chihun’s life trajectory and 
transformations in his conception of work was representative of many of the migrants I met in 
Jeju. Chihun was a Seoulite who studied film in college and worked for years in the Korean film 
industry in Seoul. He worked as an assistant director on some productions but was frustrated 
because he never had a chance to work in the director role. So, at the age of 28 he decided to 
move to New York City, where he lived for the next 11 years of his life. In New York, he lived 
mostly among other Koreans, getting odd jobs in Koreatown – including some work in film and 
also teaching sports classes to Korean kids. However, life in New York was not fulfilling and he 
struggled to make ends meet. He started to do some thinking and realized that Seoul and New 
York were powerful urban places had both pushed him into a life he didn’t want. He said that he 
was “like a fish that really wanted to go and live in the river but couldn’t help but live in the sea 
against its will.” These places forced him to do work he didn’t want to do and consume things 
that he didn’t need. Seoul and New York, he described, were both part of one macro system that 
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entrapped him, a system that he found to be ruled by “capitalism and neoliberalism” (chabonjuŭi 
wa shinjayujuŭi). 
 Chihun decided that he wanted a new world. He wanted to move somewhere where there 
was some “space for life,” a place to rest and also a place to reset his life apart from the 
“neoliberal” system that he had been immersed in. Chihun wanted to get back to the 
fundamentals of life – he wanted to be closer to the land. It was 2010 and Jeju and the Olle Trail 
was just beginning to splash onto Korean people’ s consciousnesses. Chihun was drawn by the 
promise of the “pure” and natural Jeju landscape, against which he could hit the reset button on 
his life. Like others, he wanted to exchange the complex web of social and economic 
relationships with a simpler return to a relationship with the Jeju landscape.  
Chihun impulsively decided that he would move to Jeju. But first he had to figure out 
where he would live. He didn’t know anyone in Jeju and so he decided to take his own personal 
tour. Since he liked the sea, he took a slow, seven-month tour of Sŏgwip'o, the southern district 
of Jeju, spending time in each of the 32 villages on its coast. At the end of the trip, Chihun was 
thoroughly “in love” with Jeju. He had also decided that one of the villages on the southeastern 
corner of Jeju, Namwŏn, was the best place to make his new home. The region surrounding this 
village was especially known for its citrus production, Jeju’s most lucrative commercial crop. He 
concluded that the quality of this land was the best in Jeju and so the people who were rooted 
there lived better, with more time to relax and enjoy their lives. For Chihun, it followed that he 
would also find a way to make a comfortable living in this landscape. He also noted that this 
region was on the southern edge of one of the southernmost islands of South Korea, which made 
it the “edge” of Korea. He had heard that the haenyŏ of this village used to sing a song when 
they rowed out to sea about a paradise island called Iŏdo that was just beyond the horizon. 
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Chihun felt that here in the southern part of Jeju, as far from the neoliberal center of country as 
he could go, he could finally approach paradise for the first time in his life.  
 Chihun started his life in Jeju working with farmers in the area who wanted help with 
distribution of their citrus on the mainland. He set up a small citrus distribution center. But he 
had a larger vision. He wanted to create a space where he and other migrants from the mainland 
could gather and spend time with one another, united by their mutual appreciation for Jeju. In 
particular, he wanted this space to be organized by a force different from the competition and 
materialism that had driven his life in the city. Chihun used the same word that I had heard from 
many migrants whom I had met when describing their attraction to Jeju: love. Chihun explained 
that he was “in love with Jeju,” and he wanted to create a place where others who loved Jeju 
could gather with him and perhaps produce something good and different. In Namwŏn, he rented 
a house and office space and put up a sign on the office that said “Jeju Back to the Farm/Village 
Cooperative,” choosing a title for his new space that indexed his migrant status on the island.  
Because the office was on a well-trafficked road, other migrants who had relocated to Jeju would 
often drop by out of curiosity. Chihun would make them a cup of coffee and chat with them 
about their lives in Jeju.  Chihun found that he had a lot in common with these fellow 
newcomers. For one, they had left everything behind and moved to a place where they knew no 
one. And secondly – and more importantly – they were all “in love” with Jeju and wanted to 
know more about it. He summed up their common sentiment with the same phrase that I heard 
from Sŏngmin and other migrants: “I love Jeju, but I don’t know Jeju.” Together with the group, 
Chihun started a book club with the goal of learning more about Jeju together. They read history, 
geography, and cultural books about Jeju, and then they would go out and visit the sites they had 
read in books. They would go hiking at an orŭm, or visit a site of a memorial for the Jeju 
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Uprising. In this way, they started to build intimacy with the new object of their affection, Jeju, 
and with one another.  
In other spaces as well where I met and socialized with groups of migrants, Jeju-centric 
relationships blossomed among them. Because millennials who were moving to Jeju lacked the 
local kin, alumni, and work networks that had constituted their social lives in the city, they often 
built relationships based on a totally new foundation: a common affection for the Jeju landscape. 
There was a robust social media ecosystem that connected migrants to each other. There was an 
openness to “friending” total strangers because of a common interest in “getting to know” certain 
aspects of Jeju. People would meet this way to go swimming, hiking, scuba diving, or attend new 
arts and cultural events that were popping up within the community. Sujin, who I describe 
earlier, noticed that even within this open environment, migrants didn’t strive for deep 
relationships, but rather practical relationships of companionship and cooperation that left room 
people to preserve their independence. She echoed Miyŏn in the last chapter who described the 
ideal low-investment sociality of being together and yet still primarily alone. 
By the time I met Chihun in 2016, his cooperative had grown larger, with over 50 
individuals/families who were regular members. They had relocated from the small office space 
they had started off in to a larger space with several big meeting rooms, a growing library, and a 
recording studio. Members and also new migrants could come in and read books, meet with 
other migrants, and get advice about life in Jeju. Through the relationships they built at the 
cooperative, Chihun and some of the other migrants within the group also started business 
ventures together that were based on their mutual love for Jeju.  
For Chihun and others, the Jeju landscape offered a new foundation for approaching both 
their relationships and their work. Having escaped the Seoul work world in one way or another, 
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none of them were invested in bringing those structures to Jeju. Rather, they were interested in 
decentering and restructuring the idea of work completely. The Jeju landscape provided 
convenient inspiration to launch modes of work that were not soul-sucking, unabashedly profit-
seeking, and entangled in hierarchical and often abusive corporate structures. According to the 
migrants I talked to, their new businesses were born from a passion they had discovered in Jeju: 
a love for the natural and cultural landscape of the island.  
The millennial migration to Jeju was different from other return to the land movements 
around the world where a return to the land meant a return to work directly on the land – i.e., 
farming or fishing – because of a generalized love of the earth. The substance of their connection 
to Jeju was an embodied and affective connection to the landscape that was more about personal 
healing and adventure than it was about reciprocal care for the land and nature. And so the 
businesses that millennials created often took the shape of delivering this intimate experience of 
Jeju to others. For example, there was a group of people in the cooperative who were involved in 
a business that brought in couples who wanted to plan small outdoor weddings in the Jeju natural 
world. The small company guided them, helped them to plan their photo shoots and their 
receptions, using their newfound knowledge and love for Jeju as a guide. Chihun was involved in 
a project that brought in young people from the mainland to Jeju for a couple weeks for a 
combined volunteer and sightseeing trip. They would spend a week doing volunteer work on a 
farm and then a week traveling around the island, doing fun things like talking with longtime 
local people and making videos about Jeju. Another young man in the cooperative was trying to 
launch a business where he brought artists to Jeju for a short period to visit and do creative work 
inspired by Jeju’s natural beauty. 
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There were many other businesses I encountered beyond the members of Chihun’s 
cooperative that had similar aims and designs. Miyŏn’s guesthouse business from the previous 
chapter was designed as a way to give guests the experience of the Jeju landscape and rural life. 
Another group of migrants had created what they called an “arts and culture space” in a small 
traditional home in the northern part of Jeju. They would organize community arts projects with 
village residents and also sponsor artists-in-residence who would get the experience of living in 
rural Jeju while they produced new creative work inspired by the Jeju landscape. Some of these 
businesses were funded in part by arts and culture initiatives of the local government, and others 
were completely self-funded. 
Sujin, who I introduced earlier in this chapter, also got involved in a Jeju-focused 
business venture after settling in Jeju. Sujin had rejected the work-centered life that the Seoul 
environment had compelled her to pursue and had decided against taking any full-time or 
freelance gigs that she didn’t feel good about, or that weren’t with people she respected.  
Eventually, however, she became connected with two other migrants from Seoul who 
were interested in starting a “social enterprise” (sahoejŏk kiŏp) that involved Jeju in an intimate 
way. They were inspired by their liberating lives in Jeju and were looking for work that held 
deeper meaning and value. Sujin and her new business partners had all worked in big companies 
in Seoul and had all rashly given them up when they moved to Jeju. Like Miyŏn, her new 
associates were unwilling to compromise morally for the sake of work, or to do work that was 
not intrinsically valuable and meaningful to them. And so the social enterprise model appealed to 
them. Social enterprises in South Korea are businesses that pursue a social purpose such as 
providing social services or creating jobs for the disadvantaged. Often they employ categories of 
underemployed people in contemporary society (i.e., youth, those who are over 60, and the 
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disabled) and provide some social value to the community. Under a new initiative, these 
companies could apply for government funding from the regional government that would help to 
get their businesses off the ground (Bidet and Eum 2011). Sujin and her two partners began to 
think about some social value that they could add to Jeju and after putting their heads together, 
came up with a “memorial book” concept. The idea was that they would interview longtime Jeju 
residents whose lives captured a certain ‘Jejuness’ that was worth preserving. Whether they had 
lived through an important historical event like the Jeju Uprising or participated in the traditional 
practice of diving for seafood, these “ordinary” people’s biographies were worth documenting, 
preserving and cataloguing. They began the project right away and received funding when they 
pitched it to the Jeju government’s “social enterprise” team. Sujin was in charge of a lot of the 
interviewing, transcribing and writing of the final biographies. Although she was paid very little 
in the early days of the company, Sujin enjoyed working with her colleagues and felt that she 
was finally using her creative talents to build something important and meaningful.  
A newfound love and connection to the Jeju landscape was the impulse behind many new 
migrant-founded businesses. Drawing from the personal and intimate connections that they had 
formed with the Jeju landscape, they were able to create modes of work that contrasted sharply 
with the Seoul corporate world. These businesses were often small-scale and cooperative in 
nature. And because migrants were the creative brains behind the businesses, they could direct 
their creative energy towards building something they were passionate about, rather than giving 
their creative talents to a company or to contract jobs that exploited them, or whose values 
clashed with their own. In this way, their embodied and affective connections to the Jeju 
landscape led to new impassioned forms of labor and alternative social structures that built 
towards an alternative social existence. As in the previous chapter, the positive alternative social 
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forms that enabled an exodus from Seoul emerged in the embodied and affective bonds that 
millennial migrants formed with place in Jeju.  
Although in discovering this new connection to the Jeju landscape and in crafting these 
alternative forms of labor migrants were able to exit the oppressive work structures that they 
were critical of and also the social networks that kept them competing with one another or 
exploiting one another for gain, the exodus to Jeju was not a romantic escape from capitalism 
and consumption. Although Chihun and others were vocal in their criticism of capitalism and 
neoliberalism, even in Jeju they weren’t able to exist outside of the Korean or the global 
capitalist economy. Their countercultural spirit was rather channeled into creating alternative 
forms of consumption for those who were similarly disappointed in Seoul life. They were skilled 
as creative and cultural workers who had had experience in immaterial production in Seoul. In 
Jeju they used these skills of immaterial production to package and market the localized and 
material connections they had formed with the Jeju landscape to others like them who were 
craving this alternative and therapeutic experience. In doing this, millennial migrants were not 
unlike other young people around the world who, in resisting structures of capitalism and 
existing forms of labor through countercultural expression, unwittingly end up producing cultural 
forms that are also sold and consumed, albeit to a different group of buyers (Campbell 1987; 
Frank 1997; Heath and Potter 2005; Luvaas 2012). Rather than being an alternative to capitalism, 
they were enacting an alternative capitalism (Luvaas 2012). While they couldn’t create a world 
outside of capitalism, by creating alternative forms, they were gesturing to possibilities beyond 
neoliberal Korea. At the same time, however, this alternative capitalism, rooted as it was in the 
space of Jeju island, couldn’t help but to have real effects on the existing economy and society of 




The restoration and rest that the Jeju landscape brought and the love and passion that 
migrants felt toward Jeju contrasted sharply with the emotional and embodied connections that 
longtime local people in the villages had with the land.  For longtime Jejuans, the land didn’t 
offer healing or inspire feelings of love. Rather, the land held painful memories – some of 
violence and destruction. As outlined in Chapter 1, in the years leading up to the founding of the 
South Korean state, insurgents on Jeju Island banded together to retaliate against police violence 
against peaceful protests, and to express their dissatisfaction with US military rule and the 
division of the country by outside forces; in response, from 1948 to 1954, Jeju Island 
experienced one of the most violent counterinsurgency campaigns by the Korean state in South 
Korean history. Backed by the US government, the Korea military enacted scorched earth tactics 
in Jeju to root what out they labeled as pro-Communist insurgents. During this time, many of the 
interior mid-mountain villages on Jeju were evacuated and burned to the ground. For many 
longtime Jejuans, complete destruction of their communities and livelihood was a foundational, 
searing memory of the Jeju landscape.  
I spent a month doing participant observation and interviewing residents from one Jeju 
village called Kashi-ri that had been hard hit by the bloodbath surrounding the Jeju Uprising in 
1948. Although I talked to longtime residents ranging from their 40s to 90s, the majority of 
longtime residents that I interacted with were in their 80s and 90s, and had remembered the days 
of scarcity and suffering following the Jeju Uprising. There was a big generational gap between 
the majority of longtime Kashi-ri residents and millennial migrants, along with regional and 
urban-rural distinctions.  
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Kashi-ri was a mid-mountain village in Jeju’s southeastern region. Longtime local people 
in this town had vivid memories of the time of the insurgency and the military suppression. On 
the morning of the contested national elections in southern Korea on May 10, 1948, the head of 
the election council/elementary school president and the Kashi-ri mayor were murdered by 
insurgents. While there was debate about whether it was insurgents or the police who carried out 
the killings in the village, across the island, these murders were linked to an attempt by 
insurgents and rebels to stop the formation of a separate South Korean government. The South 
Korean government was formed in August of 1948, and as a way to solidify the rule of the 
insecure nascent government, a quick suppression of the insurgency in Jeju was planned. Martial 
law was established on Jeju in November of 1948. The military burned nearly the whole interior 
of the island, razing villages in the mid-mountain and forcing residents to relocate to coastal 
villages. Then they launched a full-scale attack on anyone who was left in the interior of the 
island.  
At this time, in November of 1948, the whole village of Kashi-ri was burned to the 
ground by military forces. Kashi-ri residents were forced to relocate to coastal villages in the 
area where they lived together in schools and temples, while insurgents among them fled to the 
mountains. In December of 1948, police forces rounded up Kashi-ri residents again and went 
through the family registers of the villagers and identified those who were not among the 
refugees, labelling those missing as insurgents. All of the family members of the ‘insurgents’ 
who were 15 years old and older were gathered together and executed. There were seventy-six 
people who were killed in one day, labeled as “executed murderers” (H. J. Kim 2014). Several of 
the longtime Kashi-ri residents that I interviewed had lost relatives and friends during this 
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period. One man who I interviewed lost his parents and his three older brothers during the mass 
execution in December of 1948. He was left to care for his two younger siblings. 
In April 1949, residents of mid-mountain villages were allowed to move back into their 
villages and rebuild. Kashi-ri residents had lost all of their houses, livestock, and possessions in 
the state-mandated destruction of their village. They moved back onto their land with nothing 
except the clothes on their back. One interlocutor told me that after they moved back to Kashi-ri, 
people didn’t have money to buy clothes for 10 years. People went without underwear and socks 
and kids ran around without clothes. The first thing villagers did was to build four walls of an 
enclosement made from pieces of volcanic rock that were everywhere in Jeju; the enclosement 
acted as a kind of fortress within which they could all live together. People lived together 
between these walls, surviving under trees and in underground tunnels as they started to rebuild 
their houses. Without a cent of state help to rebuild, the villagers were left to their own devices to 
reassemble their lives. A local police station was built and a guard stationed in the village to 
surveil the town to watch that insurgents from the mountains did not return to the village nor 
villagers go up to join them. 
Life was grim as villagers struggled to cobble a life together from whatever they could 
glean from the land. Without seeds to plant and livestock to care for, for years they foraged in the 
nearby forests to get by. They chopped logs and gathered charcoal from the mountain and 
dragged them down to the market in the nearest coastal town to sell. They were able to get sweet 
potatoes and grains in return. They started to gather a root from the forest and make alcohol that 
they could also sell at the market. Little by little they were able to save enough money to buy 
some cows and horses. They rebuilt their homes. They began to farm again.  
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Life during these times was marked by an intense dependence on one another. Villagers 
shared all they had with one another so that no one would starve. People helped each other to 
build their houses, and later to plant crops and to harvest. Neighbors pitched in for big events 
like veneration rituals for the dead, funerals and weddings. One informant told me that Kashi-ri 
villagers were very much aware that “human resources” were the best of what they had – 
especially at the time after the April 3rd Uprising. Villagers often talked about the poor quality of 
their soil, compared to other areas in Jeju, and to the soil of the land on the mainland. It couldn’t 
produce the rice that mainlanders could grow because the land was rocky and the soil bad – and 
it was even hard to grow other grains like barley and millet.  
This older generation of Kashi-ri villagers didn’t see the Jeju landscape in the way that 
newcomers did. They didn’t see beauty or enchantment, or feel healing, wholeness, or love. 
Rather, the land held memories of pain, violence and destruction. There were two memorial sites 
in Kashi-ri that were known as “baby graves” (agi mudŏm). In each of these public grave sites, a 
mother and her children were buried – victims of the conflicts surrounding the April 3rd Uprising. 
In Kashi-ri there was also another site that was memorialized as the center of a town that no 
longer existed. The southeastern part of contemporary Kashi-ri had once been the site of a 
neighboring village called “Segarŭm” that like Kashi-ri, had been burned down in November of 
1948. But unlike Kashi-ri, it had never been rebuilt, and its lands eventually became incorporated 
into the village of Kashi-ri. As longtime Kashi-ri villagers walked through their town or when 
they talked about landmarks, they were often forced to remember sites as places of violence and 
loss.    
In the years following the Uprising, Kashi-ri villagers remembered the toil it took to 
rebuild their village in the absence of state aid – and under severe state scrutiny that came with 
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having been associated with ‘Communist’ insurgents. During this period, what they described as 
their rocky and uncooperative land was their only resource to work with as they eked out an 
existence. The landscape of the older Kashi-ri residents whom I interviewed was what Ingold 
would characterize as a “taskscape in its embodied form” (Ingold 1993, 162). Ingold described a 
taskscape as “an array of related activities” (1993, 158). He went on to make a connection 
between landscape and taskscape: “If, as Mead argued (1977[1938]:97), every object is to be 
regarded as a ‘collapsed act’, then the landscape as a whole must likewise be understood as the 
taskscape in its embodied form: a pattern of activities ‘collapsed’ into an array of features” 
(1993, 162, emphasis in the original). Landscape, he argued, is always in the process of being 
constructed through an array of activities of those using the land. For older longtime Kashi-ri 
residents, the Jeju landscape was constituted by the constant work that they put into the land.  
Their life in Kashi-ri was characterized by their daily struggle with the land and their cooperation 
with each other. They didn’t think about pausing to objectify the landscape – to call it beautiful 
and to enjoy looking at it. Rather they were in the landscape, working with it and through it in an 
effort to survive.   
Associated as it was with an everyday working relationship of survival, Jejuans largely 
had negative emotional attachments with the land. They talked about the land as rocky and 
unproductive, as harsh and unforgiving, as “bad quality” when compared to other parts of the 
country or the world. By contrast, however, their relationships with one another – the community 
spirit in Kashi-ri – was the substance and secret of their survival. Left to fight against the 
harshness of the land, Kashi-ri villagers bonded together. Older Kashi-ri villagers whom I talked 
to all bemoaned the waning of the “neighborly bonds” (chŏng) that had once knit them together 
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so closely. As one woman remarked, it was the neighborly love and cooperation between 
villagers that was responsible for the Kashi-ri of today.   
Kashi-ri villagers wished that they could escape from association with the land they lived 
on. Not only was the land unproductive and full of terrible memories, its identity as a mid-
mountain village that had been burned during the April 3rd Uprising continued to implicate them 
as Communist sympathizers and rebels. As outlined in Chapter 1, leftist thought was violently 
stamped out of Jeju and fear instilled in the people during the repressive counterinsurgency 
campaign and into the postwar era. The memory of the Jeju Uprising had been buried in history – 
the topic was banned from investigation and public discourse. Jeju residents were also 
Koreanized during the post-Korean War era. Through suppression of historical memory, 
language standardization in schools, and the promise of economic uplift through integration with 
the growing post-war South Korean economy, Jejuans in general and Kashi-ri villagers in 
particular were disciplined into imaginatively tying themselves to the Korean nation in ways that 
they had resisted before. 
In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s – the period during which many of the villagers that I 
interviewed had come of age and lived their adult lives – economic development was the name 
of the game in South Korea. Although the gap in the capital and resources put into development 
in the urban and rural areas has been well documented (Boyer and Ahn 1991; Lie 1998), Jejuans 
in general celebrated any measure of development that was tossed their way. Some benchmarks 
of development were the building of the 5.1.6 road through the mountainous areas of Jeju 
connecting the two major cities, the establishment of the first tourism development in 1979, and 
the spearheading of citrus cultivation in Jeju, which brought a much needed cash flow to 
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impoverished rural areas in Jeju. Kashi-ri was one of the towns in which citrus farming was 
established, and in the past 30 years it had brought economic stability to the town. 
Economic development and collective rise were persuasive frameworks that the now 
older generation of Kashi-ri villagers had latched onto. If they could ride the upward wave of 
development with the Korean nation, they could neutralize some of the residual stigma that 
lingered in the land they lived on: the rocky soil, the memories of violence, the association with 
red insurgency. Just as longtime Kashi-ri residents celebrated the communal bonds that had 
saved them from starvation in the harsh climate of Jeju’s mountainous regions, they also 
celebrated the deepening ties with the South Korean nation that they believed could disentangle 
them even more from the stigma of Jeju, pull them out from the margins of the state/nation. 
Seeped in the national rhetoric of the day, they looked toward collective rise as the mechanism 
for freedom from the harsh landscape and difficult past, and propulsion into a better future. 
Whereas migrants treasured and celebrated an emotional and embodied connection with 
the natural landscape of Jeju (Jeju’s sea, orŭms, mountains, etc), Kashi-ri villagers that I talked 
with remembered and celebrated the material benchmarks of economic development that came to 
their village – the markers of progress that took them further from their memories of deprivation 
in which they had existed as nomads and foragers on the land.  
The older villagers remembered with pride the day that the paved road going to Jeju City 
reached Kashi-ri. This transportation innovation materially changed their lives. They also 
remembered their participation in the New Village Movement – a political initiative launched in 
the 1970s to slow the widening income gap between urban and rural areas in South Korea. The 
idea behind the initiative was to mobilize existing communalism among rural villages in Korea 
to foster economic development through ideals of self-help and hard work. The government 
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provided raw materials for infrastructure improvement like cement and iron bars, and the village 
was responsible for organizing labor to put improvements into effect. Kashi-ri villagers 
remember that it was during this time that slate roofs were installed in homes. During this time, 
towns were tasked with raising their own capital for further infrastructure improvement if they 
wanted to reach the highest designation of “developed” or “self-sufficient” village (Boyer and 
Ahn 1991). One of Kashi-ri’s residents moved to Japan and made money in the post-war years. 
In the 1970s, he donated a lot of money to fund further improvements to the village, like 
rebuilding the local elementary school and fixing some of the roads. Kashi-ri villagers 
remembered with pride the contribution of their successful benefactor, telling stories of the day 
that his bust was installed in the town center. Later, Kashi-ri villagers’ notably successful efforts 
in the New Village Movement were recognized by the presidential visit of then President Park 
Chung Hee to their small village. Villagers loved to tell me about the pride of this moment. They 
remembered fondly that Park Chung Hee’s daughter, Park Geun-hye, the current president of the 
nation – also came to commemorate the day.   
In Kashi-ri, material signs of development that the New Village Movement brought 
provided a welcome inauguration of “development” into their village. In an age of neglect and 
marginalization, these material signs of connection to the mainland were evidence of their 
progression into the future, of the distance they were creating with the harsh land and the 
desolation they had faced in the years of the Uprising, war, and afterwards. For Kashi-ri 
villagers, the Jeju landscape held pain. By contrast, society – both at the village level but more 
importantly at the level of the nation – held emancipatory promise. The more they could build 
bonds with the nation, the further in the past the drudgery and suffering seemed to lie. For Kashi-
ri villagers, development freed them from association with a land on the margins. They often told 
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me with pride, stories about their children who had been able to leave Kashi-ri – children who 
were living in Jeju city, doing government work, or who had moved to the mainland for 
schooling and a career. Their children’s disentanglement from the land of Jeju was a cause for 
celebration and bragging.  
 
Diverging Perspectives 
Taking a phenomenological approach to landscape allows for analysis of a multiplicity of 
perspectives. In this chapter I explored both the experience of millennial migrants to Jeju who 
experience Jeju newly, or as Barbara Bender describes it, as a “landscape on the move” (Bender 
2001), and the experience of an older generation of longtime Jeju villagers who have lived on the 
land all their lives.  Diverging emotional and embodied connections among these two groups 
bring out the tensions inherent in a project of exodus. In creating alternative forms rooted in 
place in Jeju, millennial migrants risked unseating existing relationships that longtime Jeju 
villagers have formed with the landscape. 
 I took my first trip to Kashi-ri in 2013, during my first foray into pre-dissertation 
fieldwork on Jeju Island. I had started to build connections with migrants by making my rounds 
at a new circuit of small-scale guesthouses that had popped up in tiny rural towns in Jeju. These 
guesthouses were often tucked away between citrus orchards, garlic and sweet potato fields and 
the winding dirt roads of rural Jeju. They were easy to miss without precise knowledge of local 
landmarks. A friend and I were on our way to stay in one of these more popular guesthouses in 
Kashi-ri, which we had heard about through word of mouth and discovered through the 
burgeoning blogosphere of Jeju migrants. Lacking the confidence to figure how to navigate the 
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countryside bus system, we had opted to take a taxi. Although my friend had grown up in Jeju, 
even she hadn’t travelled across the island to remote Kashi-ri.  
The taxi driver was chatty and friendly, apparently shocked that a foreigner had requested 
a ride to such a remote town. It was far away from all of the fancy tourist complexes on Jeju’s 
beautiful beaches. We told him the name of the guesthouse we were travelling to – a word taken 
from a greeting in the Tibetan language. He was equally puzzled by the name of the guesthouse, 
as it sounded immediately foreign to his ears. As we entered Kashi-ri, the taxi driver told us he 
had never been to this town before and that there were likely ghosts here. He seemed to be 
warning us. The guesthouse was hard to find and we circled through the hills of the village a few 
times before finally locating it. As we began to pull into the small olle (narrow pathway from the 
road to village houses in Jeju) that led into the guesthouse, the taxi driver asked us why we were 
staying here, instead of one of the big comfortable hotels or pensions on the seafront. We had to 
explain that we wanted to check out this new popular place. Still scratching his head in wonder 
as we turned into the parking lot of the guesthouse, we came upon five or so nice rental cars 
parked in a row. In the yard just beyond the lot, there were quite a few young men and women 
sitting and talking as the sun set over the low hills. Many of them were dressed in the baggy 
pants, colorful braided and tasseled shirts, and homemade jewelry that I later came to realize was 
the sartorial preference for some millennial migrants. Puzzled again but starting to put some of 
the pieced together, the taxi driver remarked, “Oh, I see! It’s not just you! There are many 
humans like you here!” 
Entering the grounds of this popular guesthouse in Kashi-ri was indeed like stepping into 
an alternative world. Young people dressed in universally recognizable hippie clothing lounged 
about in the evening dusk. The yard held a simple wooden porch extending from the guesthouse 
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structure decorated with Buddhas and traditional Jeju statues of protection and fertility. There 
were also Tibetan flags and large brightly colored fabric strung from the porch’s ceiling. Brightly 
painted seashells and basalt stones were tucked into display shelves all around. The inside of the 
guesthouse structure had some room for guests and then a café space for hanging out. The café 
space was decorated with a dream catcher, an Egyptian eye of Horus and decor from travels 
around the world. In one corner there is a small room set apart for “craft meditation” where 
guests could go to make jewelry or other crafts while also unwinding. Guests were hanging out 
outside or sipping coffee and tea in the café or taking short walks around the property which held 
a few other spaces for guests to stay, including two Mongolian-style yurts that had just recently 
been constructed.  
The grungy, new agey global backpacker scene that we stumbled upon among the 
tangerine fields and rural houses could have been located in Vancouver, southern California, 
Hong Kong, India, France, or nearly anywhere with a young cosmopolitan population. But here 
we had found it in a tiny town tucked in the mid-mountain region in Jeju. Crossing into the 
guesthouse grounds was like entering a heterotopic space. This might have explained the deep 
confusion of our taxi driver – a longtime native of Jeju Island. It was impossible for him to 
imagine why two young women like us would want to travel to a town like this one. However, 
all the pieces came together when he pulled into the parking lot and saw the décor and the other 
guests who were mingling in the yard. He understood that this was a space set apart for a 
particular type of human.  
While the surrounding houses in the town were full of elderly farmers, this guesthouse 
was one of the hippest places in South Korea. Young people, mostly from Seoul, spent days or 
even weeks here to rest and recuperate from their demanding jobs. Many of them had spent time 
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abroad – either in their travels, in study abroad – and the guesthouse recreated distinctly non-
Korean, vaguely hippie global spaces for them that were reminiscent of times spent abroad. 
Coming to this refuge was one of the easiest and fastest way to escape the urban grind of the 
Korean system. I returned several times to this guesthouse, meeting interlocutors here and 
sometimes hanging out when I needed a break from fieldwork. I even took a permaculture course 
that was offered by a migrant woman who often hung out in the guesthouse and was friends with 
the owner and group of migrants who regularly gathered there.  
After staying in this guesthouse several times, though, I found that there was little to no 
interaction between guests and migrants who hung out there and the larger Kashi-ri village 
community. I once suggested to a guest that I met at the guesthouse that we take a walk around 
the village together and she was slightly taken aback because she hadn’t considered this as a 
possible activity. The days of her visit to Jeju consisted of lounging on the grounds of the 
guesthouse or taking her rental car to drive out to see natural sites on the island. Once we 
walked, though, she was pleasantly surprised by the charm of the village and the kindness of the 
villagers we met and thanked me for suggesting it. Interaction between longtime Jeju villagers in 
Kashi-ri and migrants and guests who lived or spent time there was generally limited. It almost 
seemed as if they were living in two different landscapes located on the same land.  
As I argued in the beginning of this chapter, people make landscapes even as they are 
made by them. Landscapes are always in the process of becoming, shifting as people engage 
with them materially, emotionally, and aspirationally. People bring their various experiences, 
subjectivities, and activities to their encounter with landscapes, making it an ever-changing 
phenomenon. Interactions with the land – these ways of seeing, feeling, working, reimagining, 
fearing, and loving the Jeju landscape – were involved in the process of making the 
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contemporary Jeju landscape. And because different people have often vastly differing 
relationships and activities on the same lands, multiple perspectives can often animate the same 
landscape (Tilley and Cameron-Daum 2017). Millennial migrants and longtime Jeju locals had 
vastly different interactions with the land. This led to misunderstandings and tensions between 
the groups as they strove to live together on the same space.  
Given the divergence between the newcomers’ relationship with the Jeju landscape, and 
the Jeju villagers’, for example, the villagers were profoundly confused by the influx of young 
people from the big city to Jeju. The older generation of longtime Jejuans’ biggest dream was to 
see their children leave Jeju for Seoul. And now young people from Seoul were moving to Jeju. 
In Kashi-ri, where I interviewed the older generation of village people, villagers were unsure of 
the reason that young people wanted to come to Kashi-ri. When I asked them why they thought it 
was that young people were moving to Jeju, some of them guessed that there was something odd 
about them to make them want to move to Jeju; maybe they were social outcasts. Others thought 
they moved for health reasons – for the clean Jeju air. One older Kashi-ri resident was stumped 
by my question, and after a pause, surmised that it was perhaps the water bottling plant in Kashi-
ri that had drawn the young people in. He knew that the local Kashi-ri water plant bottled water 
for Korean Air flights. He theorized that these young cosmopolitans had travelled on Korean Air 
planes, loved the taste of the fresh water that was served to them, read the label, and had tracked 
down the town where the water came from!   
Kashi-ri villagers were also generally confused by the strange culture that millennial 
migrants brought to the town. One villager told me that when he first saw one of the bearded, 
long-haired artistic types come to live in Kashi-ri, he thought he was a crazy person. But then he 
saw another bearded, long haired man and realized that the first guy wasn’t an outlier, but rather 
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a member of a group that he had not even been aware existed. Millennial migrants to Kashi-ri 
often gathered on the weekends at an informal flea market in front of one of the centrally located 
cafes in the town center. This flea market drew both guesthouse and café owners from the town, 
their longtime and short-term residents, and other migrant friends and tourists from the island. 
Some of the millennial migrants wore colorful baggy pants and embroidered and tasseled shirts 
in a bohemian style. At the Kashi-ri flea market, migrants would sell crafts that they had made – 
embroidered bracelets and necklaces, handmade soaps, shampoos, and candles, and artistic 
representations of Jeju Island. One woman who I interviewed couldn’t understand why these 
young people sold things that villagers didn’t need. She commented that she visited the flea 
markets a couple of times and bought some soap out of curiosity, but after that she was done. She 
had no recurring need for the things that these young people sold. She said the same about the 
pizza restaurant/café that had opened up in town. Villagers might go in once or twice out of 
curiosity to try pizza. But it was a novelty and there was no compulsion to keep eating it, or to 
keep frequenting the place. This woman wondered why they didn’t sell things that the villagers 
needed. She worried that if they didn’t need each other, there was no basis for a relationship.  
Many of the other villagers commented that there was no basis for meaningful exchange 
with the young newcomers. Some described it as an invisible wall that existed between them. 
They didn’t find occasion to talk to the young people because their businesses seemed to cater to 
outsiders. They would come and go as they pleased, without any concern to try to get to know 
their neighbors. These young newcomers also had very little interest in entering the village social 
structure, participating for example, in the men’s club or the women’s club, or the town 
shamanistic rituals. They seemed content to be left alone – and to the social circles they were 
forming with other migrants from other parts of the island. For the villagers, relationships with 
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one another were paramount – it was the fabric of the community. They were baffled by the lack 
of the ordinary everyday reciprocity that had always been the glue that held their community 
together (visiting one another, sharing resources when needed, helping each other out in the 
fields or in their homes). For the migrants, however, living in Jeju was about a very 
individualized relationship to the natural landscape and one of the attractions of Jeju life was 
freedom from obligatory social ties that had dominated their lives in Seoul. They certainly did 
not want to get enmeshed in deep village social ties in Jeju.  
Migrants also felt that there was a large distance between themselves and longtime Jeju 
residents – especially the residents of small villagers who were typically a couple generations 
above them. Some of the migrants empathized with the pathos and sadness of the history and 
experiences of the older Jejuan generation. They saw the primary sector labor and activity of 
Jejuans as constituting a taskscape that made Jeju what it was. The pathos and hard labor which 
tied them to the Jeju landscape was part of the sad beauty of Jeju. One young woman migrant to 
Jeju, an artist, described it this way: “The nature of Jeju is beautiful, yes, but the real reason that 
Jeju is beautiful is because of the people living here. Like the harsh natural world, they are rough 
and working really hard to survive. The Jeju ocean is beautiful, but the fishermen in the boats 
working all night on the sea, that is the beauty that really moves me.” While she found a kind of 
beauty in the relationship that Jeju people had with the natural world, it also made her feel sad.  
Another young woman who had moved to Jeju to work in a hotel and who also enrolled 
in a class to learn the trade of the Jeju haenyŏ had similar thoughts. When I asked her why she 
wanted to learn the craft of the haenyŏ, she teared up as she said:  
When I think about the haenyŏ, my heart hurts. It is clear that they do this work not 
because they like it; it is work they have to do in order to survive, for the sake of their 
kids and their families. There is saying among diving women here: ‘Earn money in the 
underworld to use it in this world.’ They have to go so far as to do dangerous work under 
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the water just to survive. As a woman, I wanted to understand that heart. The work is 
dangerous. You can get caught in the nets or get attacked by sharks. But they have to do 
it anyway. 
 
This girl saw the haenyŏ, a quintessential longtime Jeju local, as a figure wedded to the sea in the 
quest for survival. In desiring to know more about Jeju, she wanted to understand the heart of 
these women who met Jeju in a totally different way than she did – as a place full of danger, 
harsh and unforgiving.  
 However, these empathetic and romanticized attitudes toward the longtime Jeju people 
were in the minority. Much more often, when I asked migrants about their interactions with Jeju 
people, they described them as people who were not hip to the changing times. They described 
villagers who were unwilling to sell old houses and warehouses even when they were vacated, 
and migrants could improve and beautify them. They described unwanted attention from local 
villagers that they got when they really just wanted to be left alone. They were often burdened by 
the expectations of community that longtime local Jejuans placed on them. They disliked the 
questions and comments about their clothing, their work, their lifestyles, their marital status.  
 Furthermore, migrants described longtime Jeju villagers as being foolishly oblivious to 
the overflowing beauty that surrounded them. Because they were stuck in a work-based 
relationship with the Jeju landscape, they were unable to see the beauty that migrants saw with 
fresh eyes. They couldn’t see the peacefulness of the ocean or the majesty of Mount Halla. 
Yunmi, whose longer story I present in Chapter 4, had this to say about the contrast between 
longtime Jeju locals and new migrants:     
Jeju people don’t know that Jeju is beautiful or understand why people are moving here. 
However, migrants who have settled here [from the mainland] can feel the beauty of Jeju 
so much more. This is like the yearning for Korea that Koreans who were born and raised 
in Korea don’t know about, compared to Korean Americans born outside of Korea. 
[Korean Americans] cry when they listen to the Korean national anthem. This is because 
they long for their homelands. In the same way, if you live too close to something, you 
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start to lose sight of its beauty. People can’t know how beautiful the place where they are 
living is. But people who have come down from the mainland to live, above all, have 
decided to live here because they knew about the beauty of this place. 
 
Yunmi implied that people who were too tied to the taskscape of Jeju didn’t know how to see the 
beauty of the landscape. Instead, she implied that it was the role and almost duty of migrants 
who had come from the outside to see and then to mobilize the beauty of Jeju.  
 This distinction that migrants made between longtime local people and new migrants was 
often used to justify their presence and activity on Jeju Island. Young adult migrants, free from 
the baggage of Jeju history and the toil of the land, were free to have a passionate, charmed, and 
loving relationship with the Jeju landscape. And this vision, many of them argued, had 
transformative power on the island. Because of their ability to see Jeju with love and fresh eyes, 
they could nurture, clean up, and curate its beauty for other cosmopolitan Koreans to enjoy. 
Many of them believed that they were contributing to the improvement of the Jeju landscape 
through this fresh perspective that they brought to Jeju and mobilized in the creative businesses 
that I described earlier. They believed that they were better at maximizing Jeju’s natural features 
than longtime Jeju residents. Chihun, who I featured earlier in this chapter, told me that he 
“knew Jeju” better than longtime Jeju residents because he had made a study of it. Subtly, 
millennial migrants justified the transformations that they brought to rural Jeju villages. As 
lovers of the Jeju landscape, they should be trusted to bring about changes that would only 
enhance Jeju’s beauty.   
 Migrants’ embodied and affective relationship with the Jeju landscape certainly had a 
transformative effect on the rural Jeju landscape. As a loving and charmed relationship to the 
Jeju landscape became the basis for new ways of disentangling from burdensome social ties in 
the city and inspired new decentered, independent and creative modes of work, a path of exodus 
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from Seoul to Jeju was hardening. More and more millennials moved to Jeju with the express 
purpose of refusing Seoul life. However, part of the infrastructure of this new existence was the 
circuit of new businesses that I described earlier in this chapter and also in chapter 2: hospitality 
services, new programming for longer term travel, traditional homes turned art galleries, etc. 
Until this revamped, scaled-down tourism sector had arrived in rural villages in Jeju, the villages 
had been spared tourism development. But now the presence of these new businesses, along with 
millennial migrants who brought incomprehensible lifestyles into these villages, began the 
transformation of the Jeju countryside from ‘taskscape’ (Ingold 1993) to ‘leisurescape’ (Tilley 
and Cameron-Daum 2017). Jeju’s rural villages were being transformed from spaces of 
production into a landscape to be consumed for relaxation and pleasure. In large part because of 
the presence and activity of millennial migrants, new housing developments for newcomers were 
replacing fields that bordered villages, a steady stream of tourists brought unwanted noise, 
traffic, and garbage to once quiet towns. Real estate prices rose, which began to make property 
unaffordable to lower-income longtime Jejuans. Rural Jeju was being restructured in ways that 
put the future shape of its villages into question.  
 
Conclusion 
 I have emphasized a phenomenological approach to looking at landscape in this chapter, 
and in particular one that considers the physical and visual landscape as existing in dialectical 
relationship to the meaning of landscape that is formed by those who interact with it (Tilley 
1994). My approach here has been to juxtapose the landscape of the migrants with the landscape 
of the longtime Jeju villagers, who have developed very different meanings of landscape based 
on their diverging histories, affective connections, and interactions with the land. I have stressed 
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the materiality of the each of these groups’ connection with the Jeju landscape. The very material 
forms of the Jeju landscape – the sea, the mountains, the orange groves, the idyllic villages – 
gave millennial migrants the experience of peace and freedom and enabled alternative modes of 
sociality and forms of labor that have paved the way for their exodus from Seoul. On the other 
hand, longtime Jeju villagers’ experience of the near destruction of the landscape by state forces 
and of foraging from the land and working together with community members to survive, has 
shaped the rather negative meaning they have associated with the Jeju landscape. This kind of 
divergence in the experience of and meaning given to the same landscape is not unusual. Tilley 
and Cameron-Daum describe that “People take some material aspects and experiences and 
amplify them inevitably ignoring others. This messy and ambiguous partiality of subjective 
experience is itself the outcome of a material relation” (2017, 288). 
 Although a focus on materiality allows for divergence in the experience of and meanings 
surrounding landscape, it also means that landscape is not something that only exists in the mind. 
Rather the “brute materiality” of landscape constrains (Tilley and Cameron-Daum 2017). Even 
while working to remake Jeju into a leisurescape of peace, beauty and passion, millennial 
migrants face moments when they encounter head on the landscape of the longtime Jeju 
villagers. When the young woman faces the pain of the haenyŏ, for example, or when the artists 
fail to generate a comic book of happy stories about village life in Jeju, they come against the 
landscape of pain that is still written on the land and in the stories and bodies of the older 
generation of longtime Jeju villagers. They are unable to completely unseat the meanings that 
have developed over time among longtime Jeju villagers.  
As millennial migrants slowly transformed Jeju villages into a leisurescape through their 
engagement with the place and through the establishment of small-scale businesses, though, it 
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brought commercialization into the living spaces of the villages and an influx of new migrants 
and tourists; it sped up changes to the Jeju landscape. Through the small businesses these 
migrants brought, the tourist infrastructure that until now existed in designated pockets in Jeju’s 
regional cities and coastal resort areas was being pulled into the Jeju hinterland. Although the 
Jeju taskscape of longtime villagers had not been erased, it was shrinking with the changes that 
the migrants brought. In Chapter 5, I continue my discussion of the march of the leisurescape 
into Jeju villages, analyzing the way in which the Jeju regional government encourages this 
transformation in the Jeju landscape. But first, in Chapter 4 I unpack how Jeju as a space of 
leisure and a space of exodus is enabled not only by the materiality and placeness of the built 
environment and landscape of Jeju Island but also in the context of the circulation of stories told 
































 On January 29, 2011, Goŭn Choe, a 32-year-old freelance screenwriter living near Seoul 
passed away alone in her rental apartment. A couple days earlier, she had left a note on her 
neighbor’s door saying, “Thank you so much for helping me. I am embarrassed to ask again, but 
I haven’t eaten for several days and if you have some leftover rice and kimchi, could you please 
leave some by my door?” By the time her neighbor brought food over, Choi had already died 
from malnutrition and lapsed treatment of chronic health problems. The Korean public was 
shocked. One tweet that circulated widely on social media lamented, “This is not about mourning 
the loss of a starving artist. If we don’t change the system of contract work among screenwriters 
and the exploitation of the weak in our society, this kind of tragedy will keep happening.”   
 Professional screenwriters in South Korea represent a stratum of workers that has been 
hit particularly hard by recent structural shifts in neoliberalizing South Korea (K.-Y. Shin 2013). 
Without a union to keep their wages at a professional level, and with widespread use of 
temporary contracts, delayed payments, and harsh deadlines, they are overworked and their 
income is unreliable and insufficient for sustaining a life in the city. 
In this chapter, I feature the narratives of two young women, both formerly contract 
screenwriters in Seoul, who, rather than endure the harsh working conditions of the production 
industry in Seoul, have found an alternative path forward. They have quit their professional jobs 
in Seoul and left their lives in the city for Jeju Island, where they work in the nonprofessional 
sector and pursue a scaled down lifestyle away from the hustle and bustle of Seoul. The stories 
they tell are romantic narratives of transformation through a newfound connection with and love 
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for the natural world of Jeju. They also outline a triumphant rejection of the broken promise of 
middle-class Seoul life. As former screenwriters in the heart of the cultural industry in South 
Korea, their rejection of Seoul life is symbolic. In moving to Jeju and leaving the production 
industry they were able to wrest control of their creative labor and funnel their creative energy 
into rewriting the script of their own lives.   
The story of triumph and transformation in Jeju is a circulating genre of narrative in 
contemporary Jeju and in South Korea more broadly. Starting in 2008, these stories of a joyful 
and triumphant relocation from the urban center of South Korea to the rural periphery on 
beautiful Jeju Island circulated in the media (TV, magazines, newspapers, blogs). They were 
heroic stories of qualified professionals opting out of the rat race to pursue a slower paced life in 
an idyllic locale. When I arrived in Jeju for my first stint of fieldwork in 2013, I found that 
personal migration narratives were also circulating on the ground. Migrants to the island 
swapped stories of “how I moved to Jeju” in social settings to bond with one another, recited 
their stories in launching events for businesses or community spaces, and even creatively 
presented them in musical performances and art openings.  
 In the last couple of chapters, I have analyzed how the built environment and landscape 
of Jeju Island enabled new forms of subjectivity, new modes of sociality and new foundations of 
labor for millennial migrants to Jeju. These positive social and economic alternatives located in 
place on Jeju in turn paved the way for an engaged ‘exodus’ from Seoul. As the infrastructure 
was laid down in Jeju for a new kind of social existence, more young people opted to reject 
Seoul and choose a life in Jeju.  This new social existence, I argue, ‘lived’ in Jeju – lived in the 
houses that millennial migrants encountered, inhabited, repurposed, renovated, and redesigned, 
and in the ‘leisurescape’ that their newfound, impassioned and embodied relationship with the 
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Jeju landscape was producing. These new spaces opened up opportunities and pathways for other 
young people to follow suite – and engendered a broader exodus from Seoul.  
In this chapter, I unpack the parallel way in which exodus from Seoul to Jeju was also 
made discursively – in stories about migration to Jeju, what I call the “Jeju migration narrative.” 
I look at stories that millennial migrants told about places – about Seoul and Jeju – and argue that 
in telling these stories, migrants were not just talking about place but in fact crafting new 
temporalities and a new figure of personhood that offered them an alternative way forward. As 
the literature in anthropology on narrative and place tell us, stories about place are often about 
much more than place – delving into such realms as cosmology, morality, identity, and 
temporality. While I draw on this broader literature on narrative and place in anthropology, I 
mainly employ the analytic concept of chronotope as a tool for thinking about the relationship 
between narrative and the world. Chronotope, which literally means “time-space” is a concept 
that linguistic anthropologists have used to think about the ways in which temporality, places, 
and figures of personhood are inherently interconnected in narrative and other cultural forms. I 
use chronotope as a way to analyze the way in which a new figure of personhood – the freer, 
more passionate and playful Jeju migrant who lives in the present and is deeply connected to the 
Jeju landscape – emerges in the migration story. Conceptually, chronotope is also helpful in 
elucidating how, through cross-chronotopic alignment and contrast, these stories were able to 
have real world implications. The figure of the Jeju migrant becomes a viable positive alternative 
that others can encounter as the narrative circulates well beyond Jeju Island. In essence, 
chronotopic depictions of Jeju life recruit young Seoulites to identify with and live out these 
stories in the chronotope of everyday life. In doing so, these stories have real effects in the social 




Mikhail Bakhtin first wrote about the novelistic “chronotope” in his 1937 essay “Forms 
of time and the chronotope in the novel.” Borrowing a term from mathematics, “chronotope,” 
which literally means “timespace,” Bakhtin sought to analyze the fusion of time and space in 
literary forms. He argued, “In the literary artistic chronotope, spatial and temporal indicators are 
fused into one carefully thought-out, concrete whole. Time, as it were, thickens, takes on flesh, 
becomes artistically visible; likewise, space becomes charged and responsive to the movements 
of time, plot and history” (1981, 84). In other words, it is impossible to represent temporality in a 
novel without also representing some form of spatiality that is fused to it. He argued further that 
the chronotope of a novel also determined the “image of man” that appeared in the literary work. 
For him “images of man” – or as later analysts dubbed it, “figures of personhood,” were 
intrinsically chronotopic. Characters or figures in novels couldn’t be conceptually separated from 
the spatiotemporal representations in which they lived artistically. The narrated chronotopic 
world determined to a significant degree the kinds of characters or figures that could exist within 
it.   
 While Bakhtin analyzed chronotope in literary works, linguistic anthropologists have 
gone on to mobilize the concept of chronotope to analyze performance, mass media, everyday 
narrative, dialogue, and cultural forms more broadly. Wirtz (2011), for example, writes about 
Afro-Cuban performance that enacts a chronotope of “blackness as the timeless past still among 
us.” These religious and folkloric performances link the African figure of the performance to 
Cuba in the era of slavery, linking place, temporality and figure of personhood together for the 
audience to align or contrast themselves with.  Similarly, Davidson (2007) writes about how, 
when the East German chronotope is indexed, it does not just index a geographical space, but 
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also implies a time (“back then”) and membership in a particular group. Easterners 
metapragmatically index the East German chronotope or its contrast, the West German 
chrontope, when they want to take particular political stances. This fusion of place, temporality 
and figure of personhood inherent in the concept of chronotopic is crucial to my analysis in this 
chapter. 
 I also draw from recent scholarship on chronotope that looks at the way in which 
chronotopic representations unfold within participation frameworks, arguing that the salient 
cross-chronotopic alignment in oral storytelling is the alignment between the story and the 
storytelling event. There is also a lot of work among linguistic anthropologists on narrative that 
looks closely at the participation frame in its analysis. It is Bakhtin who first pointed out the 
continuous mutual interaction between chronotopes of the novel (the story world) and the 
everyday or commonsensical chronotopes that they draw from and are represented within. He 
describes a “special creative chronotope” where the exchange between the represented world and 
real life happens.  
Asif Agha further develops this conceptual point of Bakhtin: “A chronotopic depiction 
formulates a sketch of personhood in time and place; and, the sketch is enacted and construed 
within a participation framework” (2007). In other words, chronotopic representations unfold in 
real time within a participation framework that involves the real-world chronotope of readers or 
listeners. The relationship between the chronotopic world of the narrative and the real-world 
chronotope in which the narrative is being told is a social process through which participants in 
the real-world chronotope can align or contrast themselves with, reject or embrace the 
chronotope of the narrated world. This process can have real-world impacts on how participants 
think, feel, and act in their lives. Agha cites Bakhtin’s analysis of Rabelais’s work as something 
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that “seeks to disaggregate the ideological chronotopes of the medieval world . . . and to replace 
it, in the space of novelistic description, with a ‘new chronotope for a new, whole and 
harmonious man’ . . . and thus . . . making available new chronotopic formulations to readers in 
subsequent periods of European history” (Agha 2007). In this example, the novelistic chronotope 
offers up a new chronotopic representation of man that is now available for readers to take up 
and use in the real world – the world of the reader.  
There is a host of other work that looks at the overlap and spillage between the narrated 
world and the world of the everyday here and now. Wortham et al.’s (2011) piece explains how 
pay day mugging narratives that circulate in a town that is undergoing demographic shifts 
racialize groups and solidify identities that then go on to shape everyday life. Other work looks 
at how the unfolding of chronotopic representations in everyday talk can do the ideological work 
of political critique (Davidson 2007) or identity formation (Koven 2015) in the everyday world. I 
draw from this and other work to argue that the narratives that my interlocutors described didn’t 
just “tell” or represent events that had transpired; rather, through the circulation of the Jeju 
migration narrative in participation frameworks in Jeju, in Seoul, and beyond, an alternative 
social world took shape in the real world of Jeju. In her work on women, narrative, and class in 
South Korea, Abelmann argued that “change or transformation – rather than veridically reported 
or represented in words, language, stories, or narratives of identity – takes shape through words 
and stories” (2003, 14). I similarly contend that the circulation of the Jeju migration narrative 
had real world effects: it disrupted the existing middle-class narrative through a chronotopic 





The Jeju Migration Narrative 
 I begin my analysis by outlining the common plot line of the Jeju migration narrative. 
The typical Jeju migration narrative had a common structure: a young person, exhausted from 
work life in Seoul, takes a few days of vacation time, during which she takes a short trip to Jeju 
Island – the prime domestic tourist destination in South Korea. The purpose of the trip is to take 
a moment to rest, breathe, and heal from the immediate source of stress. However, it is during 
this moment of being away from the rhythm and space of Seoul that her body and mind register 
to her that there is something fundamentally wrong with her life in Seoul. Sometime during this 
vacation in Jeju, or perhaps a second or third vacation to Jeju, after some intimate encounters 
with the natural beauty of the island, she comes to a sudden realization that she doesn’t just want 
to vacation in Jeju, she wants to live in Jeju. There is a sudden shift in perspective and a rash 
decision to quit one’s job and immediately move down. Most of the young adult migrants that I 
spoke to narrate a process of a few days to a few months during which they quit their jobs in 
Seoul, fold up their lives, and move, usually alone, usually jobless, to Jeju. In Jeju, they embrace 
a restructured life. Rejecting the values of achievement and economic success that they have 
been raised with, they pursue alternative values of “earn less, spend less,” a lifestyle of expanded 
leisure, and a newfound love for the natural world.27 
As I analyze the Jeju migration narrative, I will feature at length the migration stories of 
two young adult migrants to the island: Soyŏng and Yunmi. In describing their lives before 
moving to Jeju, their transformation upon moving to Jeju, and their current lives of work and 
play on the island, Soyŏng and Yunmi present representative stories of migration – other 
                                                 
27 The stories I trace in this dissertation are generally those of migrants who stayed and settled on the island. 
However, there were many migrants who ended up returning to the mainland after a few months or even years of 
experimenting with Jeju life. I focus attention on those who made a permanent relocation to Jeju.  
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versions of which I heard countless times in other settings. Their participation with others in the 
co-creation of this common narrative opened up the opportunity for them and others to align with 
the new chronotopic world of Jeju and therefore to leave the chronotopic world of Seoul behind. 
These stories helped to pave the way of exodus from neoliberal Seoul – for them and others.   
 
Soyŏng’s Story 
 Soyŏng was a 34-year-old woman who had moved to Jeju about a year before I first 
interviewed her in 2015. She had been a contract screenwriter for big broadcasting companies in 
Seoul for eight years before moving to Jeju. She describes how the desire for a different life first 
emerges, while she is living in Seoul.  
People [in Seoul] are busy all the time, but at some moment, some spare time appears. 
Then they start to think: What am I doing now? Where am I going? What am I living for 
now? At that moment, they realize that their very lives have eroded away . . . So then 
because of this, when these people go on vacation [to Jeju] in order to soothe this sense of 
futility, and when they see that their minds are peaceful here [in Jeju] and they feel that 
the speed of time here is different, they feel a sense of safety/security. That is why I think 
people move [to Jeju]. When I think about it, my case was like this. . . I think there are 
lots of young people these days who think, “Why live like that anymore?” 
 
The spare time that appears in Soyŏng’s life, rare because of her extremely busy schedule, leads 
to a sense of problem about her life and prompts her to take an extended break to vacation in 
Jeju. Soyŏng goes on to explain that during her first vacation to Jeju, she focuses only on 
travelling to natural places, hoping to ease the burden and stresses of urban life through contact 
with the natural world. She is so struck by the beauty of the island and the calm that it brings to 
her life that she starts to take periodic journeys to Jeju, trying to visit different natural sites every 
time. During these visits, Jeju starts to make its mark on her life.  
Then Soyŏng describes the moment, on one of her travels, when she decides to move to 
Jeju for good: “I was going up Mount Songak – that is on the southern part of the island. As I 
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was hiking, I saw the South Pacific Ocean before me and my heart was totally at peace. I had a 
desperate desire to live here. And from then on, I started to think about what I could do to move 
down here to live. When I went back to Seoul I made some quick preparations and moved 
down.” In a moment, contact with the beauty of Jeju, particularly the wide expanse of the Pacific 
Ocean, makes the decision to give up her life in Seoul and move to Jeju easy. In this instant, as 
she tells it, it is as if Jeju itself is calling to her and she cannot help but respond. She goes back to 
Seoul, takes a few months to settle her life there, says goodbye to friends and family, and then 
finds one of the first jobs she can get in Jeju (an administrative position at a small community 
center) and moves down. The decision to move is narrated in a seamless way. The realization 
that Jeju is the place where she should, even must, live is something that comes naturally to 
Soyŏng, a realization that seems to be offered to her by Jeju itself.  
Soyŏng goes on to describe how her encounter with Jeju makes clear the pain and 
drudgery of her former life in Seoul. When contrasted to the sense of security, peace, and 
affection that the natural world of Jeju stirs up in her, she realizes all too plainly the harshness of 
Seoul life. The chronotopic contrast between Jeju and Seoul becomes the central structuring 
framework of her narrative. Linguistic anthropologists have pointed out that narratives are never 
pure retellings of something but always structured by the frame of their telling. Bauman (1986) 
analyzed the genre of practical joke telling to conclude that events were abstractions from 
narrative and that narration and interpretation were interdependent processes. Wortham (2001) 
also describes how the narration of a past event reconstructs the past event and the self from the 
perspective of the present and the narrative frame in the here and now. Thus, the context in 
which the story is told matters almost as much as the content of the story itself. Agha describes 
conceptually how a story and its frame create contrast with one another. He describes that when 
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a sketch of place, time and personhood comes together in narrative form, it creates a contrast 
with the chronotopic world that exists in the context of the tellers and listeners. For Soyŏng, the 
Seoul world of work and sociality that she had been immersed in for many years was the relevant 
existing chronotope at play for herself and her listeners – the contextual framing for the world 
she was encountering in Jeju. Soyŏng explains that she was unable to fully understand how 
oppressive her life in Seoul was until after she had moved completely to Jeju. In the context of 
contrast with Jeju, Seoul starts to take form as a distinctive chronotope – a fusion of a particular 
spatiality and temporality, and forms of personhood. She goes on to describe the streetscape of 
Seoul – this time from the perspective of having moved to Jeju. She is taking a short visit to 
Seoul from Jeju:  
I saw how people lived – everyone was always suffering because they were busy all the 
time. When I rode the subway and then got out to cross the street on the crosswalk or 
when I had to make a transfer, I had to walk. People walk really fast, so fast that I cannot 
keep up. Once, I went back to Seoul after a long time [of being in Jeju], in order to meet a 
friend. . . . In a moment, I realized, “Here [in Seoul] I also have to move fast, I always 
have to be anxious and tense, and with time pursuing me all the time. I have to do so 
much.” 
 
  Soyŏng realizes that in Seoul, she has to fall in line with the flow of bodies as people 
transfer between subways or exit from stations, rushing quickly to their next appointment. She 
has no choice but to walk quickly, and to be anxious and tense. This is a relationship that one is 
forced to have with the Seoul surroundings. Anthropologists of space and place have noted that 
the movement and actions of bodies and the spaces they occupy are mutually constitutive 
(Duranti 2003; Munn 2003; Richardson 2003). As Munn describes it, “spacetime [is a] symbolic 
nexus of relations produced out of interactions between bodily actors and terrestrial space” 
(2003, 93). Richardson (2003) argues that when people enter a scene, like this one in Seoul, and 
start to act out the interactions that are enabled and limited by that scene, they move into “being-
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in-the-world,” joining others in co-creating that social reality. But the scene also had temporal 
properties. Seoul, as it emerges in this embodied reality, urges Soyŏng to walk quickly. Its 
effects spread to her psychological and emotional state, forcing her to think quickly and enter a 
state of stress. As she acts her part to create the Seoul streetscape, the spatiotemporal scene also 
makes her, recruiting her into a state of hurriedness and worry. The Seoul chronotope produces a 
figure marked by speed and anxiety that Soyŏng can now recognize from the vantage point of 
Jeju.  
Later, as her narrative unfolds, Soyŏng recalls the kinds of sacrifices that she had to make 
in order to make her place in Seoul before she moved to Jeju. In particular, she describes how 
difficult it was to fall in line with the timescale of production in the broadcast company where 
she worked. Driven by strict schedules that pushed for the production of quality material that 
could be competitive on the national and global market, which didn’t account for the limits of 
human stamina, Soyŏng was often pushed to her limit. She told two stories that highlighted the 
cruelty of the pace of this kind of life. In the first story, Soyŏng was in a minor car accident on 
her way to work. However, because she was so focused on the production schedule and not 
disappointing her work colleagues, instead of calling her parents and going to the hospital to tend 
to her physical wounds, she went to work first to make sure that production was on schedule. It 
was only after work that she made it to the hospital to make sure that she was physically OK and 
was able to call her parents to let them know what happened. In a second story, she described 
how she had to miss her grandmother’s funeral because she couldn’t skip out on a live broadcast 
at short notice. Looking back on her life in Seoul, Soyŏng narrates these events as scenes in her 




Crucially, this chronotopic representation of Seoul only emerges in contrast with the 
chronotope that Soyŏng encounters in Jeju. Before Jeju, all of these things registered as normal 
expectations of the world of television production in Seoul. There were no alternatives. 
However, as Soyŏng discovers a completely different timescale and experience of placeness in 
Jeju, the contrast with Seoul becomes more and more vivid. With the discursive emergence of 
the new spatiotemporal world of Jeju, the existing chronotope of the modern Seoul world that 
Jeju has implicitly and explicitly been contrasted with is transformed. In Soyŏng’s telling, the 
Seoul chronotope is no longer the paragon of cultural, professional and social life in South Korea 
and the end goal of all young people. It has been transformed into an oppressive, hurried, soul-
crushing place, which produces anxious, overworked and unhappy figures. In this transformed 
and devalued state, Soyŏng is able to actively reject the Seoul life that was once all she had.  
If the chronotope of Seoul is characterized in Soyŏng’s narrative as fast-paced, crowded 
and anxiety-producing, Jeju is slow, full of what Soyŏng calls ‘t’ŭm.’ Here, the Korean word 
t’ŭm is a spatial term for “crack” or “gap” that people use in conversation to refer to a bit of 
spare time between important schedules or appointments. So t’ŭm has both a spatial and 
temporal component. Whereas the spatiotemporal world of Seoul is full to bursting, with neither 
extra space to cry or take a breath of fresh air nor extra time for reflection, Jeju offers t’ŭm, both 
a sense of roominess and the feeling of having spare time. Both the placeness of Jeju – the 
beautiful natural world – as well as time seem to expand around her when Soyŏng describes Jeju. 
Soyŏng explains, for example, how thrilled she is that she has time to be bored in Jeju: 
Boredom is something that people savor. If we are not bored, then we never have the 
spare time (t’ŭm) to have really different thoughts. I was looking for that spare time 
(t’ŭm) [when I was in Seoul].  . . .when I came here [to Jeju], I suddenly had a lot of free 
time and within that spare time (t’ŭm) I could have a lot of different thoughts. My life 




A key shift in her life is the expansive temporality of Jeju – time slows so much in Jeju 
that she even has the luxury of being bored. Moments of spare time expand and her thought 
world becomes full, vibrant, and creative. In part it is because she has divorced herself from the 
timescale of television production that her temporality has suddenly shifted. Now she works full 
time as an administrative assistant at a small community center in Jeju and evenings after six and 
every weekend are hers to spend as she pleases. However, the unique temporality that Soyŏng 
senses is more than just a product of her new work schedule. Soyŏng notices the distinctive 
rhythm of life that surrounds her in the natural and social world of Jeju. Because she is no longer 
selling her creative labor to production companies in Jeju and she has time to write creatively on 
her own, Soyŏng begins to write for pleasure: a dream that she has long carried with her. She 
creates a blog where she begins to record what she calls “episodes” of her new adventures in 
Jeju. She explores the natural and cultural world of Jeju and writes short observational pieces 
about these encounters. In these brief pieces, Soyŏng tackles the timescale that she discovers in 
Jeju – the richness of beauty and experience that can unfold within the moment, the t’ŭm of Jeju 
life. She writes, for example, about an unexpected encounter with a flower that blooms in the 
winter in Jeju, or the expansion of time as she describes waiting for a typhoon that never comes.  
The Seoul chronotope – the idea of working hard now in order to achieve a better future – 
had once been all that Soyŏng knew. In Seoul, Soyŏng had always lived for the future – that 
vague moment that was to come when all the hard labor of working multiple part-time contract 
jobs without a break would pay off. The Seoul chronotope that she described was partly a legacy 
of the developmentalist era in South Korea, during the latter part of the 20th century, when 
government and educational institutions, as well as mass media promoted the message that 
sacrifices in the present would reap collective gains in economic development in the future of the 
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nation, specifically in the collective rise of a new middle class (J. Lee 2010; Lie 1998; Nelson 
2000). Nelson (2000) writes, “Throughout this period, the carrot of a better, more equitable, 
wealthier, democratic (and unified) Korea was dangled before the population by the government 
and its media and institutions.” (20). This future-oriented temporality that vacated the present in 
service of the future was operative in the Seoul that Soyŏng knew. The chronotope that she had 
embodied as she rushed to work even after she had been through a car accident, not willing to 
face the consequences of slowing down production, was the developmentalist timescale writ 
small. The relationship to the present moment was always one of movement through to the 
future.  Even the places in Seoul that Soyŏng described in her narrative were defined by 
movement rather than a grounded placeness: the crowded subway and its transfers and exits, the 
taxi that took Soyŏng to work, the television studios that produced simulacra of places and times.   
With Soyŏng’s encounter with the Jeju chronotope, however, the Seoul chronotope 
suddenly paled in comparison. Soyŏng realized that she didn’t have to be one of the crowd, 
rushing to work in the morning, rushing through projects and inhumane production schedules, 
and then rushing back home just to restart everything the next day. Because of the t’ŭm – the 
“crack” or “spare time” in the Seoul chronotope that Jeju provided, Soyŏng could suddenly see 
the Seoul chronotope with different eyes: as a place of unrealized promises, a temporality that 
entailed an unreachable future. Soyŏng’s stance toward the Seoul chronotope is clear in her 
narration of the suffering she went through in the working world of Seoul and her rejection of the 
basis of Seoul life: “Why live like that anymore?” In contrast, Soyŏng aligned herself clearly 
with the Jeju chronotope, especially in her embrace of a presentist temporality. Instead of 
orienting herself to a future moment of success and rest, Soyŏng was embracing rest and pleasure 
166 
 
in the present, allowing herself to be swallowed up in the beauty that unfolded moment by 
moment in episodic bursts in Jeju.  
In telling her story, Soyŏng was signaling her embrace of the Jeju life and rejection of 
Seoul. However, she was also further entextualizing and circulating these chronotopic depictions 
for others to hear and take up. In particular, in starting her blog and producing artistic sketches of 
the small moments of wonder, slowness and fullness of nature in Jeju, Soyŏng was expanding 
and fleshing out the Jeju chronotope for others to take up and align themselves to. In taking part 
in the production and propagation of the Jeju chronotope, Soyŏng was broadening a disruption of 
the Seoul middle class narrative that had dominated in South Korea for many decades. By 
expanding and elaborating a representation of an alternative chronotope, Soyŏng was helping to 
throw a wrench in the totalizing chronotope of futurity and success in Korea and widening the 
path of exodus from Seoul.          
 
Yunmi’s Story  
Yunmi was 36 when she first shared her migration story with me in 2013. She had moved 
to Jeju with her husband three years earlier. She was originally from Seoul and, just like Soyŏng, 
had worked for many years as a contract screenwriter after graduating from university. Yunmi 
loved to write, but the demands of her job as a freelance screenwriter were exhausting. After 
marriage, she quit her job as a writer and moved with her husband to the countryside in 
Gangwon-do, a rural region on the eastern seaboard in South Korea, where she helped her 
husband run a ranch. She wanted to return to work but was wary of returning to the world of 
broadcast screenwriting. One day, about three years earlier in 2010, completely out of the blue in 
her telling, Yunmi and her husband chanced on the idea of moving to Jeju. They had quit their 
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work running the ranch in Gangwon-do and needed a place to go. Rashly, without a plan, they 
packed two bags and moved to Jeju: 
We didn’t really have a plan. We just didn’t want to live in a city, and at any rate 
Gangwon-do was also a very beautiful place; the air was good. I was doing many things 
and it ended up that we quit the business and when we asked ourselves where we could 
go, we suddenly thought “Jeju? Yeah Jeju would be good.” So the two of us didn’t have a 
house or make a plan; we just drove one car with two backpacks and blindly took a ship 
to Jeju. For one and a half months we lived in a motel. Then I accidentally hit upon the 
idea that, for a long time, I had wanted to learn to make coffee. So after we found a small 
one-room apartment that we could live in, I started to learn how to make coffee. 
 
After taking some time to get settled in Jeju and enrolling in a short barista training 
course, Yunmi opens a coffee shop just outside of a popular tourist area in Jeju. Her coffee shop 
is modestly successful and allows her to live a pleasant life at a much slower pace than her work 
in broadcast companies. Her husband makes money working as a day laborer, and they are able 
to find an affordable place to live and a community of like-minded people who are mostly 
migrants from the mainland. What is even more delightful to Yunmi is that her life in Jeju gives 
her the free time to pursue her passions. Once a week she closes her coffee shop to give herself 
time to explore the natural world of Jeju – either by surfing on the ocean or hiking Halla 
mountain or the smaller hills around Jeju. She also takes walks or goes surfing nearly every 
morning before opening her shop, syncing her body up with the natural rhythm of the place. Like 
Soyŏng, she relishes these intimate moments of contact with the Jeju world. Although she 
doesn’t’ have much time to write, every season, on the walls of her coffee shop, she puts up 
pictures that she has taken of the Jeju natural world with some lines of poetry or prose that she 
has written.  
Yunmi explains that after living in Jeju for a couple of years, she realizes that she has 
been transformed. She explains:  
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I used to think that I was able to live either in the city or in the country, and that I chose 
to live in this place [Jeju] because I liked it.  But last year when I took a trip to Seoul, I 
realized that I am a person who can’t live in the city. It is no longer a matter of choice. I 
thought, “Now I can’t live there and must stay here.”  When I went [to Seoul] that time 
city life was really hard. People were really busy and the air was really bad. Even when I 
slept I felt like I had not slept. Air is really important. When I came to Jeju my eyes 
improved. My prescription improved. Each eye went up by 0.3. When I was [in Seoul] 
doing the screenwriting work, my eyes were really not good and I was always wearing 
my glasses. . .  I always had to look at books and at the monitor screen. I didn’t want to 
wear my glasses, so I took them off. After that, things appeared a little hazy and in most 
cases I tolerated it and just didn’t wear my glasses. They were annoying. But last year I 
went to this eyeglass shop next door here in order to make sunglasses and my eyes had 
improved. “Wow,” I thought, “[Now] I have no choice but to live in a place where the air 
is good.” 
 
Like Soyŏng, Yunmi didn’t even realize how much she was suffering in Seoul until she was 
immersed in the contrasting chronotope of Jeju. It was only the relocation to Jeju – and the 
transformation that it prompted in her body -- that revealed the ugly truths of Seoul life. 
Returning to Seoul for a visit prompts a realization that she is permanently out of sync with the 
Seoul chronotope. Her body can no longer take the polluted air and the overly busy pace of life. 
Whereas Soyŏng had first experienced an emotional transformation, a feeling of peace as she 
gazed at the ocean, for Yunmi the change registered itself to her first in her body.  
Transformed, Yunmi’s most important new relationship becomes her embodied 
relationship to Jeju as a place. As with the migrants I described in Chapter 3, for Yunmi, a newly 
forged relationship with the Jeju landscape displaced social relationships left behind on the 
mainland and created new kinds of identity. Yunmi describes how, through surfing on Jeju 
Island, she feels connected to the natural landscape. She says, “surfing is a sport where you can 
breathe in rhythm with living nature.” Yunmi goes on to describe a friend who is even more in 
love with surfing and the Jeju ocean than she is, someone she admires: 
She came [to Jeju] because she was bored [of Seoul life] and until now she has not been 
bored of Jeju. This friend came here, earned money, and found and paid for housing for a 
year. She works from morning until evening. On her way to work, at dawn, she goes to 
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ride the waves. On her way home, right after she finishes work, she rushes back to the 
sea. No matter how you look at it, I think that this friend of mine is feeling more while 
living in Jeju. 
 
In describing her friend in this way, Yunmi draws up a figure of the ideal migrant to Jeju, one 
whose defining relationship is an almost obsessive relationship with the Jeju sea. She goes on to 
explain that this is a person who is not motivated by money or work, but rather by a pure love of 
the sea. If not for this kind of bond, Yunmi goes on to explain, young people cannot “make it” in 
Jeju. There are no lucrative jobs to be had on Jeju or big sums of money to be made because of 
the lack of industrial production and corporate offices. It is hard to make ends meet – migrants 
cannot live the middle class lives they lived in the city. There are also no sophisticated cultural 
venues or department stores where they can consume at levels appropriate to achieve middle 
class style and worldliness. So, if they don’t create a strong bond with the natural world – with 
“Jeju itself” – then there is nothing to hold them in Jeju.  They end up returning to the city.  
Yunmi goes on to describe herself, like her friend, as bounded – in love and affection – to 
the Jeju landscape. In doing so, she aligns herself with the figure of her friend that she admires. 
She says, “I am the girl who rides the mountains while looking at the Pacific Ocean.” She goes 
on to say, “I am living very intensely on Jeju. I have a lot of young adult friends who are also 
living very fiercely here. I have many friends who don’t have money to buy a house or to buy 
land, but who came here and want to feel as much as they can, to the maximum degree.” As in 
Soyŏng’s narrative, there is an expansion of time, an urgency to break open and feel the present 
moment “to the maximum degree.” Furthermore, there is a somatic connection to place that 
anchors the new identities that are produced in this chronotopic representation. As in other 
chronotopic representations, Yunmi’s narrative fuses the place of Jeju to a particular temporality 
and a new figure of personhood. In the chronotopic representation, Jeju emerges as not just a 
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place, but a place that by entailing new temporalities and new modes of personhood fills out a 
new possible world for Yunmi and others.  
Yunmi draws up chronotopic representations of Seoul and Jeju as stark contrasts to one 
another – contrasts within which she can then situate herself. Yunmi says,  
It is like this on the mainland: You have to earn money so that you can set some aside so 
that you can get married. When you get married you have to buy an apartment of a 
certain size and you have to spend a certain amount of money on your children’s 
education. There are many standards like this in the city. But my friends who are living 
here now do not have these standards. These are friends who do not have any of the 
standards of happiness that are based on a house and an education. Why do I have to live 
sacrificing myself in the present for the sake of a tomorrow, for the sake of a future which 
might not come? Why?  
 
This moralizing rejection of middle-class Seoul life came up in Soyŏng’s, Yunmi’s and nearly 
every migration narrative that I heard. Middle class Seoul life meant reaching an unbending set 
of accomplishments in life. And for those like Soyŏng and Yunmi whose pay and status were at 
the lower end of the professional world and also lacked job security, the middle-class dream was 
slipping out of their reach. Yunmi’s question echoed throughout many of the narratives I heard: 
“Why do I have to live sacrificing myself in the present for the sake of a tomorrow, for the sake 
of a future which might not come?” The dream of the middle-class life in Seoul was crumbling. 
It was crumbling faster for young people like Yunmi who were downwardly mobile by the 
standards that the Seoul world set for them. Yunmi and other migrants drew up the chronotopic 
representation of Seoul in narrative here – the future-oriented temporality, the benchmarks for 
middle class success – in order to contrast and distance themselves from it. They drew attention 
to the hollowness of the timescale of present sacrifice for the sake of future achievement of the 
middle-class dream. In its place, they were building a contrasting, alternative chronotopic world 
that dispensed with the future and expanded the present.   
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 In contrast to Seoul, the chronotope of Jeju – with its abundance of natural space and 
slower, more humane timescale – offered a desirable set of alternatives. In Jeju, Yunmi rents her 
humble rural house for less than $1000 a year. She doesn’t own her coffee shop either, but pays 
rent to the owner. She makes just enough money at the coffee shop (combined with her 
husband’s also modest income) to “eat and live.” She freely confesses that she doesn’t have 
much of a savings for her future, but that she is deeply satisfied with her life in Jeju. She explains 
that she and her friends who are also living by the mantra of “making money to eat and live” are 
a picture of a new figure of youthfulness in Korea:  
Everyone [in Seoul] is working so hard to earn money to live. But what about those [here 
in Jeju] that are satisfied with this situation, without all of that? When I look at these 
friends, youthful thoughts come to mind. When they come here, they discover true 
youthfulness. When I see my friends in their twenties who are surfing and playing 
excitedly while also managing to work jobs here, I think that they are so beautiful. When 
you come to Jeju and see young people here, you can feel, “Wow this is what it is to be 
young. Youthfulness is really beautiful.”  Young people on the mainland want to have 
leisure time so that they can watch movies. They have to do well [at their jobs and make 
money] so that they can go to plays and musicals and enjoy cultural life in the city. And 
then there is drinking. There is always drinking.  But here there are many healthy young 
people. . .  Their alcohol drinking is really different. They don’t tell each other to drink 
up. They go the beach and, while they are looking at the moon, they drink a little and 
then, emboldened, they swim in the water for a while and come back out. They approach 
the sea very romantically.  
 
Striking here are Yunmi’s sketches of figures that animate the contrast between Seoul 
and Jeju. Bakhtin (1981) argues that in chronotopic representations, the “image of man,” or 
figures, are intrinsically linked to and in part determined by spatiotemporal representations. 
Linguistic anthropologists have showed that different chronotopic representations often enable 
different kinds of figures (Koven 2015; Harkness 2014; Woolard 2013). In some cases, figures 
that are drawn up in narrative or dialogue become stand-ins for chronotopic representations that 
do identity work for the narrators who are speaking. Koven (2015), for example, describes how 
Portuguese migrant women who are living in France ‘voice’ the contrasting figures of non-
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modern, old-fashioned and conservative Portugal and modern and urban France. In doing so they 
create a cross-chronotopic alignment with the modern French woman and work towards 
identifying themselves as modern and French.  
In a similar way, Yunmi was creating a cross-chronotopic alignment with the Jeju figure 
of personhood that she was narrating. The Jeju figure of “youthfulness” that she describes above 
has many qualities that she admires – beauty, passion, playfulness, peace, freedom. This figure 
also shares her love of the sea and satisfaction without the money and ostensible success of those 
on the mainland. By describing this figure in this positive way and drawing comparisons 
between the values of this figure and her own, Yunmi is positively aligning herself with the 
millennial Jeju migrant.   
The figure of the ideal Jeju migrant is simultaneously bound to the landscape of Jeju and 
bound to the present moment. Yunmi drinks now not to get rid of the stress of working hard in 
the city, or because she is pressured by her peers, but because she is so happy to be swimming in 
the moonlight with her friends. Yunmi repeats the word, “youthfulness” as a trait of this figure of 
the Jeju migrant. In doing so, she presents an important contrast with the widely recognized 
figure of the middle class urban young adult who she also describes here: the figure who works 
hard in order to play hard and eventually to save up for a house, car, family and future. In 
Yunmi’s narrative, the ‘youthfulness’ of the figure of the Jeju migrant edges out the stereotypical 
and widely circulating figure of the Seoul-based middle-class young adult with its freer, more 
passionate, and happier mode of being. Agha (2007) argues that chronotopic depictions often 
create contrasts with the cultural chronotopes already at play in the larger context in which the 
depictions are narrated, performed or enacted. He contends that if ratified, repeated and 
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circulated, these chronotopic depictions can transform or replace existing cultural chronotopes 
(324). 
 Yunmi’s narrative – combined with many similar narratives that were told and retold 
about the Jeju chronotope and the new emergent figure of personhood that it entailed – had real 
social effect, bringing into popular circulation a new plausible figure of youth in South Korea. In 
particular for downwardly mobile middle-class young people like Yunmi, the depiction of the 
figure of the carefree Jeju migrant who rediscovers passion and play on Jeju Island created an 
alternative figure of personhood that they could align themselves with. This alignment helped 
these migrants to work out sociological identities that offered an alternative to continuing to try 
to reach the suffocating and unreachable standards of the Seoul middle class young person. In 
their talk of enjoying rest and play, living in the present instead of the “future which might not 
come,” and engaging passionately with the natural landscape of Jeju – Yunmi and other migrants 
discursively created a new and viable chronotopic contrast to the Seoul chronotope and its 
accompanying competitive and upwardly mobile middle class young person.  
 
Circulation of the Jeju Migration Narrative 
 Soyŏng, Yunmi and others brought about transformation in their own lives through the 
telling of the Jeju migration narrative. In the chronotopic world of Jeju that they presented in 
their narratives, they fleshed out not only a new and improved place to live, but also new 
temporalities and figures of personhood. When they aligned themselves with this new 
chronotope, they were able to simultaneously embrace a new alternative life in Jeju and reject the 
Seoul chronotope that had long defined them. The chronotope of Seoul had for so long defined 
these young people for what they lacked: stable professional employment, a house, a car, a 
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spouse, kids, etc. Jeju Island offered a discursive position from which to disrupt the middle-class 
narrative. Through the telling and retelling of the Jeju migration narrative, they flipped the script, 
producing a chronotopic alternative that expanded the present and dispensed with the future, as it 
unfolded against the ground of a surprising world of natural beauty.   
Soyŏng and Yunmi were not the only ones narrating the Jeju migration narrative. These 
sketches of calm and transformation through a connection with the Jeju landscape, of time 
stretching out and slowing down, of an easy and quick exit from Seoul, were circulating in 
stories told at social gatherings, artistic expressions of Jeju life and in books and magazines 
about Jeju life. The Jeju chronotope had been produced by the many people who had heard 
earlier migration stories and then reconfigured or reproduced new iterations of the narrative. 
While Yunmi was on the early end of the migration boom, having arrived in 2010, by the time 
Soyŏng arrived in 2014, the co-created Jeju chronotope was already circulating widely in the 
everyday talk of Jeju migrants. Thus Yunmi’s narrative displays fewer of the entextualized 
markers of the Jeju migration narrative. The Jeju chronotope took on increasingly entextualized 
form as the Jeju migration trend progressed. As Jeju migrants talked to one another and their 
friends and family back home about the “slow life” in Jeju and about their newfound connections 
to the Jeju landscape, the chonotopic representation of Jeju hardened. Beyond the discursive 
realm, this narrative also impacted migrants’ everyday lives. Agha (2007) describes how 
artistically created or narrated chronotopes get configured into everyday life, becoming codified 
into the “genres, practices, ‘fashions of speaking,’ and the institutionalized forms of life” (322-
323). The chronotopic depictions of Jeju that emerged from this new genre of narrative impacted 
and shaped migrants’ everyday lives as they enacted slower-paced lives centered on rest and play 
rather than competition, success, and upward mobility. They also enacted new forms of sociality 
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and modes of labor in line with the spatiotemporal depiction of the Jeju chronotope. And finally, 
these circulating stories drew more young people from Seoul to move to Jeju. The possible world 
told in stories about Jeju became an everyday world for those who relocated.  
In telling their stories, then, Soyŏng and Yunmi were creating alignment with the already 
circulating Jeju chronotope and a contrast with the Seoul chronotope. They were signaling their 
embrace of the Jeju life and rejection of Seoul. However, they were also further entextualizing 
and circulating these chronotopic depictions for others to hear and take up. Migrants like Soyŏng 
and Yunmi were unique in that they participated in the explicit objectification of the Jeju 
migration story by publishing their writing online – and even beyond that to print media. 
Soyŏng’s blog that documented the episodes of her Jeju adventure gained a small following 
among readers back in Seoul and was awarded a prize by the blogging platform she used. Later a 
publisher came upon her work and in 2017 brought a book-length version of her sketches of 
alternative Jeju life into circulation, aimed at a malcontented millennial audience in Seoul that 
was languishing the in corporate life and wanting to dream about a different life. Yunmi moved 
from publishing thoughts and poems of her encounters with Jeju on the walls of her café to 
publishing a column in a local newspaper. In this column she talked about her experience as a 
Jeju migrant, and especially about her encounters with the Jeju natural world.     
 Soyŏng and Yunmi, like migrants I have described in previous chapters, were recapturing 
their creative labor upon moving to Jeju. Whereas before they had employed their writing talents 
for big corporations in Seoul that had neither paid them adequately nor provided job security, in 
Jeju they were able to pursue inspired writing that came from their own lives. Soyŏng and 
Yunmi were fulfilling life-long dreams of regaining creative control over their writing. In writing 
about their own experiences in Jeju, they were sketching out their own freedom. Their stories 
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actually participated in bringing into being a new world of beauty, passion, and play. By writing, 
they were in part creating the world that they wanted to live in. In addition to transforming the 
identities and social worlds of those who heard and told these stories, then, the emergent Jeju 
chronotope also opened up a genre of writing in blogs and in books that inspired the creative 
labor of millennial migrants from Seoul like Soyŏng and Yunmi. Because of the competitive 
grind that persisted in Seoul, there was a growing market for these stories. In this way, the Jeju 
chronotope offered creative workers another level of freedom from the Seoul chronotope – a new 
world of creative labor oriented around self-expression and freedom, rather than the cultural 
production of neoliberal Seoul.  
 
Conclusion 
 Through narration of their unexpected encounter with the slow pace of life on Jeju Island 
and their somatic attachment to the natural world of the island, Soyŏng, Yunmi, and others 
created a cross-chronotopic alignment with Jeju that had far-reaching social consequences.  
Before their relocation, at the lower end of the professional middle class in Seoul, downwardly 
mobile young people like Soyŏng and Yunmi were cut out of a future for which they had been 
making daily sacrifices. In previous chapters, I have emphasized how migrants’ embodied and 
affective relationships with Jeju’s built environment and natural landscape led to new forms of 
subjectivity, sociality, and forms of labor that built towards an alternative social existence. 
Yunmi and Soyŏng, in this chapter also describe life-changing affective and somatic connections 
to the natural world of Jeju. However, I stress in this chapter also how the narrative act of telling 
and writing their stories, through which they created cross-chonotopic alignment with the place, 
temporality and figures of personhood emergent in the Jeju chronotope, allowed them to take 
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control of their lives, reject the empty promises that Seoul offered and embrace an alternative 
spatiotemporal world.  
In this way, the Jeju migration narrative intervened in the dominant narrative of middle-
class success that had progressed nearly without contestation since the developmental era. 
Instead of simply accepting the status that Seoul gave to them – the downwardly mobile middle 
class – migrants created in their stories a new sense of identity, a fierce new energy. Their stories 
reveal a vibrational quality of life, an urgency to move, feel, and experience all they can in the 
present moment, in Jeju. In the Jeju chronotope, migrants were not subject to the future-oriented 
developmentalist logics that made them into downwardly mobile middle-class subjects. Rather, 
they could be passionate creative individuals crafting a more desirable world for themselves in 
the now. They could reject the polluted, crowded cityscape for the pure and restorative natural 
landscape. And rather than being stuck in the social networks and oppressive hierarchical 
corporations of neoliberal Seoul, they could strike out on their own to explore less encumbered 
modes of personhood.  
These stories also drew up and sharpened a compelling contrast between Jeju and Seoul, 
one that resonated with millennials still stuck in Seoul. The existing Seoul chronotopic paled in 
comparison to the new Jeju chronotope crafted in these stories. Migrant stories entextualized a 
temporality, an experience of place, and a mode of personhood that gained wide mobility in both 
spoken and written forms. These stories were able travel to ever corner of South Korea, reaching 
those who didn’t have a chance to encounter the embodied and material transformations that 
were happening in Jeju. As more people heard the narrative and identified with it, more people 
were convinced of the Jeju life as a viable – and desirable alternative to the competitive urban 
178 
 
reality they faced, and were drawn into migration. The circulation of the Jeju migration narrative 


















































 So far in this dissertation I have outlined the emergence of ‘exodus’ among a generation 
of downwardly mobile millennials from Seoul to Jeju both through the localized, material, and 
embodied engagement with the space/place of Jeju (Chapters 2 and 3) and through the “Jeju 
migration narrative” (Chapter 4). I have also described the gradual transformation of Jeju 
villages from ‘taskscape’ to ‘leisurescape’ as millennial migrants’ small-scale businesses bring in 
fundamental changes to fishing and farming villages in Jeju that have previously been spared 
tourist development (Chapter 3).  
 In this chapter, I look at the Jeju regional government’s response to millennial migrants 
from Seoul. Although they did not actively recruit millennial migrants, the government was 
pleased with the influx of any new residents to Jeju, and in particular young residents who were 
repopulating villages with an ageing and shrinking population. Millennial migrants, with their 
small-scale business developments in Jeju’s villages, were lauded as “cultural immigrants” by 
the celebratory national media and were welcomed by the government as the hands and feet of a 
culture-led push towards globalizing Jeju. The government did what it could to fold millennial 
migrants into its developmental designs, particularly by funding initiatives that would recruit 
migrants into cultural and arts programing that would help to put Jeju on the global map. 
Government contracts for culture and arts initiatives were temporary and unstable, but migrants 
who had quit their jobs in Seoul and were looking for cultural and artistic work were in large 
supply. The regional government in this way groomed a self-employed, creative work force of 
millennials from the city – which successfully contributed to their goals of global development. I 
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present an extended example of the Jeju Hansup’ul Haenyŏ School in this chapter to make this 
point and also introduce Changhi and Sanghun to show how government designs on the creative 
labor of millennial migrants extended well beyond planned initiatives and created a milieu where 
young people were folded in to the work of globalizing Jeju “cultural contents.”  
However, I contend that millennial migrants’ creative labor could not be completely 
coopted by government efforts to make them into a malleable creative work force, what 
Lazzarato (1996) has called the “intellectual proletarian” (136). I highlight in this chapter the 
creation of a globalism of a very different kind among millennial migrants, one that was invested 
in creating non-Jeju, non-Korean global spaces. These were global spaces not curated by the 
government, but that rather took inspiration from global youth travelling culture that was 
distinctly non-Korean and thus separate from a history of state-led development plans and a 
neoliberal work regime. Although migrants were not escaping global capitalism, they were able 
to create alternative forms of production that placed them outside of forms of mainstream Korean 
middle classness.  
These two projects of globalism – one that was conceived by the state and the other that 
reached towards a critique of South Korea through identification with global youth culture – 
overlapped one another as this migration progressed but were not the same. In the vibrant spaces 
of alternative global culture which millennial migrants created, they were able to maintain 
control of their creative labor. In these spaces, millennial migrants were further concretizing a 
meaningful exodus from Seoul – creating a positive social alternative to the cut-throat, soul-





 “Cultural Immigrants/Migrants” 
 The ‘leisurescape’ that I described in Chapter 3 was born from millennial migrants’ 
experience of a newfound connection to the landscape that inspired alternative modes of sociality 
and labor that was manifested in new small-scale businesses that brought the embodied and 
affective experience of Jeju to others. However, in commercializing this encounter with Jeju, 
new forms of small-scale leisure business were drawn into small villages in Jeju that had 
previously been primarily involved in agriculture and fishing industries.  Together, the new 
circuit of guesthouses and coffee shops that migrants like Miyŏn established and the small 
businesses that sold the intimate, passionate, and inspiring experience of the Jeju landscape to 
others began to transform Jeju from the inside out. 
Although the early wave of migrants saw themselves as bucking mainstream trends and 
embracing an anti-material lifestyle, they were celebrated by the national media and welcomed 
by the Jeju government as an economic boon to sleepy rural towns with an aging population. 
Media outlets during the early days of the migration boom defined these young urbanites not just 
as new small business owners in the leisure industry, but as cultural trailblazers. The term 
“cultural immigrant” and later “cultural migrant” began to circulate in the media. Rather than 
being understood as merely small business owners, the work of these new savvy urbanites was 
upgraded to the status of “cultural” work. In one in-depth magazine article published in 2011 in 
SisaIN, a left-leaning progressive magazine that prides itself on its independent voice, it 
described the “new wind” that young adult migrants from the mainland gave to a small farming 
village that was described as a “cultural wasteland on the periphery of Korea,” sorely lacking in 
youthful energy. Some of the public art projects, new businesses and craft flea markets in the 
town that migrants had set up were described as “giving the worn out collapsing town new colors 
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to wear.”28 The article drew out the contrast between the ageing, lifeless, and seemingly culture-
less small town and the dynamism and freshness of the young adult migrants. The Jeju 
government for its part set up “migrant attraction” programs in its regional cities to encourage 
the continued migration of new residents from the mainland. And, as I will describe below, they 
also began to recruit migrants into cultural and artistic work that could push Jeju further onto the 
global scene.  
Millennial migrants were valuable in the eyes of the government because they brought 
potential to further the Jeju government’s interest in globalization and culture-led development. 
As I outlined in Chapter 1, although the Jeju Free International City project was the first large-
scale locally-driven development project in Jeju, it fell very much in line with the neoliberal 
climate of the rest of the country and echoed the globalization efforts of the central government. 
In developing several new large tourist developments (new themes parks, shopping districts, new 
housing developments for global residents, medical tourism, a global English education campus) 
the JFIC aimed to create new ways of bringing foreign capital as well as tourists and even global 
residents into Jeju. Part of this new push also included a concerted effort to globalize Jeju culture 
– specifically to find marketable Jejuan “cultural contents” that could be developed and that 
could circulate freely as cultural products among foreigners who came to Jeju and in the wider 
globe.   
I want to clarify here that the conception of “culture” in this context reflects a particular 
history of culture-led development in South Korea more generally and on Jeju Island particularly 
in more recent years. Cultural development has been linked to economic development in South 
Korea since its establishment as a modern nation. In the post-WWII years, UNESCO developed 
                                                 
28 An, Hyŏn-mi. 2011. “Cheju sangnyuk han 'munhwa iminja'dŭl ŭi hapch‘ang (Choir of 'cultural migrants' who 
landed on Cheju island).” Internet Sisainlive. December 2. Accessed May 8, 2018 
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a doctrine that became known as the ‘cultural exception.’ This was the idea that culture was a 
domain unlike other merchandise in that it had value beyond the commercial. In the name of 
protecting cultural diversity, especially in the developing world where local culture was at risk of 
being bulldozed by the culture of “advanced” nations, there should be a “cultural exception” to 
free trade. In order to preserve cultural diversity for the greater good of humanity, UNESCO 
took on the task of protecting the “cultural contents” of developing nations so as to make them 
eventually able to compete in the open market of cultures in the future. This UNESCO doctrine 
influenced the Korean government to put policies into effect that would “preserve” Korean 
culture – understood to be in danger of disappearing. At the same time, native culture was 
understood to be in need of bolstering and development after the period of Japanese colonialism 
and war. To this end, the Korean government passed the Preservation Act for Culture in 1952, 
limiting the influx of cultural products from abroad and promoting the promotion of Korean 
culture. Later the Park Chung Hee administration in the 70s poured money into the development 
of the cultural heritage of a traditional Korean past – folk art, traditional dancing and music, etc. 
The preservation and development of “cultural content” during this era was about rediscovering 
(and in some instances the reinvention of) the essence of Korean culture – in need of bolstering 
after years of Japanese colonization and war. Throughout the developmental regimes, cultural 
content was developed, eventually constituting an essential part of Korean ethno-national 
identity (Medina 2015). 
  This conception of culture continued through the 80s, shifting a bit as the Seoul Olympic 
Games approached in 1988. The idea of culture was extended into the realm of sports, and later 
into tourism – and became inclusive of not just illustrious past traditions but also part of the 
contemporary national body. National culture was now embodied in youth, and in the athletic 
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bodies of Koreans in the present. Korean culture was something that could also be marketed for 
the enjoyment of those who visited South Korea, as travel to Korea became more and more 
liberalized.  
Things changed again during the post-IMF crisis era of the late 90s and early 2000s. 
Culture took on a new role as the Korean government rolled out the globalization campaign and 
endeavored to shake off the image of itself as a developing nation. South Korea was eager to join 
the ranks of the leading economies. In this environment, the development of what came to be 
called the “culture industry” became a vehicle for economic recovery and for bolstering entrance 
into the “knowledge economy” of the 21st century.  While the phrase “cultural contents,” a 
holdover from the developmental era, continued to be used, the idea of investing in culture in 
order to protect and develop an ethno-national identity that would shore up the nation to work 
together towards economic development was passé. Culture was no longer something that was 
understood to be in danger of disappearing or lacking in some way. Rather “cultural content” 
was cultural products that were developed in Korea and that could be exported, sold, and traded 
on a global market. Cultural content was divorced from the national body and was seen as 
mobile, brand-able material that could bring Korea into the community of advanced nations. 
South Korea started to work on national branding – creating a brand that could easily circulate 
around the world, and that could be associated with specific cultural products – ie, music, drama, 
film, media, food, regional flavor – that could be exported and reap a profit (Medina 2015).  
The Park Geun-hye administration (2013-2017) brought a new phrase to cultural policy 
development: “creative economy.” Although the phrase had begun to build steam even before 
she took office, her administration made it part of official state policy.  “Creative economy” 
policies were designed to support knowledge and IT based industries with an emphasis on 
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innovation. The idea, although implemented vaguely, was to provide support for creative start-
ups (H.-K. Kim 2014).  
  Since the 1970s, central state-driven development policies in Jeju had heavily focused on 
immaterial production in its cultivation of the domestic and international tourism industry 
(Chapter 1). So immaterial production and a global focus was nothing new in Jeju. In recent 
decades, however, Jeju has also become wrapped up in the national push to globalize and to 
create Jejuan “cultural contents” that can circulate beyond Jeju – not just to the rest of South 
Korea, but to the world. Millennial migrants, or “cultural” migrants, then, serendipitously 
provided a creative work force that could develop the kinds of cultural, immaterial production 
that the government was interested in.  
The Olle Trail was a case in point. As I outlined in the Introduction, the Olle Trail had 
been conceived of by Suh Myong-suk as a local, Jejuan network of trails that was modeled after 
the globally famous Camino de Santiago in Europe. Suh Myong-suk had been born and raised in 
Jeju but had moved to Seoul for college and a career; in many ways her return to Jeju prefigured 
the migration of millennials from the city that was to come. She also had been involved in 
cultural work in Seoul (journalism) and had returned to Jeju for a different, more slow-paced life. 
Although the Jeju government was not eager at first even to allow the creation of these trails, 
when it realized that the Olle Trail could bring global cachet and global visitors to the island, it 
offered increasing administrative and financial support to the development of the trails. The Olle 
Trail was exactly the kind of “cultural content” the government was interested in. Suh took 
something uniquely Jejuan – the quaint stone-wall lined trails that snake through and in 
inbetween rural villages – and packaged it into something that could have global acclaim and 
forge global connections. Through Suh Myong-suk’s promotional work, the Olle Trail quickly 
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drew domestic and international visitors, reaching over 1 million yearly visitors by 2010. The 
Jeju Olle Foundation also made several initiatives that helped put it on the map as a leading 
global figure on the international trail scene. It sponsored the World Trail Conference in 2010 
and spearheaded the development of the World Trail Network in 2012 to promote sustainable 
trail development around the world and to set up global trail partnerships for mutual 
encouragement and promotion.29 Jeju has since set up ten “Friendship Trail” partnerships with 
partners in Europe, Asia, North America and the Middle East through the World Trail Network. 
It won the 2013 International Partnership Award from American Trails.30 It has also consulted 
for development of “Olle-brand” trails in Japan and Mongol; these trails, called “Sister Trails” 
have taken on the “Olle” name and style of the Jeju Olle trail in international settings.   
Given the global success of the Jeju Olle Trail, the Jeju government was eager to fold 
more young adult cultural workers from the mainland into its plans for culture-led development 
and globalization in Jeju. In step with the Park Geun-hye administration, Governor Won Hee-
ryong also adopted “creative economy” policies in Jeju Island upon his arrival to the 
governorship in 2014. During my fieldwork period, Governor Won Hee-ryong declared 2016 to 
be a year of art and cultural development on the island.     
During my fieldwork period in 2015 and 2016 there was much talk in press conferences 
and public forums about how to make Jeju into a “creative” island. As in many other parts of the 
country under the Park Geun-hye administration, the Jeju Creative Economy and Innovation 
Center was established in Jeju – a shared government-private venture. Ostensibly the plan was to 
create a start-up incubator that could fuel new business creation in Jeju. There was a lot of 
discussion about supporting young adult migrants as they brought new ideas to Jeju and 





promised to revitalize the economy. However, in an interview with Hijin, the first intern to be 
hired full-time by the Jeju Creative Economy and Innovation Center, I learned that there was 
little actual funding that went to young migrants who were working on establishing start-ups. 
Instead, low-cost office space for new businesses, free coffee and an open networking space was 
offered to a selection of start-ups in the creative economy center in downtown Jeju City. Most of 
the budget that the center received from the government went instead to bringing in high profile 
guests from foreign countries who were supposed to inspire a globalized outlook in Jeju. For 
example, one of the founders of the digital nomad hub in Ubud in Bali as well as a “successful” 
group of digital nomads from the US was brought in to speak. The latter group was provided 
with a month-long paid stay in Jeju during which they were free to work on their own work 
projects in exchange for sharing some of their tips and experiences about their travels and their 
work. Hijin was shocked at the lavish spending on the performance of globalness in the creative 
economy center in Jeju and the lack of material aid for local residents who were actually starting 
small businesses.  
 In lieu of any substantial grants or long-term programs for so-called cultural immigrants, 
one of the cultural arms of the Jeju Provincial Government, the Arts and Culture Foundation, put 
out very temporary contracts for culture and arts workers who could plan festivals for the island 
or create education programs that would promote the cultural, artistic, or touristic value of Jeju in 
some way. Every year the government hosted a myriad of festivals that were supposed to reflect 
and celebrate the culture of Jeju. There was the T’amna festival to celebrate pre-Chosŏn Jeju 
culture, the horse festival, the sea diver festival, the Jeju Olle walking festival, the citrus festival, 
and a host of traditional food festivals. There were also more general interest cultural festivals 
such as the cherry blossom festival, the Jeju Art Fair, the Stepping Stone music festival, the 
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Fringe festival in the hip urban district of Jeju City, the swing dance festival, the peace festival, 
etc. The list went on and on. The hope was that one or more of these festivals would become 
popular and give Jeju more of the global notoriety that it craved. Young adult migrants from 
Seoul would apply for funding for these programs to put their cultural and global savvy to work 
while they were establishing their own businesses or trying to otherwise cobble a living together 
in Jeju. The budget for these programs was notoriously limited, providing just enough money to 
cover the costs of the materials for the festival preparation, any food and rentals that were 
necessary, and a few hours of minimum wage pay for the work that the festival planners put in. 
Although these contracts were not designed to provide a means of living for anyone, in effect 
there were young people in Jeju who depended on these contracts as a source of income. For 
some of the migrants to Jeju who had resolved to live on very little, yearly contracts to plan a 
festival or two provided a very thin stream of income that they could latch onto.  
For example, Minji was a PhD candidate who was getting her doctorate in the newly 
created field of “cultural contents.” She had moved down to Jeju after making connections with 
some local artists who were planning a new festival called the “Jeju Art Fair” which set up short-
term art exhibitions in nontraditional gallery spaces in old Jeju City, like the rooms of historic 
hotels and guesthouses. She also worked part time in an art gallery gift shop and was writing her 
dissertation. I met her when she rented out a room to me during my first foray into field research. 
After having run the Jeju Art Fair for a couple years, the government decided not to renew the 
contract for the third year. Minji was understandably upset and had to scramble to find new, 
equally precarious ways to support herself. She was able to jump onto another project planning a 
cartoon festival in the southern part of Jeju. She also began to work day contracts in a 
landscaping business in order to make ends meet. She considered taking up agricultural day 
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labor. On the cusp of finishing her dissertation about urban renewal in the field of cultural 
contents (cultural development), Minji found herself with very few prospects for a stable job. 
With the rent prices rising across Jeju, she wondered how long she could afford to live in Jeju.  
Cultural planners like Minji were hailed as culture workers – economic assets and 
globalizing visionaries for Jeju. The government paid lip service to the new body of transplants 
from the city who were moving to Jeju. And yet, actual material support for them was scarce. In 
essence, the government was cultivating a creative and flexible workforce in Jeju that could 
serve the global ambitions of the island. This creative workforce was, in a sense, overflow from 
the cultural industries in Seoul that had created a “basin of immaterial labor” (Lazzarato 1996, 
137). Lazzarato describes this workforce of modern immaterial laborers:  
Small and sometimes very small ‘productive units’ (often consisting of only one 
individual) are organized for specific ad hoc projects, and may exist only for the duration 
of those particular jobs. The cycle of production comes into operation only when it is 
required by the capitalist; once the job has been done, the cycle dissolves back into the 
networks and flows that make possible the reproduction and enrichment of its productive 
capacities. Precariousness, hyperexploitation, mobility, and hierarchy are the most 
obvious characteristics of metropolitan immaterial labor (Lazzarato 1996, 137).  
 
Creative workers from Seoul were already accustomed to contract jobs and had been socialized 
into the “networks and flows” in which creative production happened, where life and leisure 
were increasingly blended together. The Jeju government was able to capitalize on these 
subjectivities that had been molded in Seoul. For migrants who moved to Jeju from Seoul 
because of the attachments they had formed with the Jeju landscape (Chapter 3), Jeju-related 
cultural and artwork was refreshing and even freeing for them because it was divorced form the 
big cultural industry companies that had exploited them in Seoul. And so, they were easily 
persuaded to lend their creative labor to cultural and artistic projects spearheaded by the Jeju 
government through lightweight temporary contracts.  
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However, even beyond these short-term contracts, the Jeju regional government was able 
to create a larger milieu where millennial migrants were willing to offer their creative labor to 
develop Jeju “cultural contents.” In part this was because millennial migrants, as discussed in 
previous chapters, were, in their own telling “in love” with all things Jeju. They loved the quaint 
houses, the pure and refreshing landscape, the peaceful and slow-paced life in Jeju villages. 
Many of the economic ventures that millennial migrants got involved in in Jeju flowed naturally 
from these affective attachments to Jeju. It wasn’t too much extra work – or too much of a 
contradiction of their values – to channel this energy into productive ventures for the Jeju 
government. In addition, millennial migrants also knew that although short-term, poorly funded 
contracts from the government were the standard, for those “cultural contents” that really hit it 
big on the global scene like the Jeju Olle Trail, there was a promise of much more generous 
funding. On the part of the migrants there was the hope that they might be able to hit upon one of 
the more lucrative waves of funding.  The Jeju government, for its part, hoped that the hip global 
sensibilities of the migrants from Seoul would contribute to helping Jeju be ever more integrated 
into the global creative economy. While this migration had started as an organic rejection of 
neoliberal Seoul life, nearly from its outset it was also curated by the Jeju regional government. 
The regional government in this way groomed a “polymorphous self-employed 
autonomous” (Lazzarato 1996, 139) work force of millennials from the city – which successfully 
contributed to their goals of global development. I present an extended example of the Jeju 
Hansup’ul Haenyŏ School in this chapter to make this point and also introduce Changhi and 
Sanghun to show how government designs on the creative labor of millennial migrants extended 
well beyond planned initiatives and created a milieu where young people were folded in to the 
work of globalizing Jeju “cultural contents.”  
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Hansup’ul Haenyŏ School: Back to the Sea  
The Hansup’ul Haenyŏ School was a key site where the Jeju regional government 
groomed the talents of the creative workforce of artistic and cultural types from the mainland. 
Haenyŏ, as I have described in previous chapters, are women sea divers who practice an old form 
of diving to harvest shellfish from the ocean that they can sell at markets in Jeju. Haenyŏ often 
dive up to twenty meters deep without breathing equipment to get their catch. Although this 
traditional female mode of labor exists in other parts of Korea, especially the southern areas of 
the Korean peninsula, the haenyŏ has become an iconic figure of the Jeju sea and Jeju society. 
South Koreans commonly understand haenyŏ to be a strong female figure – bringing home the 
bacon in times of scarcity, and therefore able to hold more power within the family and society 
than in the rest of patriarchal Korea. Korean anthropologist Hae-joang Cho’s classic 
anthropology of the Jeju haenyŏ concludes that haenyŏ enjoy a much more egalitarian 
relationship with their spouses than other Korean women (1979). Haenyŏ are also revered by the 
Korean public for their autonomous spirit – not only from their husbands, but also from waged 
labor more broadly. The idea of making a living with just one’s body, rudimentary tools, and 
access to the ocean, has become romanticized in contemporary Korean society. Since the early 
2000s, haenyŏ culture has been targeted by the Jeju government as an important cultural symbol 
of Jeju. The Haenyŏ Museum was established in 2006 and the Hansup’ul Haenyŏ School – a 
training ground for new haenyŏ – was established in 2007. In 2009, a provincial Ordinance for 
the Preservation and Transmission of Jeju Haenyŏ Culture was enacted.   
Haenyŏ culture was also identified by the government as a primary field for the 
globalization of Jeju culture. They hoped that “cultural contents” from haenyŏ culture could be 
developed, popularized and exported to other parts of the world. Jeju haenyŏ had already been 
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receiving international press, as reports of their sustainable practice, their feminine strength and 
their declining numbers made them popular among feminists, environmentalists and culturalists 
alike.  In the past ten years, striking images of Jeju women in their 70’s and 80’s in black 
wetsuits with their iconic orange nets slung over their shoulders hit international readers in photo 
spreads in the New York Times, the New Yorker and the Guardian among other publications, 
largely bemoaning the dwindling numbers of these ageing divers and the loss of a traditional 
practice.  All of this buzz led to the March 2014 start of the Korean national government’s 
application process to make haenyŏ culture an UNESCO Intangible Cultural Heritage of 
Humanity and late in 2016, the UNESCO inscription was granted among much fanfare.  
The Hansup’ul Haenyŏ School was an important space for creating a potentially global 
buzz around the haenyŏ. The school was established in 2007 in the village of Gwideok-2-ri by 
the village administration with the support of the Jeju regional and the central governments. It 
was established as a space for the propagation and preservation of Jeju haenyŏ culture and a 
training facility for new haenyŏ in the face of declining numbers of active haenyŏ island-wide. 
This discourse of haenyŏ endangerment was crucial for gaining international attention and 
helping to globalize the image and indominable spirit of the haenyŏ.  As part of my field 
research, I enrolled in the Hansup’ul Haenyŏ School in the summer of 2016 as a participant, with 
permission to use it as a site for participant observation. I was part of the 9th graduating class of 
the haenyŏ school, receiving a certificate of completion at the end of the four-month program. 
The Hansup’ul Haenyŏ School was popular among migrants from the mainland who had recently 
settled in Jeju and also those who were still living in Seoul but were considering relocation to 
Jeju Island. About half of the sixty or so participants flew in every week from Seoul to 
participate and were at varying stages of relocating to Jeju. There was a competitive application 
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process to get into the training school as the haenyŏ had received wide press coverage in recent 
years and there were many who were eager to learn the techniques and lifestyle of authentic 
haenyŏ.  
A variety of motivations drew my classmates to the haenyŏ training program. Some of 
them loved swimming and diving and simply wanted to spend more time in the ocean, learning 
the practical skills of diving and gathering catch from the sea. Others had recently dropped out of 
the rat race and relocated to Jeju and were looking to meet other new migrants to the island. 
Most of this group had not yet settled into permanent work lives in Jeju; they were working 
temporarily in guesthouses and cafes as they tried to figure out how to make a living in Jeju. 
There was a widespread reverence for the haenyŏ profession and the honest labor that these 
women were engaged in. On our first day of class during introductions, many professed their 
serious desire to engage in haenyŏ work in the future. One woman cried as she talked about how 
she had dreamed of being a haenyŏ since she was a young girl and had never thought it was 
really possible until this moment. She was excited and honored to be part of the group. The 
freedom of being able to “eat and live” just by the work of the body in the ocean was a romantic 
ideal for many of the participants and was part of a larger dream of exit from the competitive 
neoliberal system of South Korea.  
One woman who had graduated from art school just a year earlier gushed to me one day 
about her admiration of haenyŏ who worked what she described to me with the English phrase, 
“two jobs.” Haenyŏ harvested catch from the ocean and farmed their small plots of land to make 
ends meet –all while raising their children. This young woman dreamed of taking up the scrappy 
haenyŏ model of cobbling together a living by opening up a ceramics studio near the ocean and 
dividing her time between diving in the ocean, making ceramics, and raising a family.    
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In spite of the genuine desires of the participants to engage in the trade and lifestyle of 
the Jeju haenyŏ, and the stated intentions of the Hansup’ul Haenyŏ School to train new haenyŏ, 
in the ten years that school had been around, only three of its graduates have actually become 
practicing haenyŏ. The process for becoming a haenyŏ was complicated and not standardized. 
Practicing haenyŏ worked together in functioning cooperatives that were attached to village 
administrative systems that gave them official and exclusive access to particular sections of the 
ocean to harvest their catch. Haenyŏ members of each cooperative would set diving schedules to 
maximize the health and sustainability of the marine life and went out diving together in order to 
be there for each other in case of diving accidents. The process of admitting new members to a 
haenyŏ cooperative varied from village to village but typically required unanimous consent from 
the existing members of the cooperative. Usually there were stipulations for the new initiates as 
well – for example residency or training requirements. And these could easily be cited if existing 
haenyŏ were wary about accepting the newcomers into their communities. Since there was 
limited ocean access in each village, new members to the cooperative often meant less catch to 
go around, and so were not always welcome.  
Because the Hansup’ul Haenyŏ School didn’t create any pathways or partnerships with 
haenyŏ cooperatives to facilitate graduates’ move into haenyŏ communiites, effectively its 
training program did not lead to establishment of new haenyŏ, although there was a lot of interest 
from participants. The Jeju government tried to rectify the situation by establishing a second 
haenyŏ school in a different part of the island in 2015 that set up an internship program with 
haenyŏ collectives throughout the island. This system slowly brought a younger generation of 
haenyŏ to these small villages. But it was still getting off the ground as my fieldwork was ending 
in 2016.  
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In lieu of actually creating a pathway for new haenyŏ to enter the profession, the 
Hansup’ul Haenyŏ School, in the nine years of its operation, had become the site of the 
production of an attractive image of the haenyŏ – and “cultural contents” or cultural products 
derived from the haenyŏ image and lifestyle – that the Jeju and central governments hoped to 
globalize. Although practicing haenyŏ would join the students during the diving sessions, they 
were not involved in the design of the course or its curriculum. The lectures about haenyŏ history 
and haenyŏ practice were given by older male scholars from Jeju University. The school was run 
by the head of the fishing cooperative of the town and the school director, who was a haenyŏ 
school graduate and millennial migrant from the mainland. During diving practicums, there was 
often very little interaction between the haenyŏ in the water and the students, who complained 
that they couldn’t understand the dialect of the older generation of haenyŏ. Conversations and 
demonstrations were short, and students spend most of their time in the water practicing with 
each other. 
I started to realize in the first few weeks of the class that the Haenyŏ School program was 
more about the performance of haenyŏ-ness for the world, rather than a serious training ground 
for a new generation of haenyŏ. Over the nine years of its existence, the haenyŏ school had 
become a convenient access point for international press. International journalists, documentary 
filmmakers, and even novelists who had heard about the haenyŏ through international press, 
typically started their field investigation at the Hansup’ul Haenyŏ School. Nearly every week 
during the four months of class there was a foreign journalist or filmmaker there to speak to the 
school manager and some representative participants.  
In the second week of class, we were told in advance that there would be a very special 
guest at school that week – the American ambassador to South Korea, Mark Lippert (2014-
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2017). We were all told to arrive to class early that week so that we could do extra preparations 
for the day. We were scheduled to have a small “matriculation ceremony,” common in Korean 
educational institutions. But the event was greatly expanded given the attendance of the 
ambassador and the presence of national and international media. The ambassador had heard 
from one of his predecessors (Kathleen Stevens – 2008-2011) that the best thing to do in Jeju 
was to swim in the water with the haenyŏ. Coming to Jeju for some other business, he informed 
the haenyŏ school just a few weeks earlier that he would attend and get into a wetsuit to swim 
with the haenyŏ and the haenyŏ-in-training. The matriculation ceremony was rearranged to 
accommodate his request. Although we were not scheduled to start diving practicums in the 
water until the fourth week of class, we were told that some participants would be entering the 
water that day. An outdoor tent was set up to accommodate all the important guests from the Jeju 
regional government, and a stage was set up for speeches by Lippert and other officials. For my 
part, as one of two foreign participants of the school, I was recruited to translate the event for the 
ambassador. Although there were Koreans in the group who could have done a better job with 
the translation, I was given the task likely in order to add a more global feel to the event.   
Every aspect of the day was staged. There had been some shellfish planted in the ocean 
the day before so that the quick swim session would yield tangible, filmable successes. When the 
haenyŏ first entered the water, they were supposed to turn around and pose for a photo session 
with the ambassador. Apparently having not gotten the memo, or perhaps flustered by the song 
and dance that they were expected to perform, they proceeded to prematurely swim out into the 
ocean to begin their diving. After much commotion they were called back in and the photos 
taken. Later, when everyone came in from the water and we went inside to show the ambassador 
how to prepare and eat the fresh catch, the haenyŏ again were uncooperative. Instead of patiently 
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explaining every aspect of the catch and how to eat it, while also posing for pictures, they were 
eager to prepare the seafood, serve it and get the procedure done. At this point, one of the 
government officials took over the demonstration and the haenyŏ moved into the background. By 
the end of the class that day, it was clear that the priority of the school was to provide an 
impressive image of the haenyŏ to the outside world.  
This focus on image cultivation and the development of haenyŏ-inspired “cultural 
content” persisted throughout the training course. In the third week of class, the school director 
started off the class by talking to us about how important it was for the whole class to provide 
“cultural content” and ideas for the promotional video that we would be making. In the first 
class, we had been divided up into six different teams that we would stick with for the rest of the 
class. Each team was given a different task: one was in charge of preparing snacks, another for 
preparing programming for days when the weather kept us out of the water, another in charge of 
planning the haenyŏ festival, another in charge of photos and another in charge of making a 
video, etc. My group was charged with creation and editing of the video. I thought these were 
teambuilding tasks. However, during the third week of class, the director doubled down on his 
emphasis that the promotional video was very important – and would require the cooperation of 
all the participants. Everyone was to think about ways to make the promotional video better. It 
was our job, he told us, to promote the Hansup’ul Haenyŏ School so that we could give a good 
image of haenyŏ to the world. The idea was to create “content” that had the potential to reach a 
national and even an international audience.   
Others in my group were surprised by the director’s emphasis on image promotion and 
the development of cultural content. As we talked during the snack break that week, members of 
my team shared rumors that they had heard that the even the selection process for the students 
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was based on assessing which applicants would be better at bringing good PR to the haenyŏ 
school. As we talked in our group, we realized that nearly all the members of our group were 
writers, filmmakers, or designers. There were a couple of people who had experience in the film 
industry, a screenwriter, a novelist, an animator, a graphic designer, a translator, and me, a 
foreign researcher. It became clear that we had been selected and put into a group for the sole 
purpose of creating media content about the haenyŏ experience and the haenyŏ school. I was 
probably the one in the group who was most dumbfounded by this realization. Others had 
already picked up on this reality from talking to previous participants or by reading between the 
lines in the application process.   
As the weeks went by, many of the participants shared their disappointment in the haenyŏ 
school. Many had enrolled with the dream of actually taking on the haenyŏ profession. For some, 
becoming a haenyŏ was part of their big plan of exit from their office and family lives in Seoul. 
One woman in the school, a divorcee who was looking to quit her job in the city and pursue a 
slower life in Jeju, and who commuted by plane to class every week, confessed her deep 
disappointment to me. According to her, not only was the school just a platform for the 
promotion of the haenyŏ image and far from a serious pathway to a haenyŏ career, land prices in 
Jeju were getting so high that her dream of relocating were nearly shot. She ended up quitting the 
school – and giving up her dream of moving to Jeju – before the end of the term. Others talked 
about the wall that seemed to exist between the students and the haenyŏ instructors. The haenyŏ, 
for their part, were hurt that students seemed uninterested in interacting with them when they 




The irony that I observed in my months of participation in the haenyŏ school was that the 
government-sponsored training program seemed uninterested in fostering a real pathway to the 
expansion of the haenyŏ trade. Many of the participants were very much interested in a genuine 
“return to the sea”; they wanted to give up their white collar jobs in the city, at least for a time, 
and embrace a simpler life based on the manual labor of diving into the ocean. During the only 
question and answer session with one of the haenyŏ instructors, all of the questions that 
participants posed were about the process of becoming a haenyŏ and the real lifestyle that 
haenyŏ pursued. The school administrators, however, didn’t seem eager to actually shore up a 
declining industry. Here was a steady stream of eager students with a genuine desire to live and 
work as haenyŏ. And yet, for the most part, instead of gaining rigorous practical training, 
students were encouraged to socialize with each other and tasked with working to promote a 
glitzy image of haenyŏ.  The haenyŏ training school – ostensibly the training ground for 
revitalization of traditional material production – had become a site of immaterial production of a 
cool, romantic image of haenyŏ and its global propagation. And the participant-students, rather 
than approaching the profession of the haenyŏ themselves, were unwittingly made into unpaid 
immaterial laborers in the government’s plan for global development.           
   
Changhi and Sanghun 
The story of Changhi – one of the three Hanusupul Haenyŏ School graduates to become a 
practicing haenyŏ – and her husband Sanghun, also an aspiring diver, exemplifies the 
government’s success in creating an atmosphere in which migrants were willing to become 
independent and self-employed workers who were working towards governmental aims of 
culture-led development and globalization.  Changhi was in her early 40s when I met her and 
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used to be a financial analyst in Seoul. In her late 30s, feeling that she didn’t quite fit into the 
corporate world, she quit her job and began selling her quilting work online – a skill that she had 
already been developing for some years. About three years before I met her in 2016, she had 
come down to Jeju for a month and a half during the summer to do some freediving, which had 
become a budding hobby since quitting her corporate job. This was when she first encountered 
haenyŏ in real life. During the day, there was typically a haenyŏ from the local cooperative 
watching over her cooperative’s allotted sea territory to make sure that non-haenyŏ or haenyŏ 
from neighboring cooperatives were not harvesting in their area. The haenyŏ on duty that day 
stopped her from freediving in their territory, worried that she might be tempted to take some 
catch with her on one of her dives.  
 In spite of some setbacks in her freediving, Changhi fell in love with Jeju that summer 
and began to think about the possibility of moving to Jeju permanently. She discussed it with her 
husband, who agreed, and about a year later, she moved down and her husband soon followed 
her. One of Changhi’s main motivations for moving was, in her words, “to live in a place where 
she knew no one.” Like others of her generation, she was burdened by the thickness of social 
relationships in Seoul. However, she wanted to be able to meet like-minded people once she 
moved down. She and her husband decided to apply for the Hansup’ul Haenyŏ School program 
because their curiosity about haenyŏ had been piqued during their time spent in Jeju, but mostly 
so that they could meet other new migrants to the island. Changhi gained admission to the 
school, but her husband, Sanghun did not. Sanghun, however, gained permission to audit the 
entire course alongside his wife. They had a great time during the course and made some friends 
with their classmates. By this time the couple had bought a house on the southern part of the 
island and were setting down roots. Sanghun had been a lecturer for courses on computer 
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graphics at a university in Seoul and after relocation found a part-time job in Jeju teaching 
computer classes at a high school. He also worked on some public mural projects as an artist. 
Changhi was still figuring out what to do. But since they had moved to the southern part of the 
island, she decided to enroll in the haenyŏ school that had recently opened on the southern part 
of the island.  Again she was thinking about making some like-minded friends who lived closer 
to her and was also curious to develop her haenyŏ skills further. This haenyŏ school was brand 
new; Changhi was part of the first graduating class. It only admitted female students and it was 
designed to train women to be ready to take up haenyŏ work upon graduation. At the completion 
of the training, there was an option for graduates to actually be matched with haenyŏ 
cooperatives in the villages where they lived for unpaid internships. For the first time ever, 
Changhi started to think seriously about the prospect of actually working as a haenyŏ. And 
because she felt that this was an historic opportunity – to be among the first graduating class 
from this school to be placed in an internship program – she decided she couldn’t turn it down.  
 Becoming an intern, however, proved to be less seamless than she had thought. The 
haenyŏ cooperative in her village initially flat out refused to have Changhi work with them – 
even for a four-month unpaid internship. They were suspicious of her because she was an 
outsider and had moved from Seoul and were unsure if she was serious about settling into their 
community. However, after making friends with an elderly man in her village who had some 
clout with the haenyŏ of the village, they allowed her to at least complete the internship. They 
would decide after that whether they would allow her into the cooperative – and it would have to 
be a unanimous decision. Changhi worked very hard during her four-month internship – arriving 
early on diving days to do prep work and staying late to clean up. She was also cautious not to 
harvest too much so as to make the haenyŏ feel threatened by her youth and vitality when 
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sharing their territory with her. Her husband also joined forces in wooing the haenyŏ, helping 
them to carry onto shore their especially large catch during peak times. According to Changhi, 
Sanghun performed the physical support that many of them would have received from their 
husbands, who were now mostly deceased. He won his way into their hearts in this way. At the 
end of the internship, Changhi was unanimously welcomed into the haenyŏ cooperative and 
Sanghun asked if he could start an internship. His request was also granted.  
 When I met them, Changhi and Sanghun were happily living the life of a haenyŏ and 
haenam (the Korean word for a male sea diver). Sanghun was still an intern, but he went out with 
his wife and the other haenyŏ of the village on diving days. Generally haenyŏ in Jeju only dive 
about 15 days of the month, with a couple months of complete rest in the summer and winter 
months to avoid over-harvesting. Haenyŏ work was inherently dangerous. Sanghun related that 
diving for catch was harder than army training. It was like other physical work he had 
experienced in the sense that it was totally exhausting, but because it was work done in the sea, 
you could lose your life if your energy flagged too much or you were caught up in a dangerous 
situation without help. He described diving as “work that was close to death.” After a day of 
diving, Changhi and Sanghun ached all over and it was even hard to move and speak. It took 
them a couple of days to recover.   
In spite of these difficulties, though, they embraced haenyŏ work because they saw that 
diving gave them independence from a system of labor in the city that was laced with precarity. 
They described how their lives in Seoul had always been unstable because their jobs – at the 
bank and the university where they had worked – could be taken away from them at any time. 
Temporary contracts as well as forced early retirement were rampant in the private sector in 
Korea. However, now that she had been accepted into the haenyŏ cooperative, Changhi had a 
203 
 
“career” that no one could take away from her until the day she died. They were insistent on 
calling haenyŏ work a “career” and a “profession.” Haenyŏ could never be thrown out of a 
cooperative once they joined – they were members for life. Changhi didn’t make much money as 
a haenyŏ. At most, her catch brought in about $800 a month when sold at the market. However, 
it was a job that was sustainable and that no one could take away from her. And now that 
Sanghun was an intern, he had hope of also joining the cooperative and making a stable bit of 
income. This small measure of independence and security made everything worth it for Changhi 
and Sanghun. It was a small, stable base upon which they could add other more unpredictable 
sources of income. Sanghun continued to work at his teaching gigs and his public art projects 
and Changhi ran a guesthouse from their home in a southern village on the island. She also kept 
up with her online quilting business whenever she had the time. In these ways, they were able to 
support their lives on Jeju. 
 In this way, Changhi and Sanghun made a return to a distinctly local and material-based 
livelihood. Like migrants I described in Chapter 3, the materiality of Jeju life became an 
unexpected game changer in their lives – it opened up a path of exit from Seoul. In the case of 
Changhi and Sanghun, the ability to use their bodies to work in the sea, and to become members 
of a cooperative from which they could never be put out saved them from a life of precarity in 
the working world of Seoul. In their eyes, the haenyŏ was the real countercultural figure – 
bucking the system of waged labor far before it was trendy to do so. Jeju had been outside of the 
industrialization-chaebol-political complex of the Korean peninsula for the past six decades. And 
the haenyŏ had learned to provide for themselves and their families under dire conditions on an 
unfertile peripheral island. Haenyŏ exposed themselves to the risks and vagaries of the open sea, 
rather than those of the Korean corporate system. Although their lives weren’t always pretty, the 
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haenyŏ were able to hold onto their independence and their “careers” until the end of their lives. 
No one could take the sea away from them. 
 In spite of their celebratory descriptions of their romantic return to material labor, 
Changhi and Sanghun’s ambitions did not end at attaining membership into the haenyŏ 
cooperative. They set their sights higher. Changhi and Sanghun shared with me their vision about 
what they dreamed of beyond daily haenyŏ work.  While the physical work of diving provided a 
bit of security that they couldn’t find elsewhere, they also quickly began to think about potential 
immaterial production that could come from their work as haenyŏ. They were both artistically 
inclined and had been exposed to the push for “cultural contents” from the Haenyŏ Hansup'ul 
School and the broader atmosphere of culture-led development in Jeju. And so, in addition to 
their everyday physical diving work, Changhi and Sanghun began to strategize ways to turn their 
work into immaterial production. They started by beginning to catalogue and document the 
complex “know how” that they were picking up from the haenyŏ. They were carefully writing 
down their daily experiences with the haenyŏ. This included not only knowledge about diving – 
tools, techniques, and experiences – but also indigenous knowledge that these septuagenarians 
and octogenarians had gained over the years about the tides, the wind, and the water flows. There 
was also a complex sensorial mapping of the underwater ocean to be documented. Changhi and 
Sanghun felt that this knowledge should be catalogued and preserved before it was too late. In 
this way, they moved beyond the daily physical labor of haenyŏ work and fashioned themselves 
as the brains of haenyŏ operations.  
 They also took on the role of innovators. They were eager to introduce small changes into 
haenyŏ practice that they thought would make things easier. For example, they introduced 
“aquasocks” to the haenyŏ. These were sports socks made from material that would resist water 
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better and dry more quickly. The haenyŏ until then had worn cotton socks when they went 
diving. They also tried to introduce a different kind of diving weight. Rather than just 
participating in this traditional practice, they also aimed to slowly improve and broaden the 
profession. 
 Their biggest ambition, however, was to revamp what they called the “culture” of the 
haenyŏ. Sanghun had traveled to Japan and encountered the Japanese version of the haenyŏ on 
some of the southern islands of Japan. They were known as ama in Japan and had very similar 
diving practices with the Korean haenyŏ. In Japan, however, Sanghun noted, there were some 
ama who dove and others who focused on doing promotional work for the ama; this included 
diving performances, promotional talks, and taking pictures with tourists. He emphasized that 
development of a similar promotional arm for haenyŏ was important; it was crucial to popularize 
and propagate the profession among the broader public and also to create new “cultural content” 
for haenyŏ culture that could draw in public interest. He was doing little things here and there to 
begin this process in Jeju. For example, he created a cartoon character that represented his wife, 
created a nickname for her (“The Sparking Haenyŏ”), and printed business cards that she could 
pass out. He believed this would help bring respect and popularity to the haenyŏ trade. He 
wanted to rebrand haenyŏ as professionals. He eventually planned to create character sketches 
and names for all of the haenyŏ. The couple was having fun planning other things that they 
wanted to roll out to expand the haenyŏ culture – cultural performances and innovations. They 
hadn’t yet shared their ideas with the older generation of haenyŏ women, knowing that there 
would probably be some push back from them. However, they were hopeful that they would be 
on board once they understand the benefits this would bring to haenyŏ culture.  
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In this way, Changhi and Sanghun were doing exactly what the government-driven push 
for global mobilization of the haenyŏ culture could hope for. Their time spent at the Hansup’ul 
Haenyŏ School and among communities of migrants to Seoul had primed them for 
independently-driven immaterial labor. Although the diving work was something that sustained 
them in the present, their socialization as creative workers in 21st century Seoul and the 
environment of culture-led development in Jeju funneled them into immaterial production.  They 
were convinced that professionalization and cultural development of haenyŏ was the way of the 
future. They weren’t really interested in preserving and sustaining the haenyŏ trade as it was. 
They wanted to improve it and then find ways to promote it globally. They tasked themselves 
with taking a very local and material practice and trying to find ways to make it circulate at much 
higher spheres – nationally and eventually internationally.  
They also couldn’t have been unaware of the money that had been made available by the 
government in recent years leading up to the UNESCO designation of haenyŏ as Intangible 
Cultural Heritage of Humanity to do exactly the kind of promotional work that Changhi and 
Sanghun were pursuing. Banking on the immaterial production of haenyŏ “cultural contents” 
was their ticket to a better future in Jeju. This couple was responding to the culture-led 
development wave. Changhi and Sanghun had become the creative, independent, self-employed 
immaterial workers with global minds that the government wanted to groom. Although this work 
was in many ways orchestrated by the government, Changhi and Sanghun were pulled in because 
this was work that was inspiring, liberating and meaningful. The haenyŏ profession freed them 





Global Youth Travelling Culture 
 Even though there were some in Jeju like Changhi and Sanghun who became invested in 
the government’s goals of developing Jejuan cultural contents that aimed to popularize Jejuan 
and Korean culture on a global scale, there was also a competing form of globalism that was 
being created by millennial migrants.  This other form of globalism was about creating 
connections with the world beyond Korea as a way to reject and step beyond Korea, rather than 
participating in the nation-oriented developmental aims of the government.  These migrants were 
invested in reorienting themselves away from Korea and towards the broader and brighter world 
that they imagined was beyond Korea’s borders. They aimed to create a sense of global mobility 
in Jeju in the face of the stagnating limits that they felt in Korea.  
The discourse of “Hell Chosŏn” (helchosŏn) was widespread among the millennial 
generation during my fieldwork period in South Korea. This discourse was a scathing critique of 
neoliberal South Korea, where increased competition and the privatization of the educational 
sector meant that the highest levels of educational achievement and thus the best jobs were only 
open to those who had the money to send their kids to expensive afterschool programs and/or 
study abroad. The discourse likened contemporary Korea to the era of the Chosŏn dynasty, one 
of the longest dynasties in Korean history during which a small educated landowning gentry 
lorded it over the vast majority of tenant farmers. The young generation equated the current 
environment in Korea where wealth and connections reigned supreme to the era of “haves” and 
“have-nots” of the Chosŏn dynasty, adding the English word “hell” to emphasize the cruelty and 
injustice of the system.   
“Hell Chosŏn” often came up in my conversations with millennial migrants. The critique 
of Korea was very strong. Many of them complained about the hierarchical structure in society 
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and in companies that made life unbearable for those who were not in the upper tiers. Others 
contended that South Korea was still a corporate-centered nation, and the value of the individual 
was still not respected. One of my interlocutors commented that Korea was so “backwards” there 
was not even any respect for pedestrians in the streets in Seoul. He mused that the only hope for 
Korea was the technological development of driverless cars which, programmed to stop for 
pedestrians, would finally bring about a “human-centered” climate in Korea. In the criticism of 
the Korea that the Hell Chosŏn discourse fed, there was a widespread fatalism about the state of 
Korean society. Instead of trying to fix Korean society, young people flamed fantasies of leaving 
Korea altogether, moving to less “backwards” more human-centered countries.  
In Jeju, migrants were able to create a globalism that oriented them away from the “Hell 
Chosŏn” that many of them criticized and towards a better world beyond. Although Jeju was 
within the borders of South Korea, by enacting a global mobility in Jeju that had its origins in 
global youth travelling culture, they were able to imaginatively align themselves with the 
brighter world beyond Korea. Miyŏn’s guesthouse was a prime example of the global mobility 
that was being created in some of these millennial spaces in Jeju. In Chapter 2 I talked about how 
Miyŏn built alternative modes of sociality and selfhood through discovering, renovating and 
redesigning her home in Jeju. I describe how her guesthouse was part of an inchoate 
infrastructure of a new social field in which young people could drop social obligations and jobs 
in the city to seek personal rest and rehabilitation. Here I return to Miyŏn’s guesthouse to draw 
out another facet of her life in Jeju: the global aspect of her creative fashioning in Jeju.  
As I explained a bit in Chapter 2, travel had always been a big part of Miyŏn’s life. Hers 
was the first generation to come of age during a time of relatively laxity in international travel. 
Previous generations had been hard pressed to leave the country for personal travel. Miyŏn had 
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started her travel abroad shortly after she had graduated from college, in the late 90s. She spent 
three years getting design credentials at a local art school in Italy. When she came back to Seoul 
she was hired at an interior design firm, but quit after a few years. She continued to travel, taking 
trips in between the short-term service sector jobs that she took to earn money. She travelled to 
Europe and to the US during this time. She continued her hobby of travel internationally after 
moving to Jeju as well – going to India for a month-long sojourn during her second winter in 
Jeju. During these travels Miyŏn encountered the figure of the freewheeling young adult global 
traveler among those she met in hostels and tourist sites around the world. This was the global 
young person who had been able to escape for a time from the pressures of work and building a 
future, to experience the world as much as possible now. Miyŏn was inspired by the rugged 
individualism of these young people who were bucking the system to gain global experiences. 
When Miyŏn established her guesthouse, she was in part recreating this youth-driven 
global traveling culture for her guests. On her travels, Miyŏn had collected knickknacks that 
piqued her curiosity – miniatures from Europe, mini shrines from India, sand from the Thar 
Desert, glass jars that had held yogurt that was sold on the streets of Thailand. These objects now 
decorated her guesthouse.  In mornings or evenings spent with guests, Miyŏn sometimes regaled 
her guests with stories that these objects brought back for her. She told me a riveting story about 
meeting one of the richest people she ever knew and the poorest family she ever knew a week 
apart during her trip to India. She also described for me and other guests her most recent plan to 
take a three-month trip to see minority populations in western China. She was diligently studying 




In orienting herself to a youthful global travelling culture, Miyŏn was able to replace 
middle class modes of value-making. Miyŏn’s guests didn’t care whether Miyŏn was making an 
acceptable income or whether she was married or had children. Rather the draw for them was the 
global saavy that Miyŏn presented and the global atmosphere that they encountered at her 
guesthouse (in addition to the rest and rehabilitation they were able to experience). When they 
were at Miyŏn’s guesthouse, they found that they were in a global space that could transcend 
Korea. Spaces like these prompted guests to recall their own overseas travel and to engage in 
Hell Chosŏn discourse, namely drawing up the world beyond “backwards” Korea and 
enumerating all the ways in which Korean life fell short of global standards. In guesthouses like 
Miyŏn’s, I often heard young people talk about the appeal of Northern European countries like 
Sweden and Norway, lauding government programming that provided comfortable benefits for 
their citizens, a drastic contrast to the “inhumane” corporate-centered policies of the South 
Korean government. Or migrants would talk about wanting to travel to experience the laid-back 
vibe of countries like Spain and Italy, where they could encounter true and deep rest after the 
frenetic competition of Seoul life. These comparisons led to criticism of Korea’s neoliberal 
government, its lack of care for its young people, and the cut-throat competition in Korea that 
threatened to undo society.  
Miyŏn’s guesthouse created a sense of global mobility against the stifling limitations of 
Korean life both for Miyŏn and her guests. Miyŏn described herself as having “failed” to reach 
the benchmarks of middle-class life – a good career, and good family, the comforts of a stable 
existence. She was in a very real sense downwardly mobile; she faced an uncertain future. 
However, through the global mobility that she enacted through her travel and that she created for 
her guests in the atmosphere of her guesthouse, Miyŏn was creating an orientation towards a 
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wider and, as she saw it, better world. The global travelling culture that she tapped into allowed 
her to turn away from Korea and orient herself to the world.  Miyŏn’s life in Jeju became 
increasingly oriented to travel. Her ultimate plan was to run her guesthouse nine months of the 
year and to make enough to spend three months of every year travelling to far-flung places all 
around the world. When I met her, her income from her guesthouse business was steady enough 
to allow her to start to live out this plan. Miyŏn was enacting an exodus from Korea by 
recreating the atmosphere of the global travelling youth culture in her guesthouse and also by 
literally exiting the country as much as she could.  
There were many others I met in Jeju who were making Jeju into this kind of non-Korean 
global outpost. Sŏnyŏng and her husband Minho, for example, had also travelled around the 
globe as young people. In particular, Sŏnyŏng had travelled to India, where she encountered 
shocking poverty; she was so affected after this trip that she decided that she couldn’t return to 
the normal professional path that her friends were pursuing in spite of the fact that she was at the 
time attending a top university in Seoul. She pursued organic farming instead. Eventually 
Sŏnyŏng and Minho moved to Jeju with their children because they wanted to live outside the 
world of professional achievement and class striving. They wanted to get away also from the 
tight social networks and the cycle of reciprocity in the form of endless weddings, birthday 
parties and other social gatherings that they felt drained them of economic resources and left 
them bereft of real social connections. In Jeju they pursued organic farming and eventually 
aimed to move to a third-world country to offer their knowledge of organic farming to societies 
in need. They found a circle of friends in Jeju who shared their focus on a meaningful and 
globally-oriented life. They kept the spirit of global youth travelling culture alive among 
themselves as they recalled and shared stories about their global adventures, together critiqued 
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neoliberal Korea, and dreamed up plans for leaving Korea. One among their circle of friends had 
travelled around the world on his bicycle and flamed the global imagination of Sŏnyŏng, Minho 
and their kids with his constant stories of global adventure. Sŏnyŏng and Minho hoped that their 
children would grow up to be globally-oriented, perhaps living abroad for a time, rather than 
remaining limited and boxed in by mainstream South Korean middle classness.  
 Migrants also had a way of abstracting the Jeju countryside so that it could be aligned 
with a larger idyllic globalness that they wanted to be part of. Partly this was due to the tourism 
industry’s emphasis of Jeju’s “exotic” features. Jeju’s exceptional qualities, those that couldn’t 
be found anywhere else in Korea, were marketed in the tourism industry – the volcanic 
landscape, basalt stone walls, winds, traditional haenyŏ divers. But migrants took this a step 
further, often aligning Jeju with the rural landscapes of other, mostly western nations. As I was 
walking with a couple of migrants through a small Jeju village one day, one of them commented 
that the charming small houses and fields reminded him of rural France. Another interlocuter 
told me that she felt that when she sat in her garden behind her house, she felt like she had 
entered the setting of one of Tasha Tudor’s books. Tasha Tudor was a famous children’s book 
illustrator who worked in the latter part of the 20th century but romanticized the idyllic simple 
life of the 19th century New England in her books. While I was swimming in the ocean with 
another millennial, she suddenly told me that this ocean was so beautiful that she felt like she 
could be in Australia, and not Korea.  Millennial migrants likened Jeju to idyllic landscapes far 
away in order to bring about the global mobility that I have described. If Jeju could become more 
non-Korean and global, they could distance themselves further from the Korea that they so 
wanted an escape from.  
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Through the alternative globally-oriented spaces and communities that they formed, 
millennial migrants in Jeju were able to fashion themselves in some sense beyond Korea and 
orient themselves outward toward the world. This was one more way in which they enacted their 
exodus from Seoul. By creating global spaces that did fall not into line with the government’s 
plan for globalization but that rather aligned them with a larger global youth alternative 
travelling culture, they were writing their independence from the state-led development push as 
well as the corporate-centric neoliberal work regime. Brent Luvaas (2009) has written about 
indie bands in Indonesia who have elected intentionally to distance themselves from ethnic, 
regional and national influences in their musical compositions and performances. They sing their 
songs in English and strip their music of any trace of local flavor that would locate them in 
Indonesia. In doing so, they align themselves with a positive global youth culture that they 
admire and distance themselves from nationalist projects that they distrust, and a national 
identity they wish to eschew. The migrants that I describe here were doing something similar. 
Aligning themselves with a global youth travelling culture allowed them to distance themselves 
from the juggernaut of neoliberal global production that the Korean and regional governments 
tried hard to push them into. This alternative globalism offered a measure of freedom.  
Many of these globally-minded millennial migrants aspired to sustain a life where they 
could be secure and free enough to work for most of the year and also have a couple of months to 
simply travel to see the world. The lower cost of living in Jeju and the freedom from corporate 
jobs fed these dreams of global mobility. Some of them, like Sŏnyŏng and Minho and several 
others that I met, saw their lives in Jeju as a stepping stone to eventual immigration beyond 
Korea’s borders.  
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Although they were creating a kind of subversive counterculture, millennial migrants like 
Miyŏn, Sŏnyŏng and Minho couldn’t exit neoliberal globalization in Korea wholecloth. Through 
their work in Jeju, they were still operating within the logics of capitalism, although they didn’t 
succumb to the global push for cultural contents or work for big corporations. Many scholars of 
counterculture have argued that counterculture is always entwined with capitalism (Campbell 
1987; Frank 1997; Heath and Potter 2005). Some have gone so far as to contend that the 
creativity and the new forms of production that counterculture inspires fuels is at the very heart 
of neoliberal capitalism (Boellstorff 2008; McRobbie 2004; Comaroff and Comaroff 2001; 
Luvaas 2012). Luvaas (2012) argues that while counterculture cannot ever be separated from 
capitalism, it can be an “alternative form of capitalism,” which gestures to values beyond 
neoliberal globalization and has some potential to transform it. I argue that while millennial 
migrants were not escaping neoliberal globalization, in re-producing a global youth travelling 
culture in Jeju, they were creating a competing form of globalism from the government-
sanctioned version that offered an alternative connection to the world and new ways of orienting 
themselves away from the Korea that they were critical of. This alternative globalism also gave 
millennial migrants the opportunity to reclaim control of their immaterial labor, which had for 
too long been used in the service of higher, abstract bodies like the nation, the company, and 
society. Like other young people around the world, an alternative global orientation helped them 
to dodge the designs that the nation-state placed on them. 
  
Conclusion 
 Both the Jeju government and millennial migrants mobilized forms of globalization in 
their respective projects of place-making. Sometimes these globalisms overlapped as the Jeju 
215 
 
government successfully recruited young people into its push for the production of globally-
oriented Jejuan cultural contents. Other times they diverged, as millennial migrants resisted 
interpolation into government designs and instead created their own globally-inspired alternative 
immaterial production that helped to identify them as outside of the juggernaut of state-led 
development and large-scale corporate production.  
 On the one hand, it was hard for millennial migrants to avoid being swept into the state-
driven project of global development of Jejuan “cultural contents.” The fallout from economic 
crisis in Korea and the Jeju migration boom meant that there was a large supply of unemployed 
or underemployed young creative workers in Jeju who found that working on small contract jobs 
for the Jeju government was an improvement from soulless contract work with the creative 
industry in Seoul. Because culture and arts contracts from the government generally involved 
Jeju-centric projects, migrants, who had professed a love for Jeju, were happy to be engaged in 
what they found to be meaningful cultural work.  Some of them, like Changhi and Sanghun, used 
their entrepreneurial finesse, forged in neoliberal Seoul, to reach for as big a piece of pie of the 
global export of Jejuan cultural contents that they could. This group of workers was being 
groomed into the self-employed independent immaterial laborers that the Jeju government 
wanted.  
 On the other hand, the government couldn’t completely coopt the immaterial labor of 
millennial migrants. Another subset of millennial migrants in Jeju were able to tap into a 
different kind of globalism – a global youth travelling culture – through which they could create 
intentionally non-Korean global spaces that allowed them to reject the designs of the Jeju 
government on their immaterial labor. The globalism that they created in their spaces and 
communities indexed an alternative global youth culture as a way to move beyond Korea, orient 
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themselves to a higher global scale, and maintain their deep-seated critique of the state-led 
development, corporation-centric neoliberal work regime, and Korean mainstream middle 
classness. Tapping into the global mobility of youth traveling culture allowed them to reclaim a 
sense of meaning in their lives in the face of their downward mobility and exit from urban life.  It 
also allowed them to maintain their independence from the state and big business and control 
their creative labor.  
This was one more way in which millennial migrants enacted their exodus from Seoul. 
By creating an alternative globalism from the one that the government presented, they created a 
meaningful path of exit from neoliberal Seoul. Although they couldn’t escape neoliberal 
capitalism in Jeju, they were able to create alternative forms of production that created a 
competing connection to the world other than the one that the government promoted and helped 
them regain control of their immaterial production. These alternative forms of production helped 
them to maintain a critique of mainstream Korea and to choose something different. It helped 














I actually had to make a lot of sacrifices [to come down here]. I had work [in Seoul] and I had 
the basic foundations of life there. And I had lots of relationships. And then in an instant to just 
give it all up and to move down to Jeju. It was a big deal. This [migration] is not just a trend. 
No, in fact people’s thoughts are completely changing! Their deepest core values are being 
changed!  
 
 This is a quote from, Inhae, one my interlocutors in Jeju who I first met in 2013.  Here 
she described for me her thoughts on the migration of young people to Jeju Island. She insisted 
that this migration was not a passing trend or a temporary phase in the life course of young 
adults. She was adamant that migration to Jeju meant a shift in young people’s “core values,” a 
sea change in the thinking and choices of the millennial generation.  
 Drawing from the lives and stories of interlocutors like Inhae, I have argued in this 
dissertation that the migration of millennials from urban areas on the mainland, largely Seoul, to 
Jeju Island, is a politically engaged exodus. The cohort of young people moving to Jeju, part of 
what scholars have called “Generation IMF,” were members of an emergent downwardly mobile 
middle class and were bound by a shared affect of woundedness and a structural critique of the 
neoliberal Korean system. And yet, without a space of their own, they did not have what 
Lefebvre has called a “social existence” (1991) apart from neoliberal Korea. Lacking spatial 
alternatives, they felt trapped in a middle class stream in Seoul that they couldn’t keep pace with. 
An encounter with Jeju Island, however, mediated by the popular Jeju Olle Trail, opened their 
eyes to the availability of space on Jeju. Houses were affordable. The natural landscape that they 
found in the intimate corners of the Jeju countryside opened up before them in a pronounced 
contrast to crowded, polluted, competitive Seoul. The dispossessed edge of the Korean nation-
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state, with a history of leftist uprising, brutal state suppression, and state-led tourist development, 
became for millennials migrants what one of my interlocutors called “space for life.”  
 On Jeju migrants made a space of their own. I have argued that the migration to Jeju 
became an engaged exodus through the millennials’ creation of alternatives located in place on 
Jeju. In Chapters 2, 3 and 4, I detailed these new social formations located in place. I made the 
case that through building material, local, everyday alternatives in Jeju, millennial migrants were 
able to remake the building blocks of life that contrasted with what they had left behind in Seoul: 
sociality not based on upward mobility and competition, labor not linked to chaebols and the 
government, creative production that they could wrest control of, subjectivities that centered on 
the self rather than collective sacrifice. I highlighted in these chapters a change in affect as the 
migration to Jeju unfolded and developed. Early migrants relocated to Jeju out of a desire to hide 
away and lick wounds afflicted by neoliberal Seoul. However, as the migration became 
structured through the development of an infrastructure grounded in place in Jeju, a community 
of like-minded people, and an increasingly entextualized narrative of transformation and 
freedom, the migration turned into a celebratory escape and a chance to consciously reject the 
values of neoliberal Seoul. It became an engaged exodus. 
 In spite of the emancipatory spirit of these spatial remakings, however, this exodus was 
tempered by existing and overlapping designs on the space of Jeju Island. Although I have 
celebrated the alternative pathways that millennial migrants built, I have also drawn out the 
frictions, cracks, and pitfalls in their place-making projects in this dissertation.  In Chapter 3, I 
highlighted the tension between place-making projects enacted in the spaces of Jeju’s rural 
villages. The ‘taskscape’ (Ingold 1993) of the longtime Jeju residents – along with the social 
bonds that it had created – was illegible to millennial migrants who were moving into Jeju’s rural 
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villages. Instead of integrating themselves into the existing taskscape, millennial migrants 
overlay a ‘leisurescape’ (Tilley and Cameron-Daum 2017) in the same village spaces. Next to 
the tangerine, carrot, and broccoli fields and fishing grounds they opened guesthouse, cafes, 
galleries, bookstores, bakeries, trinket stories, and trendy restaurants. They organized tour groups 
that brought visitors into the unexplored corners of the island. They brought new energy and new 
businesses to villages – but also inflated real estate prices, increased traffic and trash volume, 
and at times unwanted night life. 
Furthermore, even while millennial migrants were running away from neoliberal Seoul, 
they encountered new neoliberal forms on the island. As I have outlined in Chapter 5, the Jeju 
regional government, seeking further integration into the global economy, was interested in the 
immaterial production that millennial migrants brought to the island. The government 
endeavored to recruit this new creative talent into the goals of global transformation, attempting 
to transform millennial migrants back into the exploited contract laborers that they had been back 
in Seoul. While there were some who fell prey to these measures, I argue that there were others 
who tapped into an alternative global youth culture as a way to creative an alternative globalism. 
In this way, they were able to gesture to a world beyond Korea and maintain their deep-seated 
critique of state-led development, corporation-centric neoliberal work regime and Korean 
mainstream middle classness. 
*** 
 Jeju was aptly described by my interlocutors as the “edge” of South Korea. One of my 
interlocutors, Chihun, whose story I recount in Chapter 3, explained that he moved to Jeju 
because he wanted to be as close to the “edge” of South Korea as he could. Chihun complained 
to me about the consumerism and competition of life in Seoul. The term “neoliberalism” had 
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made it into Chihun’s vernacular. He told me that he wanted to get away from the increasing 
neoliberalization of society and move as far away as he could – to the “edge” of the South 
Korean system -- where he could have what he called “space for life.” He saw a life rooted in 
Jeju as a balm to the struggles and wounds of neoliberal life. He loved the closeness to the land 
and sea that Jeju provided. And because the cost of living was lower in Jeju, he could afford to 
do work that the wanted to do, work that inspired him, work that was related to Jeju. And he 
could still have time for rest.  
 In Jeju, Chihun created a cooperative that was designed to bring migrants who had 
relocated from the mainland together in a spirit of cooperation rather than competition. Members 
of the cooperative shared their mutual love of Jeju, spending time reading books about Jeju and 
visiting natural and cultural sites where they could learn more. Eventually, they also developed 
businesses together, which often took the shape of delivering the intimate and transformative 
experience of Jeju to others. These businesses structured and narrativized Jeju for a growing 
body of interested travelers and would-be migrants and in doing so propagated the alternative life 
that was growing on Jeju. On the other hand, however, these young people were taking 
advantage of the underdevelopment of the Jeju countryside and establishing a new industry of 
small-scale intimate tourism, for which there was a growing market. Thus, Jeju was the “edge” 
of Korea in another key way for migrants here. As I outlined in Chapter 1, Jeju had been made 
into the dispossessed edge of South Korea through a history of military suppression, political 
disenfranchisement, disinvestment, and state-controlled development. In setting up new 
businesses at the dispossessed edge of Korea, millennial migrants were benefitting from 
development in low-cost areas. Thus, the infrastructure that they built in rural Jeju was both a 
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haven from the hubbub and pressures of Seoul but also profit-seeking businesses that often had 
negative impacts on local residents.  
 When I first visited Jeju in 2013, I met a farmer, Mr. Lee, in Taep’yŏng, a coastal village 
in Jeju that was experiencing a rapid influx of millennials. Like Chihun, Mr. Lee, also used the 
word “edge” to describe Jeju. Mr. Lee rented multiple plots of land in Taep’yŏng that he farmed 
in order to stitch together a living. With the influx of millennials to the town, some land owners 
in Taep’yŏng were happily selling former farming plots at a handsome profit to millennials who 
were starting up small-scale leisure businesses. This led to an uptick in land prices as more 
millennial urbanites moved in. In spite of the slow pace of business in these rural towns, Mr. Lee 
surmised that these millennials could make far more money than he could off the same piece of 
land. Eventually, he predicted, all the farmland in the town would be transformed into leisure 
spaces, and he would be unable to continue his livelihood. During my conversation with Mr. 
Lee, he asked me, “Why would these young people from Seoul, the urban center of Korea come 
to Jeju, an island as far as one can get from Seoul and then to Taep'yŏng, the most rural edge of 
this rural island? Why are they building a city here?” For Mr. Lee, Jeju as the “edge” had meant 
distance from the encroaching urbanization and commercialization that had spread nearly to 
every corner in Korea; it had meant land prices were low enough to allow him to do the only 
work he knew how to do. Mr. Lee didn’t have the skills to start a business or come up with a way 
to market some new aspect of Jeju. And while he didn’t make a lot money, the low cost of living 
in Jeju along with tight kinships networks had made his life sustainable. With the influx of 
millennial migrants, his future, and the future of his family, suddenly became uncertain. 
 While Chihun and others were setting up an alternative to neoliberal life in Seoul, then, 
they were also developing a new industry in Jeju’s rural villages that tied the place to capitalist 
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production in new ways and unseated sustained modes of production that were already in place. 
For both Chihun and Mr. Lee, Jeju was the “edge” of Korea – a place away from the maelstrom 
of competition and cooperation. Unfortunately, though, in marketing their version of the edge – a 
leisurescape that provided an alternative to the neoliberal center of Korea – Chihun and other 
migrants were, in part, undoing the existing edge of primary sector industry that had constituted 
Jeju’s villages.    
When Chihun explained to me that he came to Jeju so that he could be as close as 
possible to the edge of Korea, he described a song that women sea divers in Jeju sang as they 
rowed their boats out to the sea to dive. It was a song about a paradise island called Iŏdo, a 
utopia that was just beyond the horizon. They couldn’t reach it, but they rowed towards it and 
brought it to life in their songs. Chihun, too, wanted to get as close as he could to the storied 
paradise just beyond Korea. And yet he could never reach paradise, just as he couldn’t escape 
from neoliberal Korea. Although on its edge, Chihun and other millennial migrants remained 
firmly within neoliberal Korea. As I have outlined in this dissertation, even in Jeju it was hard to 
resist the pull of neoliberal Korea. However, while they couldn’t separate themselves from 
neoliberal capitalism, they could at times, in pursuing a livelihood and community that was 
based on alternative values, create alternative forms of capitalism, forms of production and 
consumption that while not outside of capitalism could gesture to values beyond it. In Chapter 5 
in particular, I argue that some millennial migrants in Jeju tapped into an alternative global youth 
culture as a way to move beyond Korea, orient themselves to a higher global scale, and maintain 
their deep-seated critique of the state-led development, corporation-centric neoliberal work 
regime, and Korean middle classness.  Even while they couldn’t escape neoliberal globalization, 
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they could create alternative capitalist forms that kept them insistently at Korea’s edge, looking 
outward, gesturing to something better beyond.  
*** 
Woven throughout this dissertation is an argument about immaterial labor. For the most 
part, my interlocutors were journalists, editors, screenwriters, after school teachers, designers, 
writers, artists, cultural workers, adjunct professors and other workers in the arts and cultural 
industries in Korea, part of a growing group of workers in post-Fordist contexts that some have 
called “immaterial labor.” (Lazzarato 1996; Hardt and Negri 2004). This kind of labor made 
them more vulnerable in Korea’s neoliberal climate as jobs in the arts and cultural industries are 
more vulnerable to casualization and flexibilization. It was no coincidence that young people in 
these fields were also experiencing downward mobility from the middle class.  
Autonomist theorists have emphasized the double movement of immaterial labor. On the 
one hand, as a form of labor that is given to the short-term contracts, breaks down boundaries 
between work and leisure and requires the passion and personality of the worker to be invested in 
the product, it has opened the modern worker to new forms of exploitation (Lazzarato 1996; 
Negri 1989). On the other hand, however, some argue that because immaterial labor exploits 
cooperation and communication between workers more than ever before, it fosters relationships 
and commonalities that can give rise to new socialities that have the potential to push against 
capitalist structures (Hardt and Negri 2004). In Jeju, I found that there were many millennial 
migrants who had successfully recaptured and redirected their immaterial labor, drawing it away 
from the service of big business and large-scale governmental plans, and applying it to the 
practical rebuilding of alternative lives in Jeju. In Chapter 2, I described Miyŏn, a former interior 
designer who quit both her job as a professional designer in Seoul and her unofficial role as a 
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manager and designer for her parents’ business to move to Jeju. In Jeju she started from scratch; 
she renovated and resignified the house that she “discovered” in Jeju in a chance encounter. In 
this house, she applied her creative talents to designing a home of her dreams – one that radically 
departs from the middle-class standards presented to her in Seoul. In Chapter 3, I introduced 
Sujin, who was an editor for a big newspaper company in Seoul before being turned off to the 
job because of corruption and a desire to see the wider world. When she moved to Jeju, Sujin 
rejected opportunities for full-time employment, choosing meaningful freelance work instead 
and a life of “voluntary poverty.” Later, though, when the opportunity came along, she got 
involved in a “social business” that set out to collect, document, and catalogue biographies of 
ordinary Jejuans in order to preserve important parts of Jejuan history. She was finally able to 
use her immaterial labor – in this case her writing and editing skills - toward something that she 
believed added value to society. In Chapter 4, I introduced Soyŏng and Yunmi, formerly contract 
screenwriters for large broadcasting companies in Seoul, who ended up gaining control of their 
immaterial labor and rewriting their own stories – and by extension the stories of their migration 
cohort – when they moved to Jeju.    
Throughout my analysis, I highlighted a crucial aspect of this restructuring of immaterial 
labor. Ironically, I found that it was the material encounters with the built environment and 
landscape on Jeju that inspired this transformed immaterial production. Migrants were inspired 
by what they saw as the rawness, purity, and potentialities of the spaces they came upon in Jeju 
(however flawed these perspectives might ultimately have been) to employ their immaterial labor 
for projects of alternative living and radical departure from the Korean middle class. For many, it 
was the visceral feeling of spaciousness, the overwhelming embodied experience of natural 
beauty, and a reigniting of feelings of passion, love, and possibility in Jeju that inspired their 
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relocation to Jeju. After they relocated to Jeju, they drew from these connections to the built 
environment and landscape of Jeju to inspire their immaterial production. Miyŏn’s experience of 
falling in love with the traditional stone home on Jeju that she encountered, for example, pushed 
her to relocate – rashly and without a plan. Later, Miyŏn’s journey towards healing in her stone 
home in Jeju and through her meditative walks on Jeju’s coast fueled the affective labor she 
engaged in for her guests – listening to their tales of hardship and struggle and encouraging them 
to stake out their own path of healing in Jeju.  For millennial migrants, Jeju as a very material 
space far away from and in such stark contrast to the space of Seoul, was central to the 
recapturing and repurposing of their immaterial labor.  
 And yet, this restructured, Jeju-centric, alternative immaterial production is not innocent 
in its practice, nor impervious to the encroachment of dominant forms of power. As I describe in 
Chapter 3, the leisurescape that millennial migrants created in villages in Jeju often occupied the 
same space as the longstanding taskscape – spaces of work and aspirations to a developmentalist 
economy – of longtime Jeju villagers. And as migrants increasingly structured this leisurescape 
for tourists and would-be migrants from the outside, it became a depository of dreams for 
newcomers and outsiders. Meanwhile real estate prices went up even in rural areas and the 
taskscape of longtime Jejuans was threatened. Furthermore, as I have described above, the Jeju 
government, with its own dreams of global development, was sometimes successful in coopting 
the immaterial labor of these migrants. There was something very emancipatory about millennial 
migrants’ harnessing of their own immaterial labor. And yet, living as they did at the edge of 
neoliberal Korea, there was the constant threat of this labor being drawn back into the streams 




 The lines between heroic escape and neoliberal production are blurred in the story that I 
have told in these pages. Urban South Korean millennials fell in love with the spaces they 
encountered in Jeju, inspired by the possibility of leaving the oppressive stream of middle-class 
pressures and the precarious existence they were enduring in Seoul. In Jeju, they engaged in a 
labor of love. They inhabited and renovated homes – while also restructuring subjectivity, 
sociality and social reproduction. And taking inspiration from newfound connections with the 
Jeju landscape, they wrested themselves free from the pressures of neoliberal Seoul, crafted new 
modes of labor, rewrote the tempo of their lives, and created figures of personhood that 
circulated and inspired others. And yet the object of their affection wasn’t entirely what they 
imagined it to be. Jeju was not a just a beautiful landscape with affordable housing. The space of 
Jeju was in fact full of existing meanings, projects, and competing dreams. At times they 
mobilized their love of Jeju to marketize the spaces they inhabited. And other times, their 
passions were courted by existing neoliberal projects that millennials had thought they had left 
behind. 
Tempered as it was by spatial realties that they encountered in Jeju, millennial migrants 
to Jeju still produced a meaningful alternative social existence in Jeju that transformed them 
from downwardly mobile middle class subjects to individuals who could meaningfully reject the 
standards that Korean middle classness had laid out for them. As Inhae emphatically proclaimed 
to me, their migration was not just a trend, but signaled a substantive shift in values. Many who 
moved to Jeju took the dramatic steps of walking out on the professional world, on the social 
networks that had buoyed their lives, and even on natal and extended families. While they 
couldn’t cast off neoliberal logics completely in Jeju, they could create alternatives within the 
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constraints that they found themselves up against. The alternative capitalism that they crafted 
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